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COMPANIES 
ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
In the current international economic set-up where countries progress towards 
globalization, private foreign capital is indispensable and caters to the large 
requirement of capital for development. 
Capital Account Convertibility facilitates free inflow of capital as investors 
have the freedom to take money out whenever they want it without 
government restrictions and control. 
India embarked upon liberalization of the current account and the capital 
account after experiencing a major Balance of Payment crisis in 1990-91. A 
host of factors including domestic political crises and increase in oil prices 
contributed to the decline in the rupee value. India's credit rating was 
downgraded twice (with the second downgrade placing the country in the 
"speculative grade") and with instalment payments against some foreign loans 
coming due, the economy nearly collapsed. 
Meanwhile, in 1991, a new government was sworn in and the rupee was 
devalued (in two quick steps) by a total of 22 percent. Simultaneously, 
dramatic changes were made in trade policy; the negative list for imports was 
significantly shortened and a new instrument (the Exim scrip) created to 
provide exporters with additional returns. Thus began the process of 
economic liberalization. This was clearly the first step towards the supposed 
market-determination of the rupee exchange rate. 
In the Union budget for 1992-93, the rupee was made "partly convertible", or 
more correctly, partly floating, thus ushering in the Liberalised Exchange Rate 
^iSSt' 
Management System (LERMS). Under the new scheme, 40 percent of the 
export receipts (denominated in dollars) was to be surrendered to the RBI at a 
predefined (official) rate; the proceeds would be used for import of "essential" 
items (such as petroleum, fertilizers and edible oils). The balance 60 percent 
could be sold in the "free market" to. importers. 
Beginning December 1992, ostensibly in acknowledgement of the dollar's 
sharp gains overseas (which had rendered exports in non-dollar currencies 
much less profitable), the RBI signalled a change in policy by lowering 
(devaluing) its official rate. The market knee-jerked to the sudden move and 
the rupee slipped immediately. A political crisis at home only aggravated the 
situation and there was a steady decline in dollar inflows; by February 1993, 
the rupee was falling fast. Finally, in the Union budget for 1993-94, "full float" 
of the rupee was allowed. 
In 1993-94, India shifted towards a "market determined exchange rate", 
where the exchange rate was determined on the basis of the market and not 
administratively determined. The economic reforms initiated by the 
Government of India led to a surge in capital inflows into the country from 
1993. At this time, RBI chose to intervene to prevent a rupee appreciation 
and maintained a fixed parity currency regime at Rs.31.37 per US dollar for 
nearly two and half years. This led to reserve accumulation and growth in 
money supply. RBI chose to engage in monetary tightening to bring down the 
money multiplier to contain growth in money supply. 
In his Budget speech for 1997 - 98, the Union Finance Minister, Shri P. 
Chidambaram, indicated that the regulations governing foreign exchange 
transactions needed to be modernized and he felt the time had come for 
preparatory work towards capital account convertibility. This led to the setting 
up of the Tarapore Committee to recommend measures that should be taken 
to achieve full capital account convertibility and to specify the sequence and 
time frame in which such measures were to be taken. The Committee in its 
recommendations gave a set of pre-conditions to be fulfilled in a phased 
manner from 1997 - 98. 
With liberalization, a need was felt to remove the drastic measures of the 
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act (FERA) of 1973 and replace them by a set 
of liberal foreign exchange management regulations. Therefore from 1^' June 
2000, the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) was enacted. 
FEMA simplified the regulatory regime for foreign-exchange transactions and 
liberalized capital-account transactions. It also appointed the RBI as the sole 
monitor of all capital-account transactions. The Act put all foreign-exchange 
offences under the purview of civil law (these were criminal offences under 
FERA), thus subjecting them only to monetary penalties. FEMA dictates, 
among other things, the conditions for Indians holding foreign currency and 
immovable property outside India (or vice versa) and rules for exporters. 
India has completed the first step towards full float of the Rupee by allowing 
foreign direct investment and institutional investors to bring in and take out 
money from the country. The second stage of allowing companies and 
individuals to borrow and invest in foreign exchange has been initiated but not 
completed in full. 
For more than five decades, the Rupee had been steadily depreciating from 
the level of Rs. 2.40 per dollar prior to 1947 to Rs. 49.07 in June 2002. From 
July 2002 onwards the rupee appreciated to Rs.43.40 per US dollar as of 
March 2004. From April 2004, the Rupee has again started depreciating 
against the US dollar and reached a level of Rs. 46.16 end of September 
2004. On 7* December 2004 it reached a level of Rs.43.70. The recent trend 
shows a lot of volatility in the exchange rates of the Rupee against the US 
Dollar. 
Importance of the Study 
Based on the information given above, it is obvious that Capital Account 
Convertibility has received the attention of policy makers in India ever since 
we embarked on liberalization. Various studies have aimed at examining the 
importance of capital account convertibility and its associated macroeconomic 
factors in terms of its Influence on exchange rates. In the first part of this 
study, the major macroeconomic factors affecting the Rupee - US dollar 
exchange rates are identified. In the second part of the study, forecasting of 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar based on statistical models, 
which will treat exchange rate as a function of a number of important 
macroeconomic factors is attempted. In the third part of the study, a survey is 
conducted on the foreign exchange risk management practices of Indian 
companies and the exchange rate forecasting models are used to help 
companies manage their foreign exchange exposure. 
Arrangement of Chapters 
CHAPTER-1: Introduction 
This chapter deals with what is capital account convertibility and convertibility 
concepts on current account and capital account. Then, the benefits of capital 
account convertibility are discussed. This chapter also covers pitfplls of capital 
account convertibility based on international experience. Pre-conditions for 
capital account convertibility are also discussed. 
CHAPTER - 2: The evolution of India's exchange rate from the pre-Bretton 
Woods period up to the current position is highlighted in this chapter. 
This chapter discusses the pre-Bretton Woods exchange rates system in 
India, why the Bretton Woods system broke down, the early years of floating 
rates, the movement towards a basket-linked exchange rate system, the 
macroeconomic crisis of 1990-91 and the steps taken towards current 
account convertibility and capital account convertibility. Foreign exchange 
regulation aspects and the changes from FERA to FEMA are also discussed. 
CHAPTER - 3: This chapter concentrates on literature survey and research 
methodology. After studying the existing literature on capital account 
convertibility, exchange rate management and currency risk management for 
companies, the gap in the research literature has been identified. Based on 
this, the objectives and hypothesis of the study have been laid down. The 
primary as well as the secondary data have been collected and the sources of 
data, their definition and the methodology of analysis of collected data have 
been explained in tiiis chapter. The limitations of the study are also 
highlighted in this chapter. 
CHAPTER - 4: The recommendations of the Tarapore Committee on Capital 
Account Convertibility, the pre-conditions stipulated by the Committee and the 
various signposts laid down in the report are discussed in this chapter. The 
timing and sequencing of various measures and their current status as of 
September 2004 are also discussed. Based on the above discussion, the 
various factors affecting exchange rates are identified. 
CHAPTER - 5: In this chapter, the daily exchange rates for the Rupee and 
the US Dollar for the period January 1973 to November 2004 are studied. The 
exchange rates have followed a linear depreciating path from January 1973 to 
June 2002. From July 2002 to November 2004, the exchange rates have 
turned volatile. Using simulation, the volatility in the exchange rates is 
demonstrated and the risk of leaving open the foreign currency exposure of 
companies is highlighted. This leads to the need for forecasting exchange 
rates for the Indian companies and taking appropriate risk cover through 
hedging tools like fonA/ards, options and swaps available now in India. 
Further, this chapter concentrates on examining the relationship between 
selected macroeconomic factors and exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar. These variables have been identified based on the literature review 
done by us and also based on the recommendations of the Tarapore 
Committee on Capital Account Convertibility. 
An exchange rate forecasting model is built based on the exchange rate 
(dependent variable) and nine other macroeconomic variables (independent 
variables) for the years 1991 to 2004. 
Univariate analysis and multivariate analysis are used to find out the 
correlation between the variables and the extent of dependency of the 
exchange rate on the nine independent variables. 
Time series regression analysis, exponential smoothing method and moving 
average method are also used for forecasting the exchange rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar using the data from January 1973 to November 2004. 
CHAPTER - 6. This chapter deals with exchange rate risk management by 
Indian companies, based on primary data collected from the executives who 
are dealing with foreign exchange in their companies, through a 
questionnaire. The opinions of regulators and bankers have also been 
considered, based on personal interviews. A couple of case studies have also 
been used for this purpose. The questionnaire data has been analyzed and 
conclusions drawn. 
CHAPTER 7: This being the last chapter of the thesis, it deals with the 
summary, conclusions and recommendations. Guidance for future research 
has also been put forward. 
Research Gap 
From the literature review on Capital Account Liberalization, exchange rate 
management and corporate risk management, it is clear that various studies 
have been made but the direction of these studies lack the following: 
(i) Sequencing of Capital Account Convertibility and the pre- conditions 
required for Capital Account Convertibility in India. 
(ii) Identification of various macroeconomic factors affecting exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar and the relationship of these factors 
with the exchange rates. 
(ill) Exchange rate forecasting based on non-linear statistical models. 
(iv) Survey of Indian companies for studying their foreign exchange risk 
management practices. 
Justification for tlie study 
Under the present condition of available literature and the gap in the existing 
studies, there is a need to have a detailed study, which should incorporate the 
sequencing of capital account convertibility and the pre-conditions required for 
capital account convertibility in India. There is a close link between capital 
account convertibility and the various macroeconomic factors affecting the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. The study aims to identify the 
macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange rates and the relationship 
between them. Further, there is a need to look into the recent volatility in the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. Exchange rate forecasting is 
attempted based on statistical models using the identified macroeconomic 
factors. There is a need to look into the foreign currency risk management 
practices of the Indian companies, which will help the companies manage 
their foreign currency risk in a better manner. Based on primary data 
collection through questionnaire survey, the study aims to help companies by 
suggesting measures for improving their foreign currency risk management. 
Objectives of the Study 
(1) To study the recommendations of the Tarapore Committee for Capital 
Account Convertibility, it's sequencing and the present status of 
implementation in India to identify macroeconomic factors affecting the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
(2) To examine the recent volatility in exchange rates and to demonstrate 
its continuance based on simulation. 
(3) To establish a relationship between Macroeconomic factors and 
Exchange rates for forecasting the Rupee-Dollar Exchange Rate. 
(4) To study the foreign currency exposure risk management of selected 
Indian companies through a survey and interview. 
(5) To suggest measures for handling foreign exchange exposure for 
Indian companies. 
Scope of the Study 
1) While studying the macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange 
rates, the study limits itself to the data for the period 1991 to 2004. 
2) The study is confined to Rupee-Dollar only. 
3) The companies covered are predominantly Chennai-based companies 
having exposure to foreign exchange on account of imports, exports or 
foreign currency loans. 
Data Sources and Collection 
Primary data from the corporates and secondary data from the handbook of 
statistics on the Indian economy. Reserve Bank of India, annual report of the 
Reserve Bank of India, the website of Reserve Bank of India viz. 
www.rbi.org.in. Center for Monitoring Indian Economy and the Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release of the US government are used for the study. 
The secondary data are very reliable and sound. Primary data collection was 
made through questionnaire survey on Chennai-based companies. The views 
of experts/knowledgeable people in the foreign exchange field namely Chief 
Financial Officers of companies, bankers and regulators with respect to 
foreign exchange risk management for Indian companies are also obtained 
through personal interviews. 
Methodology 
(a) Monte Carlo Simulation to demonstrate the volatility in exchange 
rates 
The daily exchange rates of the Rupee against Dollar from January 
1973 to November 2004 were studied to understand the behaviour of 
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the exchange rates. The exchange rates have steadily depreciated 
from 1947 to June 2002. From July 2002, the rupee has turned volatile. 
Using Monte Carlo simulation the volatility of exchange rates is studied. 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique is a well-known technique that 
uses random numbers generated from a uniform distribution and maps 
the relative frequency to the random numbers generated. Each time 
when a random number corresponds to a specific relative frequency, 
the exchange rate that is associated with that category is taken as the 
prediction for the next period. Monte Carlo simulation method is equally 
applicable when random numbers are generated from a standard 
probability distribution such as the normal distribution. In this case, the 
cumulative probability of the standard normal distribution is taken as the 
basis for predicting the exchange rate. 
(b) Exchange Rate Forecasting 
The forecasting of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
using a forecasting model based on multivariate regression analysis is 
attempted. Macroeconomic data from 1991 to 2004 have been used for 
this purpose. For the empirical analysis of exchange rates (the 
dependent variable) and nine other macroeconomic variables 
(independent variables) for the years 1991 to 2004, the univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis are used. The data analysis and 
results are discussed in the chapter-5 on exchange rate volatility and 
it's forecasting. 
(c) Primary data collection through questionnaire survey 
125 Chennai-based companies were identified, which had exposure to 
foreign exchange on account of imports, exports or foreign currency 
loans from the database of Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. 
Structured questionnaires were sent to the Chief Financial Officers of 
these companies. 54 responses were received and the analysis of the 
above is covered in Chapter-6, Implications of Exchange Rate 
Management for Indian Companies. The Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) was used for the above analysis. 
The macroeconomic variables selected for data analysis are: -
(1) Exchange Rate 
(2) Bank Rate 
(3) Balance of Payments 
(4) External Debt 
(5) Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Institutional Investment 
in India 
(6) Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(7) Gross Domestic Product 
(8) Fiscal Deficit 
(9) Inflation 
(10) US Federal Interest Rate 
Hypothesis Development 
Hypothesis 1: Bank Rate and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between bank rate and exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the bank rate and exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 2: Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Balance of Payments and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Balance of Payments and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 3: External Debt and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against 
the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the External Debt and exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the External Debt and exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 4: FDI and Fll and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the FDI and Fll inflows and exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the FDI and Fll inflows and exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 5: Foreign Exchange Reserves and Exchange Rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 6: Gross Domestic Product and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Gross Domestic Product and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Gross Domestic Product and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
Hypothesis 7: Fiscal Deficit and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against 
the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Fiscal Deficit and exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Fiscal Deficit and exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar 
Hypothesis 8: Inflation (Based on CPI) and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Inflation (Based on CPI) and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Inflation (Based on CPI) and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
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Hypothesis 9: US Federal Interest Rate and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the US Federal Interest Rate and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the US Federal Interest Rate and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
Limitations of the study 
(i) Predominantly Chennai based companies only were considered in our 
sample 
(ii) Only the Rupee against Dollar exchange rates has been taken for the 
study. 
(iii) The macroeconomic data are limited to the period 1991-2004. 
(iv) Political factors and speculation have not been considered in the study. 
These factors have shown influence on exchange rates from time to 
time. 
(v) The companies who have responded are very limited in numbers and 
do not represent all the sectors of the economy. 
Summary and Conclusions of the Study 
The conclusion of the study and the recommendations that are put-forward 
are presented here. For this purpose, the following scheme of presentation of 
this chapter has been adopted: 
(i) Conclusions related with the recommendations of Tarapore Committee 
on Capital Account Convertibility, its sequencing and present status of 
implementation in India. 
(ii) Identification of macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar. 
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(iii) Exchange rate volatility and its forecasting 
(iv) Implications of exchange rate management for Indian companies 
Summary of major pre-Conditions of Tarapore Committee and the 
current position as of November 2004 
1. Gross fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to come down from a budgeted 4.5% in 
1997-98 to 3.5% in 1999-2000. In November 2004, it was still at 5%. 
2. A consolidated sinking fund has to be set up to meet the Government's 
debt repayment needs; to be financed by the increases in RBI's profit 
transfer to the Government and disinvestments proceeds. As of now, it 
is not yet done. Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2003 has been passed to 
reduce government's borrowings. 
3. Transparent and globally comparable procedures for fiscal accounting 
need to be implemented. 
4. Inflation rate should remain between an average 3.5% for the three-
year period 1997-2000. It was around 7.5% in November 2004. 
5. Gross NPAs of the public sector banking system needs to be brought 
down from the present 13.7% to 5% by 2000 and at the same time, 
average effective CRR needs to be brought down from the 10% level to 
3% level. The Gross NPAs to advances of public sector banks as of 
2003 are at 9.4% and Gross NPAs to total assets of the public sector 
banks are at 4.2%. The net NPAs to total advances of public sector 
banks as of 2003 are at 4.5% and net NPAs to total assets of the public 
sector banks are at 1.9% (RBI Annual Report, 2003). 
6. RBI should have a Monitoring Exchange Rate Band of plus/minus 5% 
around a neutral Real Effective Exchange Rate. RBI should be 
transparent about the changes in REER. Currently, RBI is tracking the 
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REER, but it does not have any target rate in mind or any band within 
which the rates should move. 
7. External sector policies should be designed to increase current receipts 
to GDP ratio and bring down the debt-servicing ratio from 25% to 20%. 
This has been achieved. Current receipts to GDP ratio is 18.7% and 
debt service ratio Is at 14.7%. 
8. Indicators should be used for evaluating adequacy of foreign exchange 
reserves to safeguard against any contingency. Plus law should 
prescribe a minimum net foreign asset to currency ratio of 40%. 
Currently, our foreign exchange reserves are about $126 billion as of 
November 2004 and they are quite adequate. Foreign asset to 
currency ratio is more than adequate at 130%. 
Identification of Macroeconomic Factors affecting Exchange Rates 
The Management of the external sector has been one of the success stories 
of India in the last decade. The country has completed the first step towards 
full-float of the Rupee by allowing Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign 
Institutional Investment and the investors can bring in and take out money 
from the country. The second stage of allowing companies and individuals to 
borrow and invest in Foreign Exchange has been initiated but not completed 
in full. The country has comfortable Foreign Exchange Reserves (126 billion 
Dollars as of November 2004) and a healthy Balance of Payments situation. 
India needs to bring down the gross fiscal deficit to GDP Ratio fi'om the 
present 5% to 3.5%. Inflation should be contained from the current 7.5% to 
3.5%. GDP should grow consistently at a growth ratio of 8% to 10%. If the 
above are achieved, India will be ready for full convertibility of the capital 
account. Based on the recommendations made by the Tarapore Committee 
and the analysis made, the following 9 factors, which are very important for 
capital account convertibility and which have influence on the exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar are identified as the Balance of Payments 
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position, Inflation, Bank rate. Fiscal deficit, Gross Domestic Product, Foreign 
Exchange Reserves, External Debt, Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign 
Institutional Investment and US Federal Interest Rate. 
Exchange rate volatility 
The daily exchange rates of the Rupee against the US Dollar from January 
1973 to November 2004 were studied and it was found that the Rupee 
exchange rates have followed a linear depreciating trend from 1973 to June 
2002. From July 2002, they have turned volatile. Monte Carlo simulation 
results show that the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar is volatile 
and the rate is most likely to be in the range of Rs.44 per Dollar to Rs.47 per 
Dollar for the year ending March 2005. 
Forecasting of Exchange Rate 
1. The relationship between the exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar and the nine-macroeconomic variables identified on Capital 
Account Convertibility has been studied. The univariate analysis 
rejected the null hypothesis for eight out of nine variables. Hence, it 
was found that there is a relationship between bank rate, balance of 
payment, external debt, FDI and FN, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 
GDP, Gross Fiscal Deficit, Inflation and the exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. Only in the case of US Federal Interest 
Rate and the Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the Dollar, the null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship between the two variables is 
accepted at 5% level of significance. However, it is significant at 
8.55% level based on the "P" value given in the summary output. In 
other words, if we increase the level of significance to 8.55% then the 
null hypothesis is rejected and there is a relationship between the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar and the US Federal 
Interest Rate. 
2. Multivariate analysis has been used for all the nine macroeconomic 
variables and it was found that there is a very strong linear relationship 
between the dependent variable (exchange rate of Rupee against 
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Dollar) and the nine independent variables (bank rate, balance of 
payment, external debt, FDI and Fll, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 
GDP, Gross Fiscal Deficit, Inflation and US Federal Interest Rate). 
The statistical validity test ANOVA also overwhelmingly rejects the null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship between the dependent variable 
and the set of independent variables already mentioned above. Then 
six of the significant independent variables have been selected, using 
the "P" (Probability significance) value. They are external debt, foreign 
exchange reserves, GDP, US Federal Interest Rate, Bank Rate and 
Gross Fiscal Deficit. Multivariate analysis using the six significant 
variables found that the results are equally good and the differences 
are only marginal in the correlation value, r^  value and the adjusted r^  
value. 
3. The forecast of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
based on all the nine variables using the above multivariate regression 
model comes to Rs.44.55 per Dollar for March 2005. 
The forecast of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
based on the six significant variables using the multivariate regression 
model come to Rs.45.91 per Dollar for March 2005. 
The forecast of the exchange rates based on time series regression 
analysis was made. It was found that this method of forecasting 
showed a linear depreciating trend even when the Rupee was 
appreciating and hence we found it to be not reliable. 
The forecast of the exchange rates based on exponential smoothing 
method taking the monthly data and the yearly data was also made 
and it was found the forecast exchange rate per Dollar to be in the 
range of Rs.44.10 Per Dollar to Rs.44.17 per Dollar from December 
2004 to March 2005. 
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The forecast of the exchange rate based on the monthly moving 
average method and the yearly moving average method was made 
and it is in the range of Rs.44.63 per Dollar to Rs.43.70 per Dollar. 
Based on the various techniques of forecasting, the exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar is expected to be in the range of 
Rs.43.70 per Dollar to Rs.45.91 per Dollar during December 2004 to 
March 2005. The forecast rates vary due to the application of different 
methods of calculation. 
Summary of the questionnaire based survey findings 
The survey reports the results of the empirical study into the foreign exchange 
risk management practices of 54 responding companies. Of the 125 
companies that were addressed, a total of 54 responded to the questionnaire. 
The managers of these companies were asked about the mode of exposure 
to foreign exchange, about their risk management strategies, the risk 
management techniques that they were using and their reasons for using the 
same and if they were not using a particular technique, their reasons for not 
using the same. The managers were asked to quantify their uncovered 
exposure. They were also asked how they forecast the exchange rate. 
The results can be summarized as follows: 
1. Most of the firms (51.9%) had exposure to foreign currency on account 
of all of imports, exports and foreign currency loans. 
2. A sizeable majority of the firms (83.3%) adopted a selective hedging 
strategy based on case-to-case and time-to-time decisions. 
3. Overwhelming majority of the companies (92.6%) did not forecast 
exchange rates on their own. About 77.8% of the responding 
companies relied on bankers' opinion and experts' opinion for taking a 
view on the exchange rates. 
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4. Only a small minority of firms (5.6%) does not hedge its foreign 
exchange risks and only a few companies (27.8%) hedge their 
exposure completely. 
5. A majority of the corporate managers (85.2%) feels that the exchange 
rates will move in the range of Rs.45 to Rs.46.5 per Dollar upto March 
2005. 
The companies cited the foWowing reasons for using forwards for hedging 
their foreign exchange exposure:-
(1) Simple and easy to understand 
(2) Liquid and available all the time 
(3) Transparent 
(4) Cost effective 
(5) Useful in targeting a budgeted cost 
The companies cited the following reasons for using options for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Strike price and premium are attractive 
(2) Flexible with room to manoeuvre 
(3) Gives right without obligation 
(4) Liquid and available 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using options for hedging 
their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Option premium is high 
(2) Minimum contract size is high 
(3) Companies are not yet comfortable with the product 
(4) Fear of manipulation 
(5) Option quotes favour the banks only 
(6) Absence of dynamic quotations 
The companies cited the following reasons for using swaps for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Interest rate reduction 
(2) Cost effective 
(3) Transparent 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using swaps for hedging 
their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) The international swap dealers association agreement is too confusing 
(2) The agreement has irrelevant clauses 
(3) It is too lengthy 
Summary of the views expressed by Corporate Chief Finance Officers, 
Bankers and Regulatorsi 
The foreign exchange derivative products that are available in the Indian 
financial markets are fonvards, options and currency swaps. 
Rupee forwards 
An important segment of the foreign exchange derivatives market in India is 
the Rupee fonward contract. This market is growing rapidly with an increased 
participation from the corporates and banks. Till February 1992, forward 
contracts were permitted only against trade related exposures and these 
contracts could not be cancelled except where the underlying transactions 
failed to materialize. In March 1992, in order to provide operational freedom to 
corporates, unrestricted booking and cancellation of forward contracts for all 
genuine exposures, whether trade related or not, were permitted. Due to the 
Asian currency crisis, this freedom to rebook the cancelled contracts was 
suspended in 1998, which has been relaxed for the exporters in 2002 and for 
importers in 2004. 
The liquidity in the Indian forward market has been steadily improving and the 
bid-offer spread has been decreasing considerably with the increase in turn 
over in the fonward market. The fonward market in our country is active only 
upto 6 months, where two-way quotes are available. With the initiative of RBI, 
the maturity profile has elongated and quotes are now available upto one 
year. But the liquidity of this segment needs to improve. Understandably in 
most markets, where there are restrictions on capital movements, liquidity 
across the spectrum as seen in the developed markets, proves to be difficult 
In early stages of development of the market. 
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The liquidity in tine Indian forwards market is mainly for the end of the month 
maturity contracts, where the bid-offer spread is low. Standard maturity 
contracts like, for three months and six months, are not quoted in the inter 
bank markets. Hence, the cost of entering into a standard maturity contract is 
much higher as compared to a month end contract. 
The Indian forward market is relatively illiquid for the standard maturity 
contracts as most of the contracts are for the month ends only. One of the 
reasons for the market makers' reluctance to offer these standard contracts 
could be the absence of a well-developed term money market. The market 
makers feel that given the future like nature of Indian forward market, 
currency futures could be allowed. Some of the benefits that may be provided 
by the futures are as follows: -
a) Currency futures, since they are traded on organized exchanges, also 
confer benefits from concentrating order flow and providing a 
transparent venue for price discovery, while over-the-counter fonward 
contracts rely on bilateral negotiations. 
b) Two characteristics of futures contract - their minimal margin 
requirements and low transaction cost relative to the over-the-counter 
markets strengthen the case for their introduction. 
c) Credit risks are further mitigated by daily marking to market of all future 
positions with gains and losses paid by each participant to the 
clearinghouse by the end of the trading session. 
d) Future contracts are standardized using the same delivery dates and 
the same nominal amount of currency units to be traded. 
Currency options 
The Reserve Bank of India has permitted authorized dealers to offer cross 
currency options and Rupee currency options to the corporate clients. Cross 
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currency options provide a way of availing of tlie upside from any currency 
exposure while being protected from the downside on payment of an upfront 
premium. The corporates feel the option premium is currently very high and 
the spread is very wide. Minimum size of the contract is also high at quarter 
million Dollars. At present, activity in this product is limited as it is in its early 
stage of introduction. Increased activity in options can result as the 
corporates start understanding this product better. 
Currency swaps 
Another spin-off of the financial reforms and liberalization is the introduction of 
foreign currency to Rupee swaps. Initially, the market was very small and the 
two-way quotes were very wide. The market started developing as more 
players as well as corporates started understanding this product and using 
them to manage their exposures. Corporates started using swaps for hedging 
their currency exposure and to reduce their borrowing cost. RBI tried to 
regulate the market by fixing USD 10 million as the limit for open position on 
the swap book for the authorized dealers. This was raised to USD 25 million 
and then to USD 50 million. The authorized dealers were also allowed the use 
of currency swaps to hedge their asset-liability portfolio. These developments 
are expected to result in increased market activity. The corporates feel the 
international swap dealers' association agreement, which they have to sign 
with the Authorized Dealers, at the time of entering into a swap deal, is too 
confusing, lengthy and has lot of irrelevant clauses. This agreement needs to 
be made user-friendly for the corporates. 
Summary of the cases 
Case Study 1: Infosys Technologies Limited has a very good risk 
management structure. Inspite of their very good risk management 
framework, the Rupee's sudden depreciation in the quarter ending June 2004 
caught them by surprise and they had to change their hedging strategy. 
Infosys had covered their June quarter end receivables through fonward 
contracts around the March 2004 rate of Rs.43.40 per US Dollar. They had to 
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book losses on the forward cover by marking to market the forward cover 
contracts at the rate of Rs.45.99 to the Dollar for the entire position of $228 
millions as the Rupee started depreciating from the March, 2004 level of 
Rs.43.40 to Rs.45.99 by June, 2004. 
Case Study 2: Orchid Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited belongs to the 
risk neutral category and follows a selective hedging approach to their foreign 
exchange risk management. They entered in to a swap deal on 11'^ 
September 2002 with ABN-AMRO Bank for a one-year maturity converting 
800 million rupees into US dollars @ Rs.48.52 per dollar at an interest rate of 
9.78% when the rupee loan was taken at 12.5% from IDBI. On 23'" May 2003, 
this deal was closed at a rupee-dollar rate of Rs.47.42. The Rupee interest 
plus principal repayment was Rs.900,000,000.00. But the actual cash outflow 
was Rs.871,282,231.38 on account of the swap deal. This deal resulted in a 
profit of nearly Rs.2.87 crores for Orchid. In September 2003, the rupee 
reached the level of Rs.46. If Orchid had continued this transaction till 
September 2003, the expected gain for the company could have been nearly 
Rs.5.63 crores. This is an opportunity loss for the company. 
In both cases, the opportunity loss was due to the inability of the companies to 
forecast the exchange rates. 
Recommendations for the Companies 
The study has amply demonstrated the volatility in the exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. From January 1973 to June 2002, the Rupee 
depreciated steadily from the level of Rs.8.02 to a Dollar to Rs.49.07 to a 
Dollar. From June 2002, it appreciated steadily till March 2004 to a level of 
Rs.43.40. From April 2004 again it has started depreciating and reached a 
level of Rs.46.16 end of September 2004. By end of November 2004, it has 
again reached a level of Rs.44.75. From 2002 to 2004, there is lot of volatility 
in the exchange rate movement and the trend is no more unidirectional. This 
calls for forecasting of exchange rates with emphasis on various factors 
affecting the exchange rates and continuous monitoring of the exposure. Prior 
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to the volatile phase in the exchange rates, corporates used to hedge their 
exposure on imports, interest payments and loan repayments and leave their 
export receivables un-hedged because of the unidirectional movement of the 
Rupee-Dollar exchange rates. The current scenario calls for active risk 
management on the part of the fund managers. They have to make effective 
use of currency fonwards, currency options and swaps. These products are 
now freely available, thanks to the policy changes announced by the Reserve 
Bank of India. For effective use of these products, corporates need to forecast 
the exchange rates based on the macroeconomic factors that affect the rates. 
Based on the forecasting models and views from the corporate finance heads, 
bankers and regulators, we have arrived at a range of Rs.43.70 to Rs.45.91 
for the Rupee - Dollar exchange rates for the year ending March 2005. 
Corporates should cover their export receivables at the higher end of the 
range (Rs.45.91) and cover their payables on account of imports, interest 
payments and repayment of loans at the lower end of the range (Rs.43.70). 
They should constantly watch the exchange rate movement and take the 
above steps when the opportunity presents itself. 
Recommendations for the Regulators and the Government 
The Indian foreign exchange derivatives market is still in a nascent stage of 
development but offers tremendous growth potential. The development of a 
vibrant foreign exchange derivatives market in India would critically depend on 
the growth in the underlying spot/fonward markets, growth in the Rupee 
derivative markets along with the evolution of a supporting regulatory 
structure. Factors such as market liquidity, corporate investor behaviour, 
regulatory structure and tax laws will have a significant bearing on the 
behaviour of market variables in this market. Increased convertibility on the 
capital account would accelerate the process of integration of Indian financial 
markets with international markets. Some of the necessary preconditions to 
this, as suggested by the Tarapore Committee, are already met. Introduction 
of derivative products, tailored to specific corporate requirements, would 
enable corporates to completely focus on their core businesses, de-risking the 
currency and interest rate risks while allowing them to gain from the financial 
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markets. Increased convertibility on the Rupee and regulatory impetus for new 
products should see a host of innovative products and structures tailored to 
business needs. The possibilities are many and include currency futures, 
Rupee forward rate agreements, Rupee and cross currency swaptions as well 
as structures composed of the above to address the needs of corporates. A 
further development in the derivatives market could also see derivative 
products linked to commodities, weather etc., which would add great value in 
an economy where substantial section is still agrarian and dependent on the 
vagaries of the monsoon. 
Direction for future Research 
This study has revealed interesting insights into the fascinating world of 
foreign exchange markets and exchange rate management. This study has 
taken only two currencies namely; the Rupee and the Dollar. Similar studies 
can be taken up against other currencies like Euro, Pound and Yen. 
(i) With 31 countries adopting Euro as their national currency, it will be 
interesting to study the Euro - Dollar exchange rate behaviour in the 
immediate future. 
(ii) This study is based on 54 companies, which are predominantly 
Chennai based. The scope of the study can be enlarged by taking 
sample Companies on an all India basis. 
(iii) Conducting a focus group discussion involving CFOs that would shed 
light on certain important underlying dimensions can further delineate 
the study. These dimensions and their ramifications cannot be brought 
about by one to one discussion with experts because there is no 
interaction amongst experts. In the focus group discussion, the 
collective synergy of these experts will give rise to a number of useful 
hypotheses. These hypotheses could be tested at a macro level by 
conclusive studies. Needless to mention here that the audience for the 
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focus group discussion must form a homogenous group and screened 
before they are invited for the discussion. 
(iv) Advanced econometric models of forecasting could be undertaken by 
making available a large database. These models would include Box 
and Jenkin (Johnston, 1972; Greene, 2000; Ramu Ramanathan, 
2002), ARIMA (Auto Regressive Moving Average) and Adaptive 
Filtering. 
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PREFACE 
In the current international economic set-up where countries progress towards 
globalization, private foreign capital is indispensable and caters to the large 
requirement of capital for development. 
Capital Account Convertibility facilitates free inflow of capital as Investors 
have the freedom to take money out whenever they want it without 
government restrictions and control. 
India embarked upon liberalization of the current account and the capital 
account after experiencing a major Balance of Payment crisis in 1990-91. A 
host of factors including domestic political crises and increase in oil prices 
contributed to the decline in the rupee value. India's credit rating was 
downgraded twice (with the second downgrade placing the country in the 
"speculative grade") and with instalment payments against some foreign loans 
coming due, the economy nearly collapsed. 
Meanwhile, in 1991, a new government was sworn in and the rupee was 
devalued (in two quick steps) by a total of 22 percent. Simultaneously, 
dramatic changes were made in trade policy; the negative list for imports was 
significantly shortened and a new instrument (the Exim scrip) created to 
provide exporters with additional returns. Thus began the process of 
economic liberalization. This was clearly the first step towards the supposed 
market-determination of the rupee exchange rate. 
In the Union budget for 1992-93, the rupee was made "partly convertible", or 
more correctly, partly floating, thus ushering in the Liberalised Exchange Rate 
Management System (LERMS). Under the new scheme, 40 percent of the 
export receipts (denominated in dollars) was to be surrendered to the RBI at a 
predefined (official) rate; the proceeds would be used for import of "essential" 
en 
items (such as petroleum, fertilizers and edible oils). Tlie balance 60 percent 
could be sold in the "free market" to importers. 
Beginning December 1992, ostensibly in acknowledgement of the dollar's 
sharp gains overseas (which had rendered exports in non-dollar currencies 
much less profitable), the RBI signalled a change in policy by lowering 
(devaluing) its official rate. The market knee-jerked to the sudden move and 
the rupee slipped immediately. A political crisis at home only aggravated the 
situation and there was a steady decline in dollar inflows; by February 1993, 
the rupee was falling fast. Finally, in the Union budget for 1993-94, "full float" 
of the rupee was allowed. 
In 1993-94, India shifted towards a "market determined exchange rate", 
where the exchange rate was determined on the basis of the market and not 
administratively determined. The economic reforms initiated by the 
Government of India led to a surge in capital inflows into the country from 
1993. At this time, RBI chose to intervene to prevent a rupee appreciation 
and maintained a fixed parity currency regime at Rs.31.37 per US dollar for 
nearly two and half years. This led to reserve accumulation and growth in 
money supply. RBI chose to engage in monetary tightening to bring down the 
money multiplier to contain growth in money supply. 
In his Budget speech for 1997 - 98, the Union Finance Minister, Shri P. 
Chidambaram, indicated that the regulations governing foreign exchange 
transactions needed to be modernized and he felt the time had come for 
preparatory work towards capital account convertibility. This led to the setting 
up of the Tarapore Committee to recommend measures that should be taken 
to achieve full capital account convertibility and to specify the sequence and 
time frame in which such measures were to be taken. The Committee in its 
recommendations gave a set of pre-conditions to be fulfilled in a phased 
manner from 1997 - 98. 
With liberalization, a need was felt to remove the drastic measures of the 
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act (FERA) of 1973 and replace them by a set 
(ii) 
of liberal foreign exchange management regulations. Therefore from 1^' June 
2000, the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) was enacted. 
FEMA simplified the regulatory regime for foreign-exchange transactions and 
liberalized capital-account transactions. It also appointed the RBI as the sole 
monitor of all capital-account transactions. The Act put all foreign-exchange 
offences under the purview of civil law (these were criminal offences under 
FERA), thus subjecting them only to monetary penalties. FEMA dictates, 
among other things, the conditions for Indians holding foreign currency and 
immovable property outside India (or vice versa) and rules for exporters. 
India has completed the first step towards full float of the Rupee by allowing 
foreign direct investment and institutional investors to bring in and take out 
money from the country. The second stage of allowing companies and 
individuals to borrow and invest in foreign exchange has been initiated but not 
completed in full. 
For more than five decades, the Rupee had been steadily depreciating from 
the level of Rs. 2.40 per dollar prior to 1947 to Rs. 49.07 in June 2002. From 
July 2002 onwards the rupee appreciated to Rs.43.40 per US dollar as of 
March 2004. From April 2004, the Rupee has again started depreciating 
against the US dollar and reached a level of Rs. 46.16 end of September 
2004. On 7*" December 2004 it reached a level of Rs.43.70. The recent trend 
shows a lot of volatility in the exchange rates of the Rupee against the US 
Dollar. 
Importance of the Study 
Based on the information given above, it is obvious that Capital Account 
Convertibility has received the attention of policy makers in India ever since 
we embarked on liberalization. Various studies have aimed at examining the 
importance of capital account convertibility and its associated macroeconomic 
factors in terms of its influence on exchange rates. In the first part of this 
study, the major macroeconomic factors affecting the Rupee - US dollar 
exchange rates are identified. In the second part of the study, forecasting of 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar based on statistical models. 
(iii) 
which will treat exchange rate as a function of a number of important 
macroeconomic factors is attempted. In the third part of the study, a survey is 
conducted on the foreign exchange risk management practices of Indian 
companies and the exchange rate forecasting models are used to help 
companies manage their foreign exchange exposure. 
Arrangement of Chapters 
CHAPTER-1: Introduction 
This chapter deals with what is capital account convertibility and convertibility 
concepts on current account and capital account. Then, the benefits of capital 
account convertibility are discussed. This chapter also covers pitfalls of capital 
account convertibility based on international experience. Pre-conditions for 
capital account convertibility are also discussed. 
CHAPTER - 2: The evolution of India's exchange rate from the pre-Bretton 
Woods period up to the current position is highlighted in this chapter. 
This chapter discusses the pre-Bretton Woods exchange rates system in 
India, why the Bretton Woods system broke down, the early years of floating 
rates, the movement towards a basket-linked exchange rate system, the 
macroeconomic crisis of 1990-91 and the steps taken towards current 
account convertibility and capital account convertibility. Foreign exchange 
regulation aspects and the changes from FERA to FEMA are also discussed. 
CHAPTER - 3: This chapter concentrates on literature survey and research 
methodology. After studying the existing literature on capital account 
convertibility, exchange rate management and currency risk management for 
companies, the gap in the research literature has been identified. Based on 
this, the objectives and hypothesis of the study have been laid down. The 
primary as well as the secondary data have been collected and the sources of 
data, their definition and the methodology of analysis of collected data have 
been explained in this chapter. The limitations of the study are also 
highlighted in this chapter. 
(iv) 
CHAPTER - 4: The recommendations of the Tarapore Committee on Capital 
Account Convertibility, the pre-conditions stipulated by the Committee and the 
various signposts laid down in the report are discussed in this chapter. The 
timing and sequencing of various measures and their current status as of 
September 2004 are also discussed. Based on the above discussion, the 
various factors affecting exchange rates are identified. 
CHAPTER - 5: In this chapter, the daily exchange rates for the Rupee and 
the US Dollar for the period January 1973 to November 2004 are studied. The 
exchange rates have followed a linear depreciating path from January 1973 to 
June 2002. From July 2002 to November 2004, the exchange rates have 
turned volatile. Using simulation, the volatility in the exchange rates is 
demonstrated and the risk of leaving open the foreign currency exposure of 
companies is highlighted. This leads to the need for forecasting exchange 
rates for the Indian companies and taking appropriate risk cover through 
hedging tools like forwards, options and swaps available now in India. 
Further, this chapter concentrates on examining the relationship between 
selected macroeconomic factors and exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar. These variables have been identified based on the literature review 
done by us and also based on the recommendations of the Tarapore 
Committee on Capital Account Convertibility. 
An exchange rate forecasting model is built based on the exchange rate 
(dependent variable) and nine other macroeconomic variables (independent 
variables) for the years 1991 to 2004. 
Univariate analysis and multivariate analysis are used to find out the 
correlation between the variables and the extent of dependency of the 
exchange rate on the nine independent variables. 
(V) 
Time series regression analysis, exponential snnoothing method and moving 
average method are also used for forecasting the exchange rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar using the data from January 1973 to November 2004. 
CHAPTER - 6: This chapter deals with exchange rate risk management by 
Indian companies, based on primary data collected from the executives who 
are dealing with foreign exchange in their companies, through a 
questionnaire. The opinions of regulators and bankers have also been 
considered, based on personal interviews. A couple of case studies have also 
been used for this purpose. The questionnaire data has been analyzed and 
conclusions drawn. 
CHAPTER 7: This being the last chapter of the thesis, it deals with the 
summary, conclusions and recommendations. Guidance for future research 
has also been put fonward. 
(vi) 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Globalization, fostered by the free flow of information and rapid progress in 
technology, is a driving force that no country can reverse. It imposes market 
discipline on the participants, which is the mechanism that drives progress and 
prosperity. Liberalization and globalization are both part of the economic reforms 
undertaken by many countries in the last decade. Liberalization has two 
dimensions, internal and external. Pure internal reform confines its attention to 
the domestic economy and takes measures to make it more responsive to 
market forces. External liberalization, on the other hand, consists of relaxation of 
state control in the spheres of foreign trade, foreign investment and flow of 
finance in and out of the country (Edwards, 1989; Eswar Prasad, Kenneth 
Rogoff, 2003; Shang-Jin Wei and Kose, 2004). Full convertibility on current and 
capital accounts is an important component of external liberalization. 
1.1 What is Capital Account Convertibility? 
In simple terms. Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) means free inflow 
and outflow of capital. CAC refers to the freedom to convert local financial 
assets into foreign financial assets and vice versa at market determined 
rates of exchange. There is minimal control on capital movements. 
1.2 Convertibility Concepts 
A currency can be considered convertible if both residents and non-
residents have unlimited freedom to use and exchange it for any purpose 
whatsoever, at some definite rate of exchange (Gold 1972). A definite rate 
of exchange can mean a fixed, floating or flexibly fixed exchange system. 
The convertibility concept hinges more on the purpose for which the 
freedom of exchange should be allowed. If the exchange conversions 
under capital and current accounts do not require any official permission, 
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the situation resembles "unrestricted convertibility" of the type prevailing in 
most industrialized countries. However, a number of developing countries' 
currencies are considered convertible today, compatible with various 
degrees of trade restrictions and capital controls which are in place. 
(a) Current Account 
Current account convertibility is embodied in Article VIII, Section 2 
(a) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. According to the IMF's 
concept of current account convertibility "no member shall, without 
the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on making payments 
and transfers for current account transactions". This definition only 
implies the absence of restrictions on the settlement of cross-
border claims, whether for exports, imports, repatriation of profits, 
or interest on debt but leaves the regulation of such claims to the 
discretion of the country in line with national preferences. Thus, 
while financial convertibility needs to be maintained, members can 
effectively limit commodity convertibility through import licensing. 
The IMF clarifies this as follows: 
"Restrictions on trade do not become restrictions on payments 
within the meaning of Article VIM, because they are Imposed for 
balance of payments reasons" (Gold 1972). 
Thus, the IMF definition of convertibility is not specific regarding the 
degree of current account restrictions. Indeed, the spirit of 
convertibility would be diluted de facto if abolition of payments 
restriction were accompanied by an intensification of trade 
restrictions. Convertibility on current account, therefore, becomes a 
joint product of payments and trade liberalization, which determines 
the extent of integration of the country's goods market with global 
markets (Williamson 1991). 
It needs to be noted that the introduction of convertibility does not 
require complete liberalization. To establish rational relative prices 
from abroad, convertibility measures essentially remove 
quantitative restrictions on trade and impose moderate tariffs. The 
relaxation of non-price rationing in foreign exchange allocation has 
been the central aspect of introducing currency convertibility, since 
these hamper efficient resource allocation. 
(b) Capital Account 
CAC would imply the right to export or import capital without 
restrictions. Full capital account convertibility would mean 
the right of banks and others to convert domestic currency 
into foreign exchange and vice versa, and to maintain 
foreign exchange accounts domestically or overseas. Of 
course, free capital flows are possible through the use of 
parallel foreign exchange markets even in the presence of 
capital controls. What is relevant in the context of an open 
capital account is the freedom to acquire foreign assets at 
the official exchange rate. 
To an extent, some degree of convergence can be noticed 
between current and capital accounts of balance of 
payments. While current account convertibility takes care of 
the repatriation of dividends, royalties and technical know-
how fees, etc., capital account convertibility allows foreign 
investors to repatriate the capital itself. Simultaneous 
liberalization of both can promote foreign investment. 
Williamson (1973) argues that just like allocative efficiency, 
which provides one justification for freedom of capital flows, 
the principle of comparative advantage justifies freedom for 
trade flows. 
Resident convertibility implies the right of domestic residents 
to undertake free foreign exchange transactions. Non-
resident convertibility refers to similar rights of exchange by 
foreigners, designed to attract foreign capital and, thereby, 
involves liberalization of the regulations on foreign 
investments, reduction of the levels of taxation on capital 
gains and dividends on such investments and the right to 
repatriate the earnings at will by investors. De Varies (1969) 
defines the distinction between external and internal 
convertibility as follows: 
"A currency is externally convertible when all holdings of that 
currency by non-residents are freely exchangeable into any 
foreign (non-resident) currency at exchange rates within the 
official margins. All payments that residents of the country 
are authorized to make to non-residents may be made in any 
externally convertible currency that residents can buy in the 
foreign exchange market. On the other hand, if there are no 
restrictions on the ability of a country's residents to use their 
holdings of domestic currency to acquire any foreign 
currency and hold it, or transfer it to any non-resident for any 
purpose, the country's currency is said to be internally 
convertible. Total convertibility involves both external and 
internal convertibility". 
Benefits of Capital Account Convertibility 
(a) Current Account Convertibility 
Currency convertibility plays a key role in integrating the domestic 
economy with the world economy. Convertibility on current account 
along with trade liberalization enhances the degree of competition 
in production of domestic tradables and causes world prices to 
prevail in tiie domestic economy (Basu 1993). By lowering of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, export competitiveness is improved since 
industries can procure inputs from global markets at lower costs 
(Bhagawati and Srinivasan 1993). Convertibility measures, along 
with the easing of controls on foreign investments, are also 
expected to boost investment flows and technology transfer. 
(b) Capital Account Convertibility 
Capital account convertibility leads to the equalization of rates of 
return across countries. Dismantling capital controls can generate 
cross-border diversification of assets and liabilities, so that 
borrowers find lower funding costs and lenders can attain higher 
yields. Opening up of the capital account and liberalization of the 
financial market enhances the competitiveness of a country's 
financial system (Rangarajan and Virmani, 1991; Alok Roy, 1993; 
Pradhan, 1994; Arvind Panagariya, 2004; Sivakumar 
Sivaprakasam, 2004). 
Convertibility measures in India, have accompanied the 
liberalization of the external sector. The main elements of this 
opening up process are highlighted below: 
1.4 Current Account IVIeasures 
i. There has been virtual elimination of quantitative restrictions (QRs) 
on capital and intermediate goods imports: all twenty-six import-
licensing lists are abolished except for a short negative list. All 
import items are now freely importable at the market exchange rate. 
The list of canalized items imported or exported through public 
sector agencies has been drastically reduced. 
ii. The maximum tariff rate has been reduced from 150 percent to 25 
percent. 
iii. The numbers of banned export items have been reduced from 68 to 
7, and are limited to goods of ethical and ecological significance. 
iv. Payments restrictions on all other items under current account have 
been freed from exchange controls. Remittance of dividend by 
foreign investors without RBI approval has been allowed, the facility 
of maintaining foreign currency accounts is available to exports, 
release of foreign exchange for foreign travel for business has been 
freed from RBI control by delegating power to the commercial 
banks and transparency has been introduced in the system of 
buying and selling foreign exchange, both spot and fonward, by 
users in India. 
V. Export subsidy schemes have been eliminated, except duty 
drawbacks for exports. These have been replaced by exchange 
rate adjustments, with the rates decided by market forces of 
demand and supply. Exchange rates for all transactions are 
undertaken at the free market exchange rates. 
1.5 Capital Account Measures 
i. Public and private sector institutions are encouraged to obtain 
commercial loans abroad without government guarantee. In 
particular, companies are encouraged to raise equity-based funds 
such as Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) and American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), which have been largely successful. 
There has been complete liberalization of repayments on foreign 
loans and equity-based flows at market exchange rate (subject to 
those which are recorded at the time of arrival). 
ii. Almost complete convertibility for non-resident deposits in foreign 
exchange with Indian commercial banks (upto Dollar 1 million 
permitted out of NRO Account). 
iii. Foreign investment has been significantly liberalized, with removal 
of the condition for dividend balancing (for all industries except in 
the consumer goods sector), removal of licensing of industrial 
capacities, relaxation of exchange controls and removal of the 
rigours of FERA, specially regarding hiring of foreign technicians, 
and purchase of immovable property in India and simplification of 
import-export procedures. 
iv. Foreign Institutional Investors (Flls) are allowed to invest in all the 
securities traded on the primary and secondary markets (including 
shares, debentures, warrants, and the schemes floated by 
domestic mutual funds). No restrictions are imposed on the total 
volume of such investments and also no lock-in period is 
prescribed. However, the investments are subject to a ceiling of 24, 
49 & 74 percent of issued share capital of the company as per the 
sectoral policies and the holding of a single Fll in any company is 
also subject to a ceiling of 10 percent of total issued capital. 
V. Along with liberalization of foreign investment, emphasis is also 
being placed on Indian investment abroad, such as Indian joint 
ventures overseas. For this purpose, all cash remittances upto 
$500,000 are approved on an automatic basis. 
1.6 Pitfalls of Capital Account Convertibility 
At the end of 1990, 21 developing country members of the IMF had 
achieved somewhat free currency convertibility while the remaining were 
operating under controls of various kinds. The notable features of 
exchange controls in developing countries are: surrender requirements 
of exchange accruals, quantitative restrictions on capital flows on both 
residents and non-residents, dual or multiple exchange rates and taxes on 
financial transactions. 
Governments in developing countries are conservative witii respect to 
capital account liberalization, mainly for two reasons. First, it may lead to 
flight of capital and, as a consequence, domestic savings are not utilized 
for domestic investments. Second, there are certain unwelcome 
repercussions of free capital movements such as unnecessary swings in 
exchange rates and interest rates. 
Let us examine the problems faced by some Asian currencies, which had 
gone in for Capital Account Convertibility. In 1996-97 there had been a 
turbulence in the Currency and Stock Markets in most of the South East 
Asian countries. The problems of South East Asia slowly affected the 
currencies of some of the stronger economies as well. An analysis of the 
causes and effects of such debacle is given here under: 
1.7 Major causes for the currency crisis in South East Asia 
Professors Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini, (1998) 
found that countries in South East Asia, which had suffered a major 
currency crisis during 1996-97 had the following things in common: 
a. All these economies which had gone in for CAC had 7% to 8% 
growth rates in the decade preceding the crisis and growth rates 
could not be sustained any longer. 
b. The economic boom in these countries was driven by a lot of 
foreign investments in the form of FDI in industry, Fll investments in 
stocks etc., and a host of short term investments for better yield. 
c. The economic growth witnessed by these countries had fuelled 
artificial prices for their shares and real estate prices sky rocketed 
as more money was chasing the few investment opportunities and 
most of the industries had built up excess capacities. 
d. Corporates had taken large foreign currency debts, a major 
proportion of it in short term debts. 
e. Domestic banks had a large exposure to the property sector 
advances against securities and were saddled with mounting 
NPAs. 
f. Further, though there had been advance indicators available, the 
countries had ignored the same. 
1.8 Summary of the causes for the Asian currency crisis 
Professors Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini, (1998); 
and George Allayannis, Gregory W. Brown and Leora F. Klapper, (2001) 
had summarized the causes for the Asian currency crisis: 
Fixed exchange rates regimes, capital inflows and moral hazards jointly 
led to real appreciation of the currencies and investment boom in wrong 
sectors in these countries. This led to asset price bubble and large current 
account deficits that led to accumulation of a large stock of short-term 
foreign liabilities. Such deficits were financed mostly through banking 
system intermediation (given the lack of developed securities market in 
the region). Banks borrowed abroad in foreign currency and their 
borrowings were mostly short term. These large currency positions were 
mostly un-hedged as firms and banks expected the fixed exchange rates 
to be maintained and / or to be bailed-out if things went wrong. Once the 
firms' investment projects turned out as not very profitable, the firms and 
the banks found themselves with a huge amount of currency-denominated 
foreign debt that could not be repaid. The exchange rate crisis that 
followed made things only worse as the currency depreciation increased 
the real burden of the foreign-currency denominated debt. The behaviour 
of weak and not very credible governments that were not committed to 
structural reforms exacerbated the policy uncertainty and the financial 
panic that followed. 
1.9 Impact of the Asian currency crisis on India - India was largely spared 
the financial upheaval that hit South East Asia. Part of the reason was that 
India wasn't fully convertible and the foreign exchange controls prevented 
foreign speculators from playing in our foreign exchange markets. Also 
India had managed to keep the current account deficit below 2% of GDP 
and the short-term debt obligations were at manageable levels. However 
in the last week of December 1997, the Rupee had depreciated by over 
7.5% against the dollar mainly initiated by factors such as redemptions by 
Flls/hedge funds in India to make up for their losses in the East Asian 
portfolios. 
This was coupled with political uncertainty and exporters holding back the 
receivables and demand from importers weakening the rupee. 
However to arrest the steep fall in the value of the Rupee, RBI came out 
with the following strategies to shore up the rupee. 
a) To mop up the excess liquidity in the system, which was finding it's 
way to fund the dollar purchases which was driving down the rupee. 
b) Perking up the short-term interest rates to align them with medium 
and long-term interest rates. 
c) To prevent corporates and banks from manipulating in the fonward 
market. 
The measures initiated by RBI as per the strategy above included the 
following: 
a) CRR rate hiked from 9.5% to 10% in December 1997 and to 10.5% 
in January 1998. 
b) CRR cuts announced earlier in the credit policy kept in abeyance. 
c) Interest on fixed rate repos hiked to 9%. 
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d) The facility allowed earlier in April 1997 to corporates to book 
forward contracts based on the past performance and declaration 
of exposure was suspended and fon/vard contracts can be booked 
only on evidence of exposure. 
These measures had their impact on the rupee/dollar rate and the rupee 
firmed up to below 39 to a dollar. 
1.10 Speed and sequencing of Convertibility 
After experiencing the Asian Currency Crisis, India understood the 
importance of timing of CAC, the speed and sequencing of CAC and the 
preconditions for CAC. The transition from a repressed or inward looking 
economy to a fully liberalized economy involves heavy adjustment costs. 
An appropriate sequencing would be one that would set the economy on a 
stable/ higher growth path, without inflation, debt overhang and balance of 
payments problems. History is replete with cases where many 
liberalization attempts have resulted in explosive growth paths and equally 
quick reversal. Inappropriate sequencing may render the adjustment 
process more difficult and result in a loss of credibility. 
According to the traditional view, macroeconomic stabilization should take 
place prior to currency convertibility. This sequencing has been advocated 
on the following grounds: 
(i) Stabilization usually entails contractionary policies with effects on 
output and employment, which if confused with the signals of 
economic reform, will result in a loss of credibility. 
(ii) Macroeconomic instability will result in unstable relative prices, 
which will give inappropriate incentive signals for resource 
allocation. 
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(iii) If the fiscal deficit is not brought under control, the exchange rate 
will become periodically overvalued. 
(iv) The balance of payment deficits should be brought under control 
prior to import liberalization; othen/vise, the latter is likely to 
precipitate the uncertainty and contribute further to external debt 
build up. 
Although there is consensus regarding current account convertibility, 
reservations are expressed regarding the feasibility of an open capital 
account in developing countries. The literature on sequencing has 
emphasized that developing countries should retain capital controls until 
trade liberalization is complete. Capital account liberalization has been 
known to create destabilizing capital flows which lead to high volatility in 
exchange rates. 
The dichotomy between the opening up of trade and capital accounts 
arises due to differences in the speed of adjustment in goods and financial 
markets. In the presence of domestic distortions, trade liberalization takes 
time to yield results. However, a premature opening up of the capital 
account would stimulate capital inflows, which would get absorbed in the 
lower priority and non-tradable sectors. Eventually, this may turn into a 
debt crisis since additional exports will not be generated in the process. 
Instead of complete capital account liberalization, India can strategically 
liberalize capital flows that will boost domestic investment and technology 
transfer. To that end, capital account convertibility should facilitate the 
transfer of funds relating to investment flows. What matters in this case is 
that foreign lenders or investors should have the right to remit their profits 
from India (which can be achieved with full current account convertibility) 
and repatriate capital (that becomes part of the capital account). 
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1.11 Preconditions for Convertibility 
For capital account convertibility to be effective, certain preconditions need 
to be satisfied. Two sets of preconditions are generally cited in the 
literature: macroeconomic stability and microeconomic strength. 
Williamson, (1991); Mackinnon, (1991); Joshi and Little, (1993). The 
macroeconomic conditions require that: (i) there must be adequate 
reserves; (ii) the level of exchange rate must be appropriate; (iii) the 
balance of payments must be sustainable in the medium run; and (iv) 
monetary and fiscal policies must be sound, to hold on to an inflation 
target. The microeconomic precondition requires that the industry must be 
sufficiently strong to respond to the threat of competition from imports and 
a global price system. 
In retrospect, the macroeconomic situation prevailing in India during the 
early 1990s did not justify the move to convertibility. The main argument in 
its favour was that there was no alternative. Indeed, the macroeconomic 
crisis provided the basic excuse for an overhauling of the economy. 
1.12 Macroeconomic Preconditions 
(i) Appropriate Exchange Rate 
Exchange rate plays an important role in setting the price level of 
tradables during the initial phase of liberalization. However, the level 
of real exchange rate should be broadly consistent with balance of 
payments sustainability, othen/vise, the removal of trade restrictions 
would generate large imbalances. Exchange rates with trade 
controls are bound to be overvalued. This is because, once controls 
are eliminated, the demand for imports at that rate shoots up. 
Therefore, every liberalization and stabilization programme involves 
depreciation of the local currency. The devaluation can contribute to 
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policy sustainability in two ways. First, a devalued exchange rate 
would promote exports and import substitution (particularly from the 
sectors where protection has been withdrawn). Second, the 
absence of devaluation when the trade liberalization is underway 
would othenwise precipitate the balance of payments imbalances. 
(ii) Adequate Reserves 
The holding of foreign exchange reserves must be adequate, for 
two reasons, to hold on to the required market exchange rate and to 
use as a buffer against seasonal and cyclical shortfalls in the 
balance of payments. A sound reserve position also acts as a 
precondition for establishing the credibility of macroeconomic 
reforms and to ensure commercial creditworthiness abroad. 
How large are adequate reserves? The answer, of course, depends 
on the country's trade instability factors and the climate for capital 
flows. The maintenance of reserves equivalent to at least three 
months imports has been used as a good thumb rule for countries 
with a pegged exchange rate. For example, Korea accepted Article 
VIII in 1988 when its reserves amounted to three months imports. 
Thailand adopted Article VIM in 1990 with reserves equivalent to five 
months imports and Poland had reserves and external lines of 
credit amounting to four-and-a half months' imports when it 
accepted full current account convertibility in 1990. 
The traditional view is that the holding of reserves must be minimal 
in the presence of floating exchange rates, as the demand-supply 
imbalances in the foreign exchange market will be corrected by 
exchange rate changes. Only to defend a peg, the central bank 
needs to hold adequate holdings of reserves. However there are 
two reasons why the need for reserves is greater under floating 
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exchange rates. First, because the exchange rate level is being 
targeted, it requires the holding of adequate reserves. Second, as 
already mentioned, reserves could be held for reasons other than 
financing the balance of payments or managing the float such as 
the need to preserve credit worthiness and to serve as a basis for 
raising foreign loans. Given these arguments, policy makers in 
India need to maintain a given level of desired reserves. 
(iii) Sustainable External Balance 
For convertibility to be effective, the balance of payments situation 
must be sustainable in the medium run. The balance of payment 
constraint is sought to be alleviated through a market driven 
exchange allocation and exchange rate process. Once exchange 
rates are market determined and import controls abolished, firms 
which would be able to pay at the market rates will be using the 
imported inputs. The market rate is expected to self-balance the 
demand and supply of foreign exchange, thus, curbing the excess 
demand situation and correcting the present trade imbalances. 
However, the balance of payments improvement entirely depends 
on the export side. What is the use of new imports if they are not 
used to boost manufactured exports in a bigger way? If the foreign 
exchange inflows get absorbed in the lesser, priority and non-
tradable sectors, additional exports will not be created and it will 
only accentuate the initial trade imbalances. 
India's exports have been determined by a host of external as well 
as internal factors, and the exchange rate can be just one among 
the determinants. In the case of primary exports and exports which 
basically originate from the primary sector, the demand and supply 
factors are more important. The external factors limiting India's 
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exports may include slump in global commodity prices, 
protectionism in the West, changes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and the shifting global comparative advantage 
towards inter-industry trade. 
On the import side, depreciation may be insensitive to the volume 
of imports as well as to the production of import substitutes, since a 
sizeable portion of imports are price inelastic including crude oil, 
fertilizer, edible oil, capital goods, spares and imports under 
government account. The fiscal implications of depreciation are 
also important, since the government is the net spender of foreign 
exchange for imports and debt servicing, 
(iv) Sound Macroeconomic Policies 
Monetary and fiscal policies must maintain a reasonable degree of 
stability in the price level and in the macroeconomic environment 
involving inflationary expectations. Reducing fiscal deficits has two 
important benefits. It restores internal balance by matching the 
supply-demand forces in non-tradables and also restores external 
balance through generation of exportable surplus and curbing 
liquidity, which will act as a check on import demand. The credibility 
and sustainability of reforms depend on how fiscal deficits and 
inflation (also inflationary expectations) remain within certain 
threshold limits. 
As regards fiscal consolidation, certain observations are in order: (i) 
given the urgent need to reduce the current account deficit, which 
was largely due to expansionary monetary and fiscal deficits, a 
case for substantial fiscal adjustment is called for. However, the 
adjustment must be gradual, taking in to account the recessionary 
situation in the industrial sector, (ii) the major brunt of fiscal 
adjustment seems to have fallen on capital expenditure rather than 
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a reduction in revenue deficit. The modest growth in income tax 
receipt has been offset by reductions in customs and excise duties. 
The recommendation of the Chelliah Committee (1993) for a broad 
based tax reform to compensate for the reductions in tariff 
revenues remains in the agenda, (iii) revenue expenditures have 
not fallen, largely due to increase in interest payments and plan 
revenue expenditure which largely consists of social welfare 
schemes. 
On the fiscal side, therefore, the deficits are to be eliminated to a 
large extent and there has to be an adequate tax system in place. 
Excessive adjustment in capital expenditures may operate on the 
economy as a supply shock. 
1.13 Microeconomic Preconditions 
Strength of the Industrial Sector 
The microeconomic precondition requires that industry must be 
sufficiently strong to respond to the threat of competition from 
import and the global price system. The microeconomic benefits of 
protection cannot be ignored altogether in the opening up process 
and the withdrawal of protection must be gradual and pre-
announced. This is important because the efficiency of the 
industrial sector cannot be improved in the short run, nor, is 
resource relocation possible due to low resource mobility. If a large 
part of domestic industries become uncompetitive with the opening 
up of the economy at the new (unified and depreciated) exchange 
rates, loss of industrial output and employment will occur. 
History shows that convertibility has been introduced after sufficient 
strength of the tradable goods sector was acquired and the 
industrial sector liberalized so as to respond to market forces. The 
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newly industrialized countries introduced convertibility long after 
achieving export-led growth viz. Korea in 1988, and Taiwan in 
1980, Indonesia and Thailand implemented convertibility in 1988 
and 1990, respectively. 
At this stage, it would be worth examining the potential 
microeconomic implications of convertibility and trade liberalization 
in India. An analysis of the tariff rate at the new exchange rate 
would reveal that the costs of imports have actually gone up 
substantially even after the tariff reduction, which can be attributed 
to the substantial nominal depreciation of the rupee during 1986-92. 
If this is the case, the threat of competition to Indian industry can 
come only through the elimination of quantitative restrictions. A 
case-by-case analysis of duty rates and landed costs of imports 
was made in the Chelliah Committee report (1993). It was found 
that the nominal rate of protection for the domestic import 
substituting industries was not reduced at new (lower) tariff levels; 
instead it had been enhanced to a significant extent. On an 
average, the landed costs of 50 imported manufactured items in 
1992-93 was 190 percent higher than their 1985-86 level, which 
reveals the continued import substitution bias. The point is that the 
industries using these products face an import cost structure, which 
is almost twice the 1985-86 level. Thus manufacturing enterprises, 
which use these imports can become uncompetitive at the 
prevailing world price. Thus, if the devaluation was necessary to 
establish macroeconomic balance, it has gone against the 
microeconomic strength of manufacturing industries using imported 
inputs. It is not surprising that during this short experience of 
convertibility, the less import intensive industries, particularly from 
the primary sector, could foster a larger increase in exports. 
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The Chelliah Committee (1993) recommended a policy of a pre-
announced tariff schedule to gradually reduce the import weighted 
average rate of duties in India to 25 percent by 1996-97. Such a 
policy had two important benefits; it would discourage investments 
in inefficient import substituting industries and also provide 
sufficient time for the highly protected industries to implement 
restructuring operations. The industries using imported inputs 
would, however have to face the high costs of imports. A rational 
policy alternative would have been to maintain the exchange rate at 
their pre-July 1991 level and adopting a pre-announced tariff 
schedule (even slightly enhanced tariff schedule) after the 
liberalization of imports. The main thrust to devaluation has come 
from the export side, as the official view still holds that devaluation 
in India has a very positive impact on exports (Rangarajan, 1991; 
and Virmani, 1991). 
Conceptually, import tariffs have been considered as a superior 
alternative to devaluation during the transitional period (MacKinnon 
1991). First, import tariffs yield revenue to the Government and, 
thus, improve the fiscal position. Second, devaluation is inflationary 
since it increases the prices of imports and has indirect inflationary 
' impact through resource allocation, whereas tariffs are 
concentrated on a selected group of imports. Third, the reduction of 
tariffs can create an intertemporal substitution effect in favour of 
delaying consumption and, thus, a reduction in the current 
aggregate demand. This happens because consumers delay their 
purchase due to the prospect of future price reduction arising from 
tariff reduction. 
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1.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has covered the need for capital account convertibility and 
the benefits of capital account convertibility. The pitfalls of capital account 
convertibility based on the international experience of South-East Asian 
countries are discussed and also their impact on India. The speed and 
sequencing of convertibility and the preconditions (macroeconomic and 
micro economic) required for it are covered in this chapter. In the following 
chapter, the evolution of India's exchange rate from the pre-Bretton 
Woods period to the current position is highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
This chapter narrates the evolution of India's exchange rate regime in the light 
of major developments in India and world exchange rate systems. The chapter covers 
the Rupee - Dollar movement upto November 2004. 
2.1 Pre-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System in India 
India's currency system has been a point of attention to economists, 
academicians and people-related financial administration of the country. It is not 
a matter of surprise that it has attracted the attention of not less than a world-
class economist like J.M. Keynes who wrote a book in 1913 entitled "Indian 
Currency and Finance'. He noted that the Indian system contained one 
essential feature namely, "the use of a cheap local currency artificially 
maintained at par with the international currency or standard of value is the 
ideal currency of the future". Reviews of India's exchange and currency 
systems can be found in (Jain, 1933; Bell, 1956; Conon, 1952; Bhagwati, 1974; 
Black, 1976; Williamson, 1983, De Cecco, 1984; Edwards, 1984; Jadav, 1988; 
Panchamukhi, 1984; Joseph, 1990; Virmani, 1991;Basu, 1993; JoshiandLittle, 
1993; Pradhan, 1994; Prasad, Rogoff and Kose, 2003; Ha Patnaik, 2003; 
Panagariya, 2004; Sivaprakasam, 2004). Table 2.2 outlines the major events in 
the history of India's exchange rate system since 1931. 
The value of the Rupee was artificially fixed to the Pound Sterling at 1 shilling 
and 6 pence (i.e., £1 = Rs. 13.33) in 1931, following the Hilton Young 
Commission of 1927. [This rate continued till 1946 when the currency system 
had viewed the evolution of the Rupee's exchange rate in the context of the 
growing trade relationship between Britain and India]. The Governor of the 
Bank of England controlled the Indian currency and the Rupee was kept 
overvalued for a long period keeping in view the interests of Great Britain as a 
creditor nation. 
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Dietmar Rothermund writes: 
"The main issue at stake at that time was the maintenance of the exchange 
rate of the Rupee at 1 shilling, 6 pence. The Rupee was clearly overvalued at 
that rate, and the old argument - which had been advanced in 1927 - that the 
rate was in accordance with the prevailing price level, would have sounded 
ridiculous in view of preceding events. It was stated that the rate be maintained 
in order to prevent a "flight from the Rupee" at any cost. Sir George Schuster 
(then finance member of the Government of India) was ordered to follow a 
deflationary policy so that the contraction of the currency would help support 
the exchange rate" (Bose 1990). 
De Cecco (1984) has established that India had a large trade surplus with the 
rest of the world but a continuous trade deficit with Britain. Britain's trade 
surplus with India enabled the former to settle her trade deficits with the rest of 
the world which remained high as Britain was gradually losing competitive 
advantage in relation to the US and Germany. Besides, India maintained huge 
Sterling reserves in London, which were the major sources of reserves for the 
Bank of England. India's Sterling balances at the end of World War II was 
reported at £1.3 billion which constituted 35 percent of the total Sterling 
liabilities of the UK and 52 percent of the Sterling holdings of the overseas 
Sterling area, (according to Bell, 1956; as reported in Joseph, 1990). 
2.2 The Post Bretton Woods Developments 
India's exchange rate system remained intact even after the establishment of 
the Bretton Woods System in 1944, although the existence of Sterling area with 
exchange controls around it was incompatible with the IMF objective. Under the 
Bretton Woods System, members of the Fund were to fix their exchange rates 
in terms of either gold or the US Dollar. However, India complied with the 
agreement by declaring the value of the Rupee in terms of 4.145142857 grams 
of fine gold, but the par value was fixed to the then prevailing Sterling parity at 1 
shilling 6 pence (i.e. £1 = Rs. 13.33). A margin of 1 percent on either side of the 
parity was allowed within which the Reserve Bank committed to buy and sell 
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spot Pound Sterling against ttie Rupee at fixed buying and selling rates. When 
the Pound Sterling was devalued in September 1949 by 30.5 percent against 
the US Dollar i.e., from $4.03 to $2.80, India maintained the Rupee Sterling 
parity at Rs. 13.33, thus allowing the devaluation of the Rupee against the US 
Dollar. This decision was favoured in order to protect the trade interest of India, 
which was heavily concentrated in Sterling area countries. It needs to be 
mentioned here that although India's trade became diversified with an 
increasing proportion of trade being invoiced in the US Dollar (particularly after 
the adoption of currency convertibility by the major West European countries in 
1958) there was no change in the Rupee-Sterling peg till September 1975, 
except for a brief period during 1971 (August-December) when the Rupee was 
pegged to the US Dollar. The Pound predominated in three important areas of 
India's international transactions: currency of pegging, currency of intervention 
and the currency of reserve assets. 
Two major exchange rate developments occurred during the sixties. First, the 
Rupee was devalued by 57.5 percent on June 6, 1966 by bringing down the 
Rupee-Sterling rate from £1 = Rs.13.33 to Rs.21. Since the Pound was fixed in 
terms of the US Dollar, the Rupee-Dollar rate underwent a corresponding 
devaluation, from $1 = Rs.4.7619 to Rs.7.50. The devaluation was essential to 
correct the massive overvaluation of the Rupee, as the Indian economy 
accumulated an overall price rise of over 50 percent during 1951-66 periods. 
Another exchange rate change occurred when the Pound Sterling was 
devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 (14.3 percent) in November 1967. The Indian 
Rupee underwent a corresponding appreciation against the Sterling, from £1 = 
Rs.21 to Rs.18, although the Rupee-Dollar rate was maintained at $1 = 
Rs.7.50. 
2.3 Breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the early years of Floating 
A major change occurred in August 1971 when the US suspended the 
convertibility of the Dollar into gold, leading to the collapse of the Bretton 
Wood's par value system and the floating of many industrialized countries' 
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currencies. On August 22, 1971, the Reserve Bank pegged the Rupee to the 
US Dollar at the prevailing level of $1 = Rs.7.50 that had existed since the 1966 
devaluation, while still retaining the Pound Sterling as the currency of 
intervention. Thus, if the Dollar appreciated against the Pound in the London 
foreign exchange market, the Rupee-Sterling rate was reduced by the same 
extent to maintain the Rupee-Dollar rate. However, the decision was meant to 
be temporary, as the Reserve Bank decided to de-link the Rupee from the US 
Dollar following the Smithsonian realignment of currencies in December 18, 
1971 and pegged to the Pound Sterling at the existing rate of £1 = Rs. 18.9677. 
The Pound served as the currency of peg and intervention. The value of the 
Rupee was fixed to this new Rupee-Sterling parity, but with a wider margin of 
2.25 percent on either side of the parity (thus, giving a band of 4.50 percent) 
that was permitted by the IMF under the new regime. The quick return to 
Sterling peg was observed as a fall-out of Indo-US political and economic 
relations, since India was engaged in a war with Pakistan that had strained her 
relationship with the US and also the suspension of US aid to India (Joshi and 
Little 1987). 
The acceptance of the new Pound-Sterling rate meant a devaluation of the 
Rupee by 5.38 percent across the board, compared to the prevailing rate of £1 
= Rs. 18.00. This arrangement with the Pound Sterling as the peg and 
intervention currency continued even after the UK Treasury floated the Pound 
Sterling effective from June 23, 1972 and also when the US Dollar was 
devalued in February 1973. Since the Pound began floating against the leading 
currencies, the Rupee, in effect, was floating against these currencies and 
those that were pegged to currencies other than the Pound Sterling. 
During this period, severe uncertainties prevailed in the foreign exchange 
markets of the world. With the floating of the Pound Sterling in June 23, 1972 
and the major countries shifting away from the Pound Sterling peg and reducing 
sharply the share of Sterling in their reserve holdings, the Rupee's external 
value became uncertain to traders. As Britain joined the European Economic 
Community in January 1973, the supremacy of Sterling area was virtually 
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abolished. Indeed, the Pound Sterling underwent continued depreciation, due to 
UK's balance of payments crisis and the Rupee also depreciated considerably. 
On the contrary, the Reserve Bank did not use fully its discretionary power to 
revalue the Rupee to the extent of 2.25 percent. Instead, the Rupee was 
allowed to depreciate along with the sliding Pound. The revaluation of the 
Rupee against the Pound Sterling was only 0.093 percent in June 1972 to £1 = 
Rs. 18.60, 0.79 percent in July 1972 to £1 = Rs. 18.80 and 1.06 percent in July 
1975 to £1 = 18.60, which remained till September 1975 when the basket link 
was effected. The depreciation of the Pound Sterling on an effective basis as 
per the IMF data was about 22 percent during June 1972-September 1975. The 
Rupee depreciated on the nominal effective basis by 21 percent during the 
same period. The nominal depreciation of the Rupee did not bring about an 
equiproportionate real depreciation, due to higher inflation in India as a result of 
a four-fold increase in all prices in 1973, which increased the cost of imports. 
Between 1970-75, the depreciation of the Rupee on a real effective basis was 
15.6 percent. On a bilateral basis the Rupee also depreciated by 9.7 percent 
against the US Dollar, 25.1 percent against the Yen, 17.7 percent against the 
Pound Sterling, 39.1 percent against the Deutschemark and 30 percent against 
the French Franc. 
2.4 The move towards a Basket-Linked Exchange Rate System 
The developments in the international monetary and trade environment 
following the adoption of floating by major countries had far-reaching 
implications for the Indian economy. The policy makers were concerned about 
how to protect the Indian economy from the sharp fluctuations of free market 
exchange rates and exogenous shocks such as terms of trade deterioration 
resulting from rising oil costs and decline in primary commodity prices. Pegging 
to a single currency meant accepting float against rest of the floating currencies 
and against non-floating currencies that were pegged to a different standard. 
The single currency peg was no longer feasible for the Rupee, as India's trade 
pattern had already diversified. The Rupee had to be protected from free 
market fluctuations. 
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On September 25, 1975 the Rupee was delinked from the Pound Sterling and 
linked to an undisclosed basket of currencies. This arrangement, which 
remained till February 1992, retained the Pound Sterling as the intervention 
currency and the Reserve Bank daily established the Rupee-Sterling rate. The 
exchange rates of the Rupee against all other currencies were determined on 
the basis of the cross rates with the Rupee-Sterling rate and the Sterling value 
of the concerned currencies In the London market. The number of currencies 
included in the basket as well as their relative weights was kept confidential by 
the Reserve Bank, presumably to avoid speculation. A five percent margin on 
either side of the basket related parity introduced an element of discretionary 
management and the Reserve Bank made suitable adjustments in the parity 
through appropriate changes in the Rupee-Sterling rate. The broad objectives 
of the basket-pegged regime have been spelt out by the RBI as follows: 
"On September 24, 1975, the Government of India, on a view of the exchange 
rate movements considered it necessary to change over immediately to a new 
arrangement which, on balance, might be expected to import a greater measure 
of stability to the Rupee's exchange rate and in consequence, to India's 
international transactions. Accordingly, the Rupee was delinked from the Pound 
Sterling from that date and a new arrangement was adopted effective 
September 25, 1975 under which the exchange value of the Rupee was 
determined with reference to the daily exchange rate movements of the 
selected number of currencies of the countries which were India's major trading 
partners (commonly known as the basket of currencies). The selection of the 
currency units and the weights to be assigned to them was left to the discretion 
of the Bank subject to the approval of the Government. The Pound Sterling, 
however, continued as the currency of intervention" (RBI 1983). 
In pursuance of this decision, the Reserve Bank's rates for spot Pound Sterling 
were revised with effect from September 25, 1975, so as to give a new middle 
rate of Rs.18.3084 per Pound. Thus, the central rate of Rs.lOO = 5.2721 was 
no longer valid. While effecting subsequent changes in the exchange value of 
the Rupee, the Bank maintained the Rupee value of the basket of currencies 
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within a band of 2.25 percent on eitlier side of the base value of Rs. 18.3084, 
adopted at the time the multi-currency basket was introduced. Effective January 
30, 1979, however, the exchange rate Is being maintained within a wider band, 
not exceeding 5 percent on either side, the change being found necessary in 
the light of developments in the currency markets which had been 
characterized by large and erratic fluctuations. The change, it was felt, would 
help in fixing a more appropriate exchange rate for the Rupee and in imparting 
a measure of stability to that rate (RBI, 1983). 
The basket-pegged system has been generally accepted by the developing 
countries that have relatively well diversified trade patterns. It provided scope 
for a more flexible management of the Rupee for India. The adjustment norm of 
5 percent on either side of the parity implied that the authorities may or may not 
effect a change to the full extent. Secondly, once an adjustment was effected, 
whether full or part of the stipulated margin, the new parity became the basis for 
determining the 5 percent margin on either side for subsequent Rupee-Sterling 
rate change. This discretion transformed the basket arrangement into a 
managed floating currency in practice. Indeed, the IMF classified the Indian 
exchange rate system from 1979 onwards as the "managed floating" system 
instead of a pure basket peg. 
One important advantage of the basket peg regime was that a desired effective 
exchange rate target was achieved without undertaking any discrete exchange 
rate change. As one component of the currency basket i.e., the Rupee-Sterling 
rate, served as the intervention currency, a series of backdoor devaluations 
could be affected over an extended period of time to achieve a large change 
(Table - 2.2 for the Rupee-Sterling rate changes). This was the main strategy of 
exchange rate adjustment pursued during the eighties. Another advantage of 
the basket peg was that it enabled implementation of exchange rate policy in 
line with national preferences. For instance, India could allow its exchange 
rates to depreciate due to market forces by refusing to Intervene through the 
Rupee-Sterling rate change. 
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The Rupee-Sterling rate was devalued on a step-by-step basis by 2.8 percent 
during 1975-79, i.e. from £ 1 = Rs. 18.31 to 17.80. This, however, led to 
depreciation of 5.7 percent of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER^). 
The larger fall of the NEER was mainly due to the fall of the US Dollar in world 
foreign exchange markets during the period along with which the Rupee also 
slid. However, there was a steep depreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate (REER )^ by 15.3 percent, since domestic inflation had grown slower than 
the combined foreign inflation. 
NEER^ - Nominal effective exchange rate measures the relative price of two 
currencies (say, units of domestic currency per US Dollar), 
REER^ - The real effective exchange rate establishes the relative purchasing 
power of two currencies in the goods markets. The real exchange rate has 
been obtained by deflating the nominal rate by an index of relative prices 
between home and abroad. 
2.5 Exchange Rate policies in the Eighties 
The years during the eighties were the most turbulent period in worid foreign 
exchange markets, characterized by unprecedented volatility and large swings 
in major country exchange rates. There were two distinct phases in the 
movements of the major country exchange rates. The first phase spans the 
period 1980-85 and the second phase over 1985-87. There was a sharp 
appreciation of the US Dollar and a decline of all other major currencies during 
1980 to 1985. At the end of the first quarter of 1985, the appreciation of the 
Dollar was 90 percent against the Steriing, 58 percent against the 
Deutschemark, 48 percent against the Swiss franc and 25 percent against the 
Yen. In the second phase (1985-87), the US Dollar fell sharply. The reversibility 
of the exchange rates around their trend line made the Reserve Bank effect 
frequent Rupee-Steriing rate changes, which increased from just 1 in 1976 to 
34 in 1980 and 154 in 1985. However, the average magnitude of change in the 
Rupee-Steriing rate gradually declined i.e. 3.08 percent in 1976, 3.49 percent 
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in 1977, and 1.45 percent in 1979 and less than 1 percent tliereafter. This 
revealed the strategy of the Reserve Bank of effecting small but frequent 
discretionary devaluations of the Rupee, something very much similar to the 
crawling peg arrangements of the Latin American countries. 
During 1980-85, the Reserve Bank had to appreciate the Rupee against the 
Pound Sterling to achieve an orderly decline of the Rupee against the US 
Dollar. The Rupee depreciated against the US Dollar by 36 percent, and at the 
same time appreciated against the Pound by 31 percent and 38 percent 
against the French Franc. On the whole, the Rupee actually appreciated in 
nominal and real effective terms during the period. Indeed, between 1979-83, 
the appreciation was 12.3 percent in NEER and 21 percent in REER. The 
external value of the Rupee was fast deteriorating during the second half of the 
eighties. Between 1985-90, the NEER depreciated by almost 50 percent and 
the REER by 30 percent. 
2.6 Exchange Rate adjustments in July 1991 and March 1992 
Two significant exchange rate adjustments were made duhng 1991-92. The 
first was in July 1991 when the Reserve Bank sharply devalued the Rupee in 
two stages, to £1 = Rs.34.36 on 1^' July and to Rs.41.56 per Pound on 3"^ July. 
These were the first discrete adjustments since the 1966 devaluation of the 
Rupee. The second adjustment was in March 1992 when the Rupee was made 
partially convertible. The shift from the basket peg to the new regime based on 
partial convertibility was partly a surrogate for the devaluation of the Rupee. 
There was a one-shot depreciation of the Rupee following the introduction of 
partial convertibility, from Rs.26 to Rs.30 a US Dollar and from Rs.45 to Rs.50 
a Pound Sterling (based on the market rate). While the market rate had 
undergone sharp devaluation, the official rates for the US Dollar were pegged 
at Rs.25.954 for imports and Rs.25.826 for exports (rates are converted from 
the indirect quotations). 
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With these two changes during 1991-92, the Rupee underwent considerable 
nominal and real devaluation against all major currencies important to India's 
trade. Most of the devaluations were achieved primarily after 1985 and during 
1991-92. The prolonged devaluation of the Rupee in nominal and real terms 
during the period revealed the strategy of the policy makers to use the 
exchange rate for the balance of payment adjustments. 
2.7 Macroeconomic Crisis: 1990-91 
The movement towards convertibility was in response to the macroeconomic 
crisis that shattered the Indian economy during 1990-91. The macroeconomic 
crisis was the reflection of an unprecedented foreign exchange crisis with 
unsustainable payments deficits, rapid depletion of reserves, mounting external 
debt burden, and unmanageable budget deficit and inflation (Rangarajan, 
1991). 
The basic underlying factors for the balance of payment crisis were high 
internal inflations (11.60 percent in 1990-91), large fiscal deficit (10.5 percent of 
GDP in 1990-91) and high internal debt build up (about 48 percent of GDP). 
The current account imbalances reflected an excess of national expenditure 
over national income, a situation aptly termed as a "nation that lives beyond its 
means". The exchange rate depreciation in real terms did not work since the 
imbalances arose primarily from expansionary policies and the liberalized 
import structure. Although real exports grew by about 10 percent in the second 
half of the 1980s, it was insufficient to meet the increased demand for imports 
after its partial liberalization and rapid growth in interest payments on external 
debt. 
The current account deficit was sustained mainly by borrowing from 
commercial sources and NRI deposits, which with short maturities and variable 
interest rates, resulted in a bunching of repayment burden towards 1990. The 
size of external debt reached $75 billion in March 1990, 45 percent of which 
was contracted from private creditors at variable interest rates. The debt 
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service payments had reached 30 percent of export earnings, which was close 
to some of the heavily indebted countries such as Indonesia (31 percent), 
Mexico (28 percent), Nigeria (20 percent), and Turkey (28 percent). 
The foreign exchange crisis was worsened by the Gulf war that began in 
August 1990 and resulted in shortfall in exports to West Asia, loss of 
remittances from Kuwait and Iraq, foreign exchange costs of emergency 
repatriation and, above all, additional cost of oil imports due to the oil price 
increase. The Gulf crisis coincided with recessionary trends in the West that 
had depressed the demand for India's exports. Furthermore, the economic 
decline in Eastern Europe led to a contraction of exports to these markets. The 
uncertain political climate at home along with the precarious balance of 
payments situation led to the erosion of India's credit ratings abroad. Moodys' 
Investor Services, the US based credit rating agency, had downgraded India's 
status to BB, the highest speculative grade for long term debt. 
There were indications that the net resource transfer on account of official and 
private credit became negative in 1990-91 i.e. the fresh inflows were not even 
adequate to meet the obligations on account of amortization and interest 
payments. The level of foreign exchange reserves fell to just $1 billion in 1990-
91. This desperate situation led the Reserve Bank to sell 20 tonnes of gold in 
May 1991 and pledge another 46.91 tonnes in July 1991, to meet foreign 
exchange needs. An imminent foreign exchange crisis loomed large before the 
Indian economy. 
2.8 Economic Reforms: The Rationale 
The unsustainable balance of payments situation, which was aggravated by the 
Gulf crisis in August 1990, could be considered as the symptom of a disease 
caused by the trade and industrial regime, which had protected the economy 
from both internal and external competition. Without going into any empirical 
verification, the following propositions, which have been well accepted in the 
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literature, (Bhagawati and Srinivasan, 1993; Rangarajan, 1993; Nayar, 1993; 
Joshi and Little, 1993) can be stated: 
i. The import-substituting inward looking trade regime adversely affected 
domestic productivity and specialization. 
ii. The inefficiency of the trade regime had much to do with prohibitive tariffs 
and a pervasive system of import controls. 
iii. Quantitative restrictions (QRs) and high tariffs created an extremely high 
level of protection and incentive for import substitution in manufacturing 
and, therefore, led to a pronounced anti-export bias. 
iv. The shrinking share of India's exports in global trade could be considered 
a reflection of receding export competitiveness and the absence of a right 
kind of commodity mix in the export basket. 
V. India's poor export performance occurred at a time when the East Asian 
economies forged way ahead in terms of export growth. 
vi. There was a high allocation in the budget on export subsidization and 
duty reimbursements to exporters. 
vii. Non-market allocation of foreign exchange and administered rate fixation 
gave rise to parallel market trade, mis-invoicing and capital flight. 
viii. Unauthorized markets also acted as conduits, for the financing of 
smuggling operations into and out of the country. 
ix. The black market for foreign exchange was largely supported by the 
official gold movements into India. Domestic gold price was higher and 
increasing faster than the international gold price and this supported gold 
smuggling into India. 
2.9 From crisis to convertibility 
The adoption of current account convertibility and exchange unification was a 
part of the IMF-supported structural adjustment programme for India that began 
in 1991. Following the acceptance of this programme, India devalued the 
Rupee by 21 percent against the Pound and 22 percent against the Dollar in 
July 1991. This was followed by important trade policy changes. One of them 
was the suspension of the Cash Compensatory Support (CCS) for exporters. 
The redundancy of the CCS scheme was felt after devaluafion, because after 
adjusting for removal of the CCS, there was a net devaluation gain to 
exporters. However, the relative incentive structure was different across 
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sectors, since the cash subsidies were different for different sectors and the 
industries with high import intensity suffered a cash loss. 
Another change was the replacement by the "Exim Scrip" scheme of the 
existing system of Replenishment licenses (Rep licenses), which were issued 
to exporters to replenish imported raw materials required for the production of 
exportables. Rep licenses were granted on the basis of rates, which were in the 
range of 10 to 20 percent of the f.o.b value of exports. Although the Rep 
licenses were issued to meet input requirements for the production of 
exportables, the issue of licenses in many cases was ad hoc and, therefore a 
secondary market existed where such licenses could be sold at a premium (the 
premium was about 25 percent in June 1991). 
The EXIM scrip scheme brought rationalization to the Rep license scheme, by 
granting to all exporters, to cover even those who were not using imported 
inputs, a standard rate of import entitlement at 30 percent of the f.o.b. value of 
exports (which was revised to 40 percent for some import intensive sectors). 
The scrips were made freely tradable which fetched, to begin with, about 40 
percent premium to exporters. Thus, the EXIM scrip scheme established a dual 
exchange rate system between the exporter and importer and, in a way, the 
scheme did not benefit the highly import intensive exports. 
The 1992-93 Budget scrapped the EXIM scrip scheme for two reasons. First, 
the premium on the scrips dropped from about 45 percent to 10 percent, which 
made them an unattractive proposition. Second, the scheme could be misused 
since the scrips were in the bearer form. The incentive aspect of the EXIM scrip 
scheme was sought to be incorporated through the 'partial convertibility' of the 
Rupee effective from March 3, 1992. The Reserve Bank termed this as the 
"Liberalized Exchange Rate Management System" (or LERMS as it is termed). 
This system established dual exchange rates for the Rupee, by creating a free 
market rate and an official rate. It envisaged that 60 percent of all exchange 
receipts on current account be surrendered at market exchange rates 
determined by the authorized dealers (ADs.) of foreign exchange - mainly 
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commercial banks - and the remaining 40 percent exchanged at the Reserve 
Bank's official rate. Since the market rates were depreciated by about 15 
percent below the official rates, exporters got a rate equivalent to the weighted 
average of the market rate and the official rate (at 60:40 norm), while most of 
the private imports were paid at the (depreciated) market rates. The 40 per-
cent amount surrendered to the Reserve Bank at the official rate was used 
generally for meeting payments for imports of national priority such as crude 
oil, fertilizers, life saving drugs and some government imports. 
The partial convertibility system was considered superior to the EXIM scrip 
scheme since the premium on official rate (i.e. the market rate) was for 60 
percent of the total exports, as against about 30 percent of total exports in the 
EXIM scrip scheme (Virmani 1993). It is important to note that with the 
introduction of partial convertibility in March 1992, the basket-peg arrangement 
was totally dispensed with. The official announcement was that the Reserve 
Bank's quotations of official rates for the 40 percent of export earnings were 
decided on the basis of the basket mechanism hitherto adopted. However, the 
Reserve Bank chose to maintain an implicit US Dollar peg at $3,853 for imports 
and $3,872 for exports per Rs.lOO for the period March-December 1992 and 
there was, thus, no such thing as the basket. Effective March 1992, Section 40 
of the RBI Act was amended to replace the Pound Sterling by the US Dollar as 
the currency of intervention. 
2.10 Full convertibility of Current Account 
The system of partial convertibility seemed to have worked well, as far as the 
trend in the exchange rate level was concerned. The stability of the Rupee 
around its medium term trend provided the necessary confidence to the 
government to adopt full convertibility of the Rupee on current account in the 
Budget of 1993-94. Moreover, the system of partial convertibility was 
considered as a tax on exporters, since 40 percent of the foreign exchange 
earnings were surrendered at a discount (of about 15 percent) from the market 
rates. The full float of the Rupee on current account effective March 1993, thus 
eliminated the earlier dual exchange rate system. Free market forces of 
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demand and supply have determined exchange rates of the Rupee and 
imports, including the government imports, are transacted at these market 
rates. This heralded a new era in the history of exchange rate management in 
India. 
2.11 Capital Account Convertibility 
In his budget speech for 1997-98, the Union Finance Minister Shh P. 
Chidambaram indicated that the regulations governing foreign exchange 
transactions needed to be modernized and he felt the time had come for 
preparatory work towards capital account convertibility. This led to the setting 
up of Tarapore Committee to recommend measures that should be taken to 
achieve full capital account convertibility and to specify the sequence and time 
frame in which such measures were to be taken. The committee in its 
recommendations gave a set of pre conditions to be fulfilled in a phased 
manner from 1997 - 98. We study the recommendations of Tarapore 
Committee for their implications on exchange rates in detail in Chapter - 4. 
2.12 Foreign Exchange Regulations 
The Foreign Exchange Regulations Act (FERA) of 1973 and its amendments 
were replaced on June 1®' 2000 by the Foreign Exchange Management Act 
(FEMA), which established a simplified regulatory regime for foreign-exchange 
transactions and liberalized capital-account transactions. It also appointed the 
RBI as the sole monitor of all capital-account transactions. The Act put all 
foreign-exchange offences under the purview of civil law (these were criminal 
offences under FERA), thus subjecting them to only monetary penalties. 
FEMA dictates, among other things, the conditions for Indians holding foreign 
currency and immovable property outside India (or vice versa) and rules for 
exporters. 
The rupee has been fully convertible on the current account since August 1994. 
Under FERA, all foreign-exchange transactions that were not specifically 
authorized were prohibited; FERA later reversed this, so that only specifically 
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prohibited activities are not allowed. Every transaction involving foreign 
exchange is subject to controls set out in the RBI's Exchange Control Manual, 
which specifies procedures to be followed by authorized dealers. (Mainly banks 
are licensed to deal in foreign-exchange transactions). 
New rules effective from June 1®' 2000, when the Foreign-Exchange 
Management Act came into force, affect current-account transactions. The 
new regulations raised the ceiling on withdrawal of foreign exchange for a host 
of current-account transactions, including private and business travel abroad. 
For private visits, the cap was raised to US $10,000 from US $5,000. Anything 
exceeding US $10,000 within 12 months requires the approval of the RBI. For 
overseas business travel, the ceiling for release of foreign exchange was 
raised to US $25,000 per person, regardless of length of stay. Earlier the limit 
was a daily allowance of US $350-500 for a maximum of 45 days. The rules 
include a negative list, which bans withdrawal of foreign exchange for remitting 
earnings from lotteries, racing or other hobbies overseas, buying lottery tickets 
or paying for call-back services. The RBI also allowed branches of foreign 
companies operating in India to remit profits to their head offices, through 
authorized dealers of foreign exchange without the RBI's prior approval. The 
RBI directed all authorized foreign-exchange dealers to accept unlimited 
foreign-currency notes or travellers cheques from tourists and non-resident 
Indians visiting India where the proceeds are to be credited to the resident and 
non-resident accounts of the tenderers. It also asked bankers not to insist on 
further documentation or to enquire into the source of the instruments, provided 
they follow the normal safeguards prescribed for credit into non-resident 
accounts. In September 2002, the RBI allowed authorized dealers to release 
up to US $50,000 for medical treatment abroad without extensive 
documentation. 
There have been some advances on capital-account convertibility, though it 
remains largely a one-way benefit - foreign institutional investors may bring in 
funds that may be repatriated, and Indian companies may borrow from 
international markets with the RBI's approval. But Indian residents and firms 
may not freely convert the rupee in order to acquire assets or lend funds 
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overseas. The government and the RBI have slowly liberalized capital-account 
transactions, by allowing Indian companies to make limited investments abroad 
and ADR or GDR issues fund such investments 
2.13 The'Managed Float'system 
Although the exchange rate system in India is supposed to be a full float, the 
RBI intervenes in the market at regular intervals to direct the movement in 
Rupee values (thus the term "managed float"). The intervention by the RBI in 
the market could be passive (whereby the apex bank engaged in off-market 
deals) or active (whereby it purchases or sells Dollars). Intervention could also 
be made through statements (to the press or otherwise) in times of exchange 
rate crises, or in extreme circumstances, through a package of monetary and 
other measures. Therefore, it may well be stated that the exchange rate system 
in India is not exactly full float. 
The accompanying Table - 2.1 summarizes the alternative exchange rate 
systems in use across the world. As we move from the top to the bottom of the 
Table, the degree of flexibility that the system imparts to the economy declines. 
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Table - 2.1: Alternative Exchange Rate systems in use across the world 
Regime Main Features Comments 
Free Float Value of foreign exchange freely 
determined. 
Virtually no country has pure float. 
The U.S., Germany, Switzerland 
(and Japan, according to some) 
come close. 
Managed Float A managed float may be 
conceived as a float with wide 
bands, with the (undisclosed) 
position of the bands providing 
the criterion for intervention. In 
this system, central bank 
intervention in the market is 
sporadic. 
Many advanced economies have 
adopted this regime, e.g. Canada, 
Australia, (Japan, according to 
others) and Mexico, following the 
1994-95 crisis, India falls into this 
category. 
Floating within a 
Band (Target 
Zone) 
The nominal exchange rate is 
allowed to fluctuate (somewhat 
freely) within a band. 
This is the exchange rate 
arrangement of the European 
Monetary System (ERM). 
Crawling Band A band system where the central 
parity crawls over time. 
Israel adopted this system in 
December 1991. Chile had a 
widening band from 1986 to mid-
1998; Italy between 1979 and 
1991. 
Crawling Peg The nominal exchange rate is 
adjusted periodically to a set of 
indicators (usually lagged inflation 
differentials) and not allowed to 
fluctuate beyond a narrow range. 
This system as popular during the 
1960s and 1970s in Chile, 
Colombia and Brazil. 
Fixed-but-
Adjustable 
Exchange Rate 
This is the Bretton Woods 
system. The nominal exchange 
rate system Is fixed, but the 
central bank is not obliged to 
maintain the parity indefinitely. 
This is the most popular system. 
Most developing countries held on 
to (variants of) this system 
(Mexico, 1983-1993) after the 
formal collapse of Bretton Woods, 
and continue to do so in practice. 
Currency Board In this system, the exchange rate 
is strictly fixed, with institutional 
(legal and even constitutional) 
constraints on monetary policy. 
The monetary authority can only 
issue domestic money when it is 
fully backed by inflows on foreign 
exchange. 
When faced with major external 
shocks countries have abandoned 
this regime. Currently, Hong Kong 
has a currency board. 
Full Dollarisation. In this system, the country 
concerned gives up its monetary 
autonomy completely by adopting 
another country's currency. 
There have been only few 
instances of full Dollarisation. It 
worked well in Panama. 
Source: Edwards and Savastano, National Bureau of Economic Research - 1999. 
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As the Table shows, the exchange rate system in India is quite flexible (the 
managed float system is second only to free float in terms of flexibility) and has 
worked well so far. Interestingly, although the Indian system is flexible, the RBI 
has not hesitated to intervene in the foreign exchange market (both spot and 
fonward). And, it has always intervened with a definite purpose (either implicit or 
explicit) and sometimes continuously for several days. For instance, it has now 
prioritized its intervention patterns in the foreign exchange markets, given the 
adverse effects of exchange rate volatility on export growth. 
2.14 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the evolution of India's exchange rate regime in the light of 
major developments in India and world exchange rate systems is covered. The 
major exchange rate systems in use in the world are given in Table - 2.1. The 
major events in the evolution of India's exchange rates are given in Table - 2.2. 
Table - 2.3 gives the details of the exchange rates of the Rupee against the US 
Dollar. For more than five decades, the Rupee has been steadily depreciating 
from the level of Rs.2.4 per US Dollar prior to 1947 to Rs.49.07 in June 2002. 
From July 2002 onwards, the Rupee has appreciated from Rs.49.07 per US 
Dollar to Rs.43.40 per US Dollar as of March 2004. From April 2004, the Rupee 
has again started depreciating and reached the level of Rs.46.16 per US Dollar 
as of 30"" September 2004. On 7'^  December 2004 it reached a level of 
Rs.43.70. This shows lot of volatility in the exchange rate of Rupee - Dollar in 
the last nine months. 
After discussing the evolution of exchange rate regime in India, now it seems 
necessary to review the existing literature in depth on capital account 
convertibility, exchange rate management and corporate risk management to 
develop the study further. This is covered in the following chapter. 
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Table - 2.2: The Evolution of India's Exchange Rate Regime (At a glance) 
Year Type of change 
1931 The Indian Rupee was formally pegged to the Pound Sterling at the 
prevailing rate of Re.1 =1 shilling 6 pence (or £1 = Rs. 13.33). A de-facto 
Sterling standard for the Rupee was established. 
1946 India intimated the par value of the Rupee at Re.1 = 0.268601 gm of fine 
gold, retaining the Rupee Sterling peg at Re.1 = 1 shilling 6 pence. 
1949 Sterling devalued from $4.03 to $2.80 (30.5 percent) in September. The 
Rupee Sterling rate remained at Re.1 =1 shilling 6 pence, but the gold 
value of the Rupee was reduced to Re.1 = 0.186621 gm and the Dollar-
Rupee rate devalued to $1 = Rs.4.7619. 
1961 Full current account convertibility was restored to Sterling in February. 
The Dollar pool arrangement within the Sterling area began and this 
weakened the Sterling area link 
1966 The Rupee was devalued by 57.5 percent on June 6 against the Sterling 
i.e. £1 = Rs. 13.33 to Rs.21.00. The corresponding devaluation of the 
Dollar from $1 = Rs.4.7619 to Rs.7.50 and the gold parity from Re.1 = 
0.186621 gm to 0.118489 gm 
1967 Sterling was devalued in November from $2.80 to $2.40 (14.3 percent) 
and thus the Rupee-Sterling parity changed to £1 = Rs. 18.00, while the 
US Dollar and gold parity remains unchanged since 1966. 
1971 The Bretton Woods System broke down in August, The Rupee was 
pegged to the US Dollar of $1 = Rs.7.50 but re-pegged to the Pound 
Sterling at £1 = Rs. 18.9677 in December, with a margin of 2.25 percent 
on either side. 
1972 The Pound Sterling was floated on June 23. India's Pound-Rupee parity 
was revalued on June 26 to £1 = Rs. 18.95. RBI temporarily suspended 
the purchase of US Dollar between June 24 to October 9. Rupee was 
revalued to £1 = Rs. 18.80 on July 4 due to the depreciation of the Pound 
against US Dollar. 
1975 The Rupee was pegged to an undisclosed currency basket on 
September 25 with the prevailing margin of 2.25 percent on either side. 
The Rupee Steriing rate served as the intervention currency fixed at the 
time of £1 =Rs.18.3084. 
1979 The margins around the basket related parity was broadened to 5 
percent on January 30, thus giving a 10 percent band. 
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1991 (a) The Rupee was devalued by 21 percent through Rupee Sterling 
rate, from £1 = Rs.34.36 to Rs.37.19 on July 1 and to Rs.41.56 on 
July 3. The Rupee depreciated by 22 percent against the US 
Dollar fronri $1 = Rs.21.20 to Rs.25.80. 
(b) A dual exchange rate system was introduced through EXIM scrips, 
granting exporters freely tradable import entitlements equivalent to 
30-40 percent of export proceeds. 
1992 (a) The Liberalized Exchange Rate Management System was 
introduced under which 40% of the proceeds of exports and 
inward remittances are purchased at the official rate of exchange 
by the Reserve Bank for official use. All other receipts and 
payments are converted at the market rate of exchange. 
Permissible receipts and payments on capital account are 
transacted at market rates (except in the case of transactions like 
IMF flows). 
(c) The US Dollar became the intervention currency with effect from 
4*'^  March. 
1993 India shifts to "market determined exchange rate". 
1994 Full convertibility of the Rupee on current account announced. 
1997 Dr. C. Rangarajan, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, on February 28, 
1997 appointed a committee under the Chairmanship of Sri S.S. 
Tarapore to recommend measures for capital account convertibility. 
2000 Foreign Exchange Management Act replaces Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act of 1973. 
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Table - 2.3: Rs. per US Dollar from 1947 to 2004 
Prior to 1947 2.40 
UptoJuneS, 1966 4.76 
From June 6, 1966 to Mid-December, 1971 7.50 
IVIid-December 1971 to End-June, 1972 7.28 
72-73 7.71 
73-74 7.79 
74-75 7.98 
75-76 8.65 
76-77 8.94 
77-78 8.56 
78-79 8.21 
79-80 8.08 
80-81 7.91 
81-82 8.96 
82-83 9.67 
83-84 10.34 
84-85 11.89 
85-86 12.24 
86-87 12.78 
88-89 14.48 
89-90 17.22 
90-91 19.61 
91-92 29.10 
92-93 31.50 
93-94 31.37 
94-95 31.43 
95-96 34.35 
96-97 35.88 
97-98 39.53 
98-99 42.50 
99-00 43.65 
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00-01 46.85 
01-02 48.83 
02-03 47.53 
03-04 43.39 
30'*^  June, 04 45.98 
30'^ ^ July, 04 46.45 
31" Aug, 04 46.34 
30*^  Sept, 04 46.16 
29*'' Oct, 04 45.45 
30''' Nov, 04 44.75 
Source: RBI Website - rbi.org.in 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE SURVEY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter, an effort is being made to study the existing literature in a 
detailed and systematic manner so that the research gap could be identified. For a 
structured presentation of the literature review, it has been classified into three distinct 
categories, namely, capital account liberalization, exchange rate management and 
corporate risk management. 
The first part deals with the review of literature on capital account liberalization 
and the pre-requisites for moving towards capital account convertibility. The literature 
survey leads to the identification of major macroeconomic factors affecting exchange 
rates. Then, the review of literature on exchange rate management and corporate risk 
management is done to identify the research gap. On the basis of this gap, the 
objectives and the scope of the study have been presented. Data sources, 
methodology, sample selection, collection of data, data analysis and limitations of the 
study have been presented under separate sections. 
3.1 Review of literature on Capital Account Liberalization 
Most economists agree that in the past two decades, the world has slowly but 
steadily moved towards greater capital account openness. While this trend may 
have been deeper in developed countries, it is not necessarily restricted to 
them. In the words of Michel Camdessus (1988), the then IMF's managing 
director, "there is considerable amount of work to be done at the national and 
international level to ensure that the pre-conditions for the freedom of capital 
movements are in place. The big picture is clear. There is an irresistible trend 
towards Capital Account Convertibility". 
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Economic theory suggests a number of benefits that may accompany capital 
account liberalization. Open capital account can foster a more efficient 
allocation of resources, provide opportunities for risk diversification and help 
promote financial development. 
There is a large and growing literature that tests the potential benefits of capital 
account liberalization through its influence on long-run growth and 
development, by directly investigating the empirical relationship between 
capital account liberalization and economic growth. 
Almost all of these studies augment a basic growth model that includes 
variables such as the investment, population growth, the level of GDP and the 
level of schooling. 
Quinn's (1997) is one of the first studies to identify a positive result between 
capital account liberalization and growth. Quinn's empirical estimates suggest 
that change in capital account liberalization has a strong significant effect on 
growth in real GDP per capita in his cross section of 58 countries over the 
period 1960 to 1989. 
Klein and Olivei (1999) find a positive effect of capital account liberalization on 
growth among industrial countries, but they do not find evidence that capital 
account liberalization promotes growth in non-industrial countries. They 
conclude, based on a cross section of 82 developed and developing countries, 
that beneficial effects of Capital Account Liberalization are achieved only in an 
environment where there is a constellation of other institutions that can usefully 
support the changes brought about by the free flow of capital. 
Bailliu (2000) also finds that Capital Account Liberalization spurs growth by 
promoting financial development. 
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The growth effects of Capital Account Liberalization depend upon the level of 
development of an economy is supported by the results presented in Edwards 
(2001). 
Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) find that effect of Capital Account 
Liberalization across countries depends on the degree of macroeconomic 
stability. 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) examine the impact of Capital Account 
Liberalization and stock market liberalization on economic growth. They find 
that liberalization leads to increase in GDP. 
Klein (2003) provides evidence that Capital Account Liberalization significantly 
contributes to growth among middle-income countries but not among*the poor 
or the richest countries. This finding that the middle income countries benefit 
from Capital Account Liberalizafion through capital fiows is consistent with the 
view of Rodrik (1999) that countries require adequate institutions, regulatory 
policies and supervisory agencies to benefit from capital flows. 
Dr Y.V. Reddy (2000) states that there is a broad consensus on Capital 
Account Liberalization but it should be gradual, well sequenced and undertaken 
in conjunction with several other measures at the macro and micro level. He 
advocates limifing external debt, especially short-term and adequate foreign 
exchange reserves. He stated, "Optimal level of reserves and their 
management is very critical to overall capital account management, especially 
the senfiments prevailing in the foreign exchange market". 
Ashok K. Lahiri (2004) states, "Important lesson that emerges from the East 
Asian crisis is that the interaction between highly liquid global markets and 
poorly supervised financial systems can lead to a financial disaster. At the time 
of crisis, all crisis-affected countries had weak supervision and a somewhat 
inadequate reporting system. Relative openness on the Capital Account led to 
a lending boom and the eventual bursting of an asset bubble. The solution is 
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not in postponing liberalization, but appropriately sequencing capital account 
liberalization and financial sector reforms. 
In the light of the above views, it is understood that capital account 
liberalization is very important for mobilizing private foreign capital and it is very 
essential for growth and progress of developing countries. The literature survey 
further reveals that there is a need for sequencing of capital account 
liberalization, but the ways and means of sequencing the capital account 
liberalization is not shown. 
An expert committee, popularly known as the Tarapore Committee was 
appointed by RBI to examine along with other things the sequencing of capital 
account liberalization and the pre-requisites for moving to capital account 
convertibility. 
The recommendations of the Tarapore Committee and the pre-conditions set 
out for Capital Account Liberalization are studied in detail in the following 
Chapter No.4. These recommendations have major implications on factors 
affecting the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Now, the literature available on Exchange Rate Management is studied in 
detail. 
3.2 Review of literature on Exchange Rate IVIanagement 
Prof. H.K. Pradhan (1993) in his paper on exchange rates discusses India's 
balance of payment problems and devaluation. Currency devaluation 
generates price incentives for exports in two ways: it increases the domestic 
currency price or reduces the foreign currency prices of exports (or a 
combination of both). International evidence suggests that the supply 
elasticities of the primary product are extremely low and the external price 
and income elasticities are also low. The low external price and income 
elasticities would imply that countries couldn't boost the volumes of exports at 
the given US dollar price. 
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Arvind Virmani (1997) stated that private capital flows transformed the foreign 
exchange markets. He argued that capital flows generally had a long-term 
horizon and must therefore be based on projections about future development 
of the economy. Expectations therefore entered the picture. From experience 
we have learnt that political uncertainty, social upheaval and perceptions of 
Governmental indecisiveness had a negative effect on expectations. 
The effect of private investment flows is that the exchange rate and its future 
evolution are important factors in determining the profitability of foreign 
investment and therefore on the investment flows. This introduces circularity 
into the determination of exchange rates. Virmani further pointed out that trade 
imbalance and expectations have a major impact on exchange rates. 
Arvind Virmani (1999) also warned that fiscal deficit had risen dangerously high 
and it would have an impact on the current account deficit as it was due to 
increase in defense imports. 
The recent literature (Patnaik, 2003; Calvo & Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2002) has argued that India has had highly limited currency flexibility over the 
1979-2002 period. Sometimes there has been a fixed exchange rate peg (such 
as the period in the 1990s where the exchange rate was 31.37 per Dollar). This 
literature has shown that while India made a great deal of progress on removing 
restrictions on the current account and capital account in recent decades, little 
has changed in terms of exchange rate flexibility. 
Patnaik (2003) discusses that net capital inflows during 1993 to 1995 were met 
by unsterilized intervention: RBI purchased foreign exchange to keep the 
nominal exchange rate constant and thus to keep the real rate from 
appreciating. The paper concludes that as a consequence, reserve money and 
M3 expanded, leading to higher inflafion. The paper then contrasts this with the 
second episode of capital flows starting from April 2002, which was handled by 
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sterilized intervention and reduced monetary growth. Inflation remained low but 
the gap between Indian and global short-term interest rates widened and 
consequent arbitrage inflows into India. This increased the currency volatility. 
RBI faces three paths for implementation of India's de-facto peg to the US 
Dollar and reducing the volatility in exchange rates. They are: 
(1) Direct intervention on the currency market 
(2) Intervention on the currency market at the behest of RBI through other 
banks such as State Bank of India 
(3) Indirect instruments: money supply, interest rates and administrative 
controls. 
One view advanced by several distinguished economists, including Prof. 
Kenneth Rogoff of IMF during his visit to India, is that the Rupee should be 
allowed to appreciate freely in line with market trends. According to this view, 
there is no strong case for RBI's intervention as reserves are already very high. 
RBI's purchases create substantial additional domestic liquidity, which may be 
destabilizing in the long run. There is also no evidence that unconstrained 
appreciation or volatility would affect growth prospects or lead to any other 
macro-economic problem. 
An exactly opposite view held by the Confederation of Indian Industries is that 
RBI should intervene more aggressively in the market to further reduce the 
degree of currency appreciation. The main argument in favour of this view is 
that India must maintain its global competitiveness, particularly in relation to 
China which has a fixed exchange rate vyith the dollar and whose currency has 
been depreciating along with it. 
A third view that has been recently put forward by a leading economic journal 
(Economic Times) is that RBI should pursue what it has referred to as a policy 
of "calculated volatility". It has been argued that the present policy of controlled 
volatility has provided virtually risk-less gain to market participants since the 
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rupee has been expected to appreciate substantially and continuously over the 
past few months. According to this view, in order to prevent excessive capital 
inflows during this period, RBI should have allowed the exchange rate to quickly 
"overshoot" the targeted exchange rate of say Rs.46.20 (or any other number) 
to say Rs.45.50. Thereafter, RBI should have allowed the rupee to depreciate 
slowly to be above the targeted number over a period of the next few months. 
In essence, this view is akin to a policy of fixed exchange rate within a wider 
band. An implicit assumption is that the level (whatever it is) is either already 
known or will be known to the market as it is approached. RBI's past 
experience does not suggest that these assumptions are valid. It should be 
recalled that there have been periods when rupee exchange rates have been 
relatively more volatile and movements have been sharper. However, during 
periods of sharper appreciation, instead of flows declining and demand for 
foreign currency rising, RBI noticed that actual market behaviour was the 
opposite. The opposite was true during periods of sharp depreciation. 
Dr Bimal Jalan (2003), stated that a fixed exchange rate regime (even with a 
currency board) was clearly out of favour. He quoted the Brazilian, Argentinean 
and Asian crisis and said even a strong Board type arrangements of a fixed 
peg vis-a-vis the Dollar was found to be unviable. He said the dominant view for 
most countries - floating or flexible exchange rates - was the only sustainable 
way of having a less crisis prone exchange rate regime. In regard to the 
desirable degree of flexibility in exchange rates, opinions and practices vary. 
But a completely "free float" without intervention is clearly out of favour except in 
respect of a few global or reserve currencies like the Euro and the Dollar. Even 
in respect of these currencies, concerns are expressed at the highest levels 
when the movement is sharp in either direction. Studies by IMF and several 
experts also show that by far, the most common exchange rate regime adopted 
by countries including industrial countries, is not a free^float. Most Of the 
countries have adopted managed floats with HO^^ )iC»%ij)iR9dnB5^ jDath and 
Central Bank intervention periodically. #^ -^ . , l^^^' 
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In view of the considerable turbulence and volatility faced by foreign exchange 
markets in several countries in the recent past, policy issues relating to the 
management of the external sector, particularly the appropriate exchange rate 
systems, have figured prominently in ongoing discussions on international 
financial architecture in various fora, such as the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, Financial Stability Forum and the Bank of International 
Settlements. India has been participating in all these discussions along with 
Central Bank Governors and Finance Ministers of Industrial and other 
developing countries. 
Floating rates, capital movement volatility, massive changes in technology and 
integration of worldwide markets across different time zones, are relatively new 
phenomena. India is still on the learning curve. Recent changes have brought 
tremendous benefits to India by removing capital and technological constraints 
to developments. As new horizons open, we are faced with new challenges on 
exchange rate volatility (Y.V. Reddy, 2004). 
The study of Golakanath (2003) has recommended for exploring non-linear 
modelling technique to understand the exchange rate behaviour of the Rupee 
against the Dollar, but till now no study is available as recommended by him. 
This study after establishing the relationship between macroeconomic variables 
and the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar using univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis, builds an exchange rate forecasting model. 
3.3 Review of Literature on Corporate Risk IVIanagement 
The modern finance theory (as reflected in the capital asset pricing model and 
the arbitrage pricing theory) regards hedging activities aimed at a reducing total 
corporate risk (measured by the variability of the firm's cash flows) as 
irrelevant. Under certain plausible conditions, the capital asset pricing models 
as well as the arbitrage pricing theory show that unsystematic (or diversifiable 
or unique) risks are not priced in the financial market. Put differently, 
unsystematic risk has no bearing on the required rate of return. Only 
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systematic risk (or market risk) is priced and, hence, has an influence on the 
required rate of return. 
Since the price of systematic risk is identical for all the participants in the 
financial market, a firm does not benefit its shareholders by laying it off in the 
financial market. Thus, according to this line of reasoning, in an efficient 
market the expected net present value of any risk hedging activity like taking 
insurance cover or buying a fonward contract is zero. As Alan C Shapiro and 
Sherid Titman say: "Management decisions to insure or hedge assets appear, 
at best, neutral mutations (having no effect on the value of the firm). At worst, 
such actions, to the extent they are costly, are viewed as irrational behaviour 
penalizing corporate stockholders". This argument implies that company-
specific risks (or unsystematic risks) do not hurt the shareholders, as long as 
they do not jeopardize the existence of the firm. 
Prasanna Chandra (1999), however, questioned the above view. Although 
unsystematic risk may have no bearing on the required rate of return in the 
financial market, unmanaged unsystematic risk can and often does hurt 
shareholders. In terms of the DCF model of firm valuation, unsystematic risk 
may lower the expected cash flows (the numerator in the DCF model), even 
though it has no influence over the discount rate (the denominator in the DCF 
model). 
Why does higher total risk lower the expected cash flows of the flrm? Other 
things being equal, a firm with a high total risk exposure is likely to face 
financial difficulfies, which tend to have a disrupting effect on the operating side 
of the business. Inter alia, a distressed financial condition will detract from 
value because of adverse incentives, weakened commitment, and diminished 
tax shelters. 
In today's world, managing corporate risks is a daunting task. In coping with 
this challenge corporate managers will have to bear in mind the following 
interrelated guidelines of understanding the firm's strategic exposure, 
employing a judicious mix of real and financial tools, proacfively managing 
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uncertainty, aligning risk management witli corporate strategy and learning 
when it is worth-reducing risk. 
Richard Friberg (1999), in his book "Exchange Rates and the Firm" says, 
"exchange rate is part of wider macroeconomic risks, especially those relating 
to domestic interest rates, inflation rates and political developments. Individual 
firms ward off adverse effects of exchange rate fluctuations on their asset 
values and net profits by taking recourse to instruments of hedging - forwards, 
futures, swaps and options". 
A number of studies have attempted to provide insights into the practices of 
risk management within the corporate sector. Reports by Price Waterhouse 
(1994, 1995) describe corporate practices in the wider area of treasury 
management. Glaum/Roth, 1993; Batten, 1993; Aabo, 1999; and Greenwich 
Treasury Advisors, 1999; focus on the exchange risk management practices of 
multinational corporations. 
Bodnar, 1995, 1996, 1998; Grant/Marshall, 1997; Howton/Perfect, 1998 and 
Bodnar/Gebhardt, 1999; have reported on the use of derivatives for risk 
management in their papers. These empirical studies are interesting not only 
from an academic standpoint but they also provide managers with information 
on the current practices of other firms. This kind of information is valuable since 
it allows managers to critically assess and analyse their own strategies. 
CohenA/Viseman (1997) explained which questions should be asked in this 
context: "Companies should use this information to assess where they stand in 
comparison with other companies. The findings of the studies do not 
necessarily represent best practice, but they should be used as a guide for a 
treasury to compare with other organisations and their practices. 
Andrew P. Marshall (1999) surveyed the foreign exchange risk practices of 179 
companies. The main objective of managing foreign exchange risk was found 
to be minimization of fluctuation in earnings and seeking certainty of cash 
flows. This survey established that companies placed more emphasis on 
transaction risk management. 
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Claudio Loderer and Karl Pichler (2000) surveyed 96 firms listed in Zurich 
Stock Exchange. This survey found that the firms were unable to quantify the 
currency risk profile. These firms failed to understand properly why currency 
risk reduces firm value. The results found in this survey raised many questions 
for future research. One of the most challenging was the reduction of economic 
exposure with on-balance-sheet instruments on the one hand and micro 
hedging of transaction exposure with currency derivatives on the other. 
Martin Glaum (2000) surveyed 74 companies in Germany and found that the 
majority of the firms managed their transaction exposure. Most firms adopted a 
selective hedging strategy based on exchange rate forecasts (73%). Only a 
small minority of firms did not hedge foreign exchange risk at all (11%). A few 
companies hedged their transaction exposure completely (16%). 
The studies cited above explain that there is a need for hedging the foreign 
exchange risk by corporates using the available derivative products, but there 
is no research study in India showing the hedging of risk by corporates and 
their methodology etc. 
3.4 Research Gap 
From the literature review on Capital Account Liberalization, exchange rate 
management and corporate risk management, it is clear that various studies 
have been made but the direction of these studies lack the following: 
(i) Sequencing of Capital Account Convertibility and the pre- conditions 
required for Capital Account Convertibility in India. 
(ii) Identification of various macroeconomic factors affecting exchange rate 
of the Rupee against the Dollar and the relationship of these factors with 
the exchange rates. 
(iii) Exchange rate forecasting based on non-linear statistical models. 
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(iv) Survey of Indian companies for studying tlieir foreign exchange risk 
management practices. 
3.5 Justification for the study 
Under the present condition of available literature and the gap in the existing 
studies, there is a need to have a detailed study, which should Incorporate the 
sequencing of capital account convertibility and the pre-conditions required for 
capital account convertibility in India. There is a close link between capital 
account convertibility and the various macroeconomic factors affecting the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. The study aims to identify the 
macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange rates and the relationship 
between them. Further, there is a need to look into the recent volatility in the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. Exchange rate forecasting is 
attempted based on statistical models using the identified macroeconomic 
factors. There is a need to look into the foreign currency risk management 
practices of the Indian companies, which will help the companies manage their 
foreign currency risk in a better manner. Based on primary data collection 
through questionnaire survey, the study aims to help companies by suggesting 
measures for improving their foreign currency risk management. 
3.6 Objectives of the Study 
(1) To study the recommendations of the Tarapore Committee for Capital 
Account Convertibility, it's sequencing and the present status of 
implementation in India to identify macroeconomic factors affecting the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
(2) To examine the recent volatility in exchange rates and to demonstrate its 
continuance based on simulation. 
(3) To establish a relationship between Macroeconomic factors and 
Exchange rates for forecasting the Rupee-Dollar Exchange Rate. 
(4) To study the foreign currency exposure risk management of selected 
Indian companies through a survey and interview. 
(5) To suggest measures for handling foreign exchange exposure for Indian 
companies. 
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3.7 Scope of the Study 
1) While studying the macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange rates, 
the study limits itself to the data for the period 1991 to 2004. 
2) The study is confined to Rupee-Dollar only. 
3) The companies covered are predominantly Chennai-based companies 
having exposure to foreign exchange on account of imports, exports or 
foreign currency loans. 
3.8 Data Sources and Collection 
Primary data from the corporates and secondary data from the handbook of 
statistics on the Indian economy, Reserve Bank of India, annual report of the 
Reserve Bank of India, the website of Reserve Bank of India viz. 
www.rbi.org.in. Center for Monitoring Indian Economy and the Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release of the US government are used for the study. The 
secondary data are very reliable and sound. Primary data collection was made 
through questionnaire survey on Chennai-based companies. The views of 
experts/knowledgeable people in the foreign exchange field namely Chief 
Financial Officers of companies, bankers and regulators with respect to foreign 
exchange risk management for Indian companies are also obtained through 
personal interviews. 
3.9 Methodology 
(a) Monte Carlo Simulation to demonstrate the volatility in exchange 
rates 
The daily exchange rates of the Rupee against Dollar from January 1973 
to November 2004 were studied to understand the behaviour of the 
exchange rates. The exchange rates have steadily depreciated from 
1947 to June 2002. From July 2002, the rupee has turned volatile. 
Using Monte Carlo simulation the volatility of exchange rates is studied. 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique is a well-known technique that 
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uses random numbers generated from a uniform distribution and maps 
the relative frequency to the random numbers generated. Each time 
when a random number corresponds to a specific relative frequency, the 
exchange rate that is associated with that category is taken as the 
prediction for the next period. Monte Carlo simulation method is equally 
applicable when random numbers are generated from a standard 
probability distribution such as the normal distribution. In this case, the 
cumulative probability of the standard normal distribution is taken as the 
basis for predicting the exchange rate. 
(b) Exchange Rate Forecasting 
The forecasting of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
using a forecasting model based on multivariate regression analysis is 
attempted. Macroeconomic data from 1991 to 2004 have been used for 
this purpose. For the empirical analysis of exchange rates (the 
dependent variable) and nine other macroeconomic variables 
(independent variables) for the years 1991 to 2004, the univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis are used. The data analysis and results 
are discussed in the chapter-5 on exchange rate volatility and it's 
forecasting. 
(c) Primary data collection through questionnaire survey 
125 Chennai-based companies were identified, which had exposure to 
foreign exchange on account of imports, exports or foreign currency 
loans from the database of Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. 
Structured questionnaires were sent to the Chief Financial Officers of 
these companies. 54 responses were received and the analysis of the 
above is covered in Chapter-6, Implications of Exchange Rate 
Management for Indian Companies. The Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) was used for the above analysis. 
The macroeconomic variables selected for data analysis are: -
(1) Exchange Rate 
(2) Bank Rate 
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(3) Balance of Payments 
(4) External Debt 
(5) Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Institutional Investment in 
India 
(6) Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(7) Gross Domestic Product 
(8) Fiscal Deficit 
(9) Inflation 
(10) US Federal Interest Rate 
3.10 Operational Definitions: 
The above mentioned macroeconomic variables are defined below: -
(1) Exchange Rate: 
Exchange Rate is the price (rate) at which one currency is exchanged 
for another currency. It is the number of domestic currency units per US 
Dollar. 
(2) Bank Rate: 
Bank rate is the rate at which the Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India) 
lends to the banking system in India. 
(3) Balance of Payments (BOP): 
BOP is a tabulation of the credit and debit transactions of a country with 
the foreign countries and international institutions during a specific 
period. It broadly consists of: 
I. Current Account 
(a) Exports of Goods I Net Visible Balance of Trade in 
Imports of Goods f Goods 
(b) Trade in Services 
> 
Government 
Transport 
Travel 
Financial and Other Services 
V Net Invisible Balance 
of Trade in Services 
(c) Other Current Accounts transactions 
Government 
Others 
(a) + (b) + (c) Current Account Balance 
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II. Capital Account 
Investments in India 
Investments Overseas 
Other Capital transactions 
III. Foreign Exchange Reserves 
IV. Errors and Omissions 
I + II + III + IV = Overall Balance 
(4) External Debt 
External Debt is the total amount of borrowings outstanding at the end of 
each year and includes the following: 
(a) Government borrowings from Bilateral and Multilateral agencies 
(both concessional and non-concessional) 
(b) Government borrowings from International Monetary Fund 
(c) Borrowings of the public sector, financial institutions and 
commercial banks 
(d) Trade credit (buyers' credit and suppliers' credit) 
(5) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Institutional Investment 
(FN) 
The Balance of Payments manual of the International Monetary Fund 
has defined FDI as "The Category of International Investment that 
reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in 
one economy, in an enterprise, resident in another economy" (IMF 
Balance of Payments Manual, 1993). 
According to the World Trade Organization "FDI occurs when an 
investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in 
another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset". 
The management dimension is "what distinguishes FDI from portfolio 
investment in stocks, bonds and other financial instruments (FN 
Investments)" 
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(6) Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Foreign Excliange Reserves represent claims on another country held in 
the form of currency of that country, interest bearing bonds or gold. 
(7) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Gross Domestic Product is a measure of the total flow of goods and 
services produced by a country over a specified time period, normally a 
year or a quarter. GDP is obtained by valuing outputs of goods and 
services produced in the country at market prices and then aggregating 
them. 
All intermediary goods are excluded and only goods used for final 
consumption or investment goods (Capital Goods) or changes in stocks 
are included. 
The income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad is 
not included in GDP, and only the value of flow of goods and services 
produced in the country is estimated, the word "domestic" is used to 
distinguish it from the Gross National Product. 
(8) Fiscal Deficit 
Fiscal Deficit is calculated by taking the total expenditure of the 
government and reducing from it the total revenue receipts and other 
receipts excluding the borrowings of the government. It is the budget 
deficit plus the borrowings of the government. 
(9) Inflation 
Inflation is the increase in the general level of prices. CPI means 
Consumer Price Index, which measures the increases in the prices at 
the consumer level. 
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(10) us Federal Interest Rate 
This is the rate at which the Central Bank in the USA (Federal Reserve 
Bank) lends to the banking system in the US. 
3.11 Hypothesis Development 
Hypothesis 1: Bank Rate and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between bank rate and exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the bank rate and exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 2: Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Balance of Payments and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Balance of Payments and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 3: External Debt and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the External Debt and exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the External Debt and exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 4: FDi and FN and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the FDI and FN inflows and exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the FDI and FN inflows and exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
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Hypothesis 5: Foreign Exchange Reserves and Exchange Rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Foreign Exchange Reserves and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hypothesis 6; Gross Domestic Product and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Gross Domestic Product and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Gross Domestic Product and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
Hypothesis 7: Fiscal Deficit and Exchange Rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Fiscal Deficit and exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Fiscal Deficit and exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar 
Hypothesis 8: Inflation (Based on CPI) and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the Inflation (Based on CPI) and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the Inflation (Based on CPI) and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
Hypothesis 9: US Federal Interest Rate and Exchange Rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar 
Ho: There is no relationship between the US Federal Interest Rate and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Hi: There is a relationship between the US Federal Interest Rate and 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
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3.12 Limitations of the study 
(i) Predominantly Chennai based companies only were considered in our 
sample, 
(ii) Only the Rupee against Dollar exchange rates has been taken for the 
study, 
(iii) The macroeconomic data are limited to the period 1991-2004. 
(iv) Political factors and speculation have not been considered in the study. 
These factors have shown influence on exchange rates from time to 
time, 
(v) The companies who have responded are very limited in numbers and do 
not represent all the sectors of the economy. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TARAPORE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
ITS PRESENT STATUS 
In this chapter, the recommendations made by the Tarapore Committee 
for capital account convertibility and its present status of implementation in India 
is studied. The major pre-conditions laid down by the committee for capital 
account convertibility and the current position as of November 2004 are 
summarized. Based on this and the literature review, the macroeconomic factors 
affecting the exchange rate of the Rupee against the US Dollar are identified. 
The Union Finance Minister Shri P.Chindambaram in his budget speech 
for 1997-98 had indicated that the regulations governing foreign exchange 
transactions needed to be modernized and replaced by a new law consistent with 
the objective of progressively liberalizing capital account transactions. 
To quote: "I believe that the time has come for preparatory work towards 
capital account convertibility. This is a cherished goal. It is also a matter of great 
sensitivity. Hence, I shall not make any commitment. For the present, I am asking 
RBI to appoint a group of experts to lay out the road map towards capital account 
convertibility, prescribe the economic parameters, which have to be achieved at 
each milestone and work out a detailed time table for achieving the goal. I 
believe the appointment of such a group will send a powerful signal to the world 
about our determination to join the ranks of frontline nations". 
Dr. C. Rangarajan, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, on February 28, 
1997 appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Shri S.S.Tarapore with 
four other members. 
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4.1 The Terms Of Reference 
The terms of reference to the committee was to recommend measures 
that should be taken to achieve full Capital Account Convertibility and to 
specify the sequence and time frame in which such measures are to be 
taken. 
The Committee after examining the international experience of various 
countries and also looking into India's macro and micro economic 
conditions suggested the following far reaching recommendations 
Those recommendations, which are having direct or indirect impact on 
Capital Account Convertibility, are discussed below: 
1. The Committee was of the view that an open capital account has 
several benefits: the availability of a larger capital stock to 
supplement domestic resources and thereby higher growth, 
reduction in the cost of capital and improved access to international 
financial markets. Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) allows 
residents to hold an internationally diversified portfolio, which 
reduces the vulnerability of income streams and wealth to domestic 
real and financial stocks, lower funding costs for borrowers and 
prospects of higher yields for savers. An associated gain from CAC 
is the dynamic gains from financial integration. Allocative efficiency 
improves as a result and that can stimulate innovation and improve 
productivity. CAC provides the impetus for domestic tax regimes to 
rationalize and converge to international tax structures. This 
removes inducements for domestic agents towards evasion and 
capital flight. The Committee emphasises that capital controls turn 
progressively ineffective, costly and even distortive. 
73 
2. The Committee recognized that the institution of financial sector 
reforms in India brought into the open weaknesses, which had been 
in the system for a long time. The introduction of CAC requires 
more proactive policy measures as an open capital account could 
bring these weaknesses under sharper focus. CAC would impose a 
strong discipline upon the financial system and would expedite the 
early rectification of infirmities in the system and lead to 
widening/deepening of markets to enable the spreading/distribution 
of risks. 
4.2 The International Experience 
The Committee's survey of the international experience with CAC 
revealed that countries, which initiated the move to CAC on the basis of 
strong fundamentals, were able to modulate the pace of instituting CAC 
without undertaking large and dramatic shifts in the stance of 
macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, these countries were less 
vulnerable to backtracking and the re-imposition of controls. Countries 
with weak initial conditions were constrained to adopt drastic 
macroeconomic policies to facilitate the move to CAC. Some of these 
countries had to face interruptions and re-introduce capital controls in the 
evolution of CAC. 
The Committee noted that most countries considered a strong balance of 
payments position as a necessary precondition for the move to CAC and 
universally built up reserves. The Committee's survey of the country 
experiences showed that strengthening of the financial system emerged 
as the most important precondition for CAC. Fiscal consolidation was 
another important precondition for CAC among all countries. An important 
concomitant in the process of CAC was the conduct of an appropriate 
exchange rate policy. 
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In the specifics of capital account liberalization, in the countries studied by 
the Committee, restriction on inflows and related outflows by non residents 
and residents were removed first, followed by relaxation of restrictions on 
outflows by residents. Among residents, corporates and non-banks usually 
received preferential treatment, followed by commercial banks and 
individuals. Most countries maintained or were required to impose some 
controls on capital inflows during the transition to CAC. 
4.3 Preconditions/Signposts for Capital Account Convertibility 
Based on an assessment of macroeconomic conditions, the Committee 
was of the considered view that the time was appropriate to initiate a 
move towards CAC. The Committee, however, recognized, that the initial 
conditions do contain certain weaknesses and the entrenchment of 
preconditions can be achieved in the Indian context only over a period of 
time. The establishment of preconditions needed to be viewed as 
processes rather than as one-time indicators. The Committee therefore 
recommended that the implementation of CAC be spread over a three-
year period 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. The Committee stressed 
that implementation of measures towards CAC should be sequenced 
along with the authorities making an assessment of the progress towards 
the attainment of the preconditions/signposts stipulated for the relevant 
year and depending on this assessment the implementation of measures 
could be accelerated or decelerated. 
Fiscal consolidation, a mandated inflation target and strengthening of the 
financial system should be regarded as crucial preconditions/signposts for 
CAC in India. In addition, a few important macroeconomic indicators 
should also be assessed on an on-going basis. These are: the conduct of 
exchange rate policy, the balance of payments and the adequacy of 
foreign exchange reserves. 
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4.4 Fiscal Consolidation 
The Committee recommended a reduction in the GFD/GDP ratio from a 
budgeted 4.5 percent in 1997-98 to 3.5 percent in 1999-2000. The 
reduction in the Centre's gross fiscal deficit should be accompanied by a 
reduction in the States' deficit and as a reduction in the quasi-fiscal deficit. 
The practice of financing the amortization of Government market loans out 
of fresh borrowings is clearly unsustainable and this practice would 
inevitably result in a crisis situation. The lO''' Finance Commission 
recommended the institution of a Consolidated Sinking Fund (CSF) for the 
public debt and the Committee while strongly endorsing this 
recommendation, stressed that the institution of a CSF is an important 
Ingredient in the achieving of the precondition on fiscal consolidation. 
Monetary management is often clouded by the monetary authorities' 
concern about the Government's borrowing programme and therefore, the 
Committee recommended that steps should be initiated to separate the 
debt management policy from monetary management and to this effect 
the Government should set up its own Office of Public Debt. The RBI 
should totally eschew from participating in the primary issues of 
Government borrowing. 
Transparent and internationally comparable procedures for fiscal 
accounting should be adopted so as not to blur the true magnitude of the 
GFD/GDP ratio as also the constituents of the budget as a whole. The 
Committee recommended that the Government of India should consider 
an early introduction of a system of fiscal transparency on the lines of the 
New Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
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4.5 Mandated Inflation Rate 
In the context of the move towards CAC, effecuve jrieasurgs-sliould be 
taken to evolve a more specific commitment on the inflation rate. The 
Committee recommended that there should be an early empowering of the 
RBI on the inflation mandate. There should be a medium-term inflation 
mandate approved by Parliament and only Parliament should alter that 
mandate. Once the mandate is given, the RBI should be given freedom to 
use the instruments at its command to attain the medium-term inflation 
target. Intensification or withdrawal of public intervention in price formation 
or a shock in the real sectors could warrant a review of the mandate but 
there should be clear and transparent guidelines on the circumstances 
under which the mandate could be changed. The Committee 
recommended that the mandated rate of inflation for the three-year period 
1997-98 to 1999-2000 should be an average of 3-5 percent. Such a 
mandate would be necessarily needed to provide for greater 
independence for the RBI. 
4.6 Consolidation in the Financial Sector 
The Committee recommended that interest rate should be fully 
deregulated in 1997-98 and there should be total transparency to ensure 
that there are no formal or informal interest rate controls. 
The strengthening of the financial system is the most important 
precondition to the move to CAC. Noting the systemic dangers of some of 
the weak banks growing at rates faster than the system, the Committee 
recommended that the weak banks should be converted into what are 
called 'narrow banks'. The incremental resources of such banks should be 
restricted only to investments in Government securities and in extreme 
cases of weakness not only should such banks not be allowed to increase 
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their advances but there would need to be a severe restraint on their 
liability growth. Such measures are unavoidable if the financial system is 
to be safeguarded during the move towards CAC. 
The Committee recommended that the financial institutions should also be 
made to function with a targeted mandate to reduce the quantum of NPAs 
within a time-bound programme. 
4.7 Exchange Rate Policy 
The RBI should have a Monitoring Exchange Rate Band of +/-5.0 percent 
around the neutral Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). The RBI should 
ordinarily intervene as and when the REER is outside the band. The RBI 
should ordinarily not intervene when the REER is within the band. The RBI 
could, however, use its judgment to intervene even within the band to 
obviate speculative forces and unwarranted volatility. The Committee 
further recommended that the RBI should undertake a periodic review of 
the neutral REER, which could be changed as warranted by 
fundamentals. 
The Committee stressed that credibility of the exchange rate policy would 
be vital in the context of CAC and to this extent there must be 
transparency in exchange rate policy: (i) the neutral REER i.e. the base 
period should be announced (ii) the REER Monitoring Band should be 
declared (iii) the REER should be published on a weekly basis with the 
same time lag as the publication of the reserves and (iv) changes in the 
neutral REER should be made public. 
The Committee recommended that as part of exchange rate management, 
greater attention should be focused on ensuring that the fonward 
exchange markets reflect the interest rate differentials. 
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4.8 Balance of Payments 
The Committee recognized tliat in view of the growing degree of 
integration of the Indian economy, the size of the current account deficit 
(CAD), which can be sustained without encountering external constraint, is 
a function of the degree of openness of the economy, which can be 
defined in terms of the ratio of current receipts (CR) to GDP. Accordingly, 
the Committee recommended that, as a broad rule of thumb, over the 
three-year period 1997-98 to 1999-2000, external sector policies should 
be designed to ensure a rising trend in the CR/GDP ratio from the present 
level of 15 percent and the endeavour should be to reduce the debt 
service ratio gradually from 25 percent to 20 percent. The CAD/GDP ratio 
would need to be consistent with the above parameters. 
4.9 Adequacy of Reserves 
In the context of a move to CAC, capital flows would have a more 
significant effect on the balance of payments and conventional indicators 
in terms of import cover does not provide a good indicator of the adequacy 
of reserves. As a broad guideline, the Committee recommended that the 
following four indicators be used in the Indian context for evaluating the 
adequacy of reserves: 
(i) Reserves should not be less than six months of imports; this ratio is 
higher than earlier norms as it would take into account the 
uncertainties and volatility in capital flows, which can arise in the 
context of a move towards CAC. Under this formulation, the foreign 
exchange reserves required would be about US $22 billion. 
(ii) Reserves should not be less than three months of imports plus 50 
percent of debt service payments plus one month's exports and 
imports to take into account the possibilities of leads and lag. On 
this basis the requirement would be US $24 billion. When more 
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accurate data on leads and lags are available, the requirement for 
resources could be adjusted appropriately. 
(iii) The short term debt and portfolio stock which is equivalent to 70 
percent of the level of reserves should be lowered to 60 percent by 
using a formulation that incremental short term debt and portfolio 
liabilities should be accompanied by equivalent increase in 
reserves which would ensure that this ratio would decline to the 
desired extent. On this basis the required reserves would be US 
$31 billion. 
(iv) The net foreign exchange assets to currency ratio (NFA/Currency 
ratio) should be prescribed by law at not less than 40 percent. The 
requirement would be about US $26 billion. 
4.10 Strengthening of the Financial System 
The Committee recommended that a uniform regulatory system was 
needed for banks and non banks particularly FIs in relation to prudential 
norms, market participation, reserve requirements and the interest rate 
regime. 
In the context of a move towards CAC, the Committee recommended that 
reserve requirements on banks' non-resident liabilities and overseas 
borrowings should be at least on par with those on domestic liabilities. 
Furthermore, as one of the instruments for moderating capital inflows, the 
RBI should use the instrument of CRR to impose higher reserve 
requirement on non-resident liabilities including overseas borrowings. 
The Committee was of the view that risk management is a critical area, on 
which banks and non-banks (Including FIs) must bestow immediate 
attention. Towards this, the Committee recommended that: 
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(i) RBI should prescribe prudential norms for rupee mismatches. 
(ii) Banks should move to 100 percent mark-to-market valuation of 
Investments 
(iii) Banks should adopt best practices of risk management suggested 
by the Expert Group on Foreign Exchange markets (Chairman Shri 
O.P. Sodhani) 
(iv) Banks should follow international accounting and disclosure norms 
(v) Capital prescriptions should be stipulated for market risk. 
A successful move to CAC required an effective supervisory regime, which 
would be able to pick up the warning signals and weaker entities would be 
required to be monitored more closely and frequently. 
As risks faced by the financial sector were much higher in developing 
countries, the Committee recommended that the RBI should consider the 
imposition of even more stringent capital adequacy standards than the 
Basle norms and income recognition and asset classification norms should 
be tightened expeditiously. There could also be steeper capital 
requirements for banks with higher level of NPAs. 
The Committee was of the view that much more was needed to be done to 
enable public sector banks to operate with a greater degree of autonomy 
to cope with the rapidly changing environment. The Committee 
recommended that the more efficient public sector banks were to be 
allowed, nay actively encouraged, breaking away from the pack and their 
activities should not be hemmed in by concerns for the weak banks. The 
Committee recommended that the FIs should also be given a greater 
degree of operational freedom within the framework of strict prudential 
norms. While issues of autonomy are often posed as one of the 
regulator/owner giving freedom to the entities, there is also the issue of 
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entities taking on their rightful autonomy. The Boards should be so 
constituted that they effectively operate as autonomous units. The 
Committee emphasized that autonomy is never given, it is always earned. 
The Committee recommended that a comprehensive banking legislation 
and an enforcement machinery be put in place not only to reduce the 
quantum of NPAs but also to ensure that such framework serves as a 
deterrent for future defaulters. In the context of CAC, a comprehensive 
review of all banking and finance related enactments needs to be taken 
up, which have engendered inflexibilities/rigidities in the system. 
The Committee was of the view that without a greater degree of 
technology absorption, the market participants will be ill equipped to build 
strong risk management systems and management information systems. 
Up-gradation of technology can pave the way for an efficient payment and 
settlement mechanism, which will strengthen the financial system 
considerably. 
The Committee underscored the need for strong initiatives on the part of 
market participants to upgrade their human resource skills for enabling 
Indian financial entities to compete meaningfully with their counterparts 
abroad. In order that they attract the best talent and expertise, individual 
banks and FIs should have freedom to determine their personnel policies 
including recruitment and wage policies without being constrained by any 
rigidity. 
4.11 Timing and sequencing of measures 
The Committee recommended that alongside further measures of 
liberalization of capital inflows it was desirable to simultaneously liberalize 
controls on outflows as a means of contending with capital inflows. An 
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early albeit cautious beginning to allow capital outflows is desirable as the 
system is attuned to a totally rigid ban on certain outflows and the system 
needs to develop confidence that some capital outflows, far from being 
destabilizing, would be conducive to the overall efficiency of deployment of 
resources. 
The Committee recognized that while the timing and sequencing of CAC 
proposed can be undertaken under the existing laws and regulations 
relating to foreign exchange, they would be facilitated by the proposed 
change in the legislative framework governing foreign exchange 
transactions. 
The timing and sequencing of measures for liberalization of capital 
outflows and inflows are set out in a tabular form given in Table - 4.1. 
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Table •4.1 
Implementation of Tarapore Committee recommendations and the current 
position after passing through the three phases recommended by the 
committee 
($ indicates US dollars) 
Item 
COPORATES/BI 
A. Corporates/B 
1. Issuing 
foreign 
currency 
denominated 
bonds to 
residents (only 
rupee 
settlement) and 
investing in 
foreign 
currency 
denominated 
bonds and 
deposits (only 
rupee 
settlement) 
2. Financial 
capital transfers 
abroad 
including for 
opening 
current/ 
chequeable 
accounts 
3. Accessing 
capital markets 
abroad through 
GDRS& 
ADRs/other 
forms of equity 
issues 
Position 
as of April 
1997 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
JSINESSES 
usiness - Residents 
Not permitted 
Not permitted 
Permitted 
individually by 
Government. 
Approval under 
FERA given by 
RBI 
To be permitted 
without any ceiling 
$25,000 per 
annum 
No approval to be 
taken from 
RBI/Government. 
Reporting within 30 
days from close of 
issue. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
$50,000 
per 
annum 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Phase III 
1999-2000 
Same as 
Phase 1 
$100,000 
per annum 
Same as 
Phase 1 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Not 
permitted 
Upto 
$25000 
permitted 
per annum 
Permitted 
as per GOI 
guidelines 
under 
automatic 
route, 
subject to 
complying 
with 
prescribed 
conditions. 
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Item 
4. External 
Commercial 
Borrowings 
(ECB) 
Position 
as of April 1997 
ECB are subject 
to overall ceiling 
with sub- ceilings 
as indicated 
below: 
(i) Import linked 
short- term loans 
(Buyers/ 
Suppliers credit) 
for less than 3 
years (i.e. 35 
months) 
approved by RBI 
subject to sub-
ceiling fixed by 
Government, 
(ii) Loans 
beyond 35 
months 
approved by 
Government, 
(iii) US $ 3 
million for a 
minimum period 
of 3 years for 
business related 
expenses 
including 
financing rupee 
cost of the 
project-approved 
by RBI within 
sub-ceiling fixed 
by Government, 
(iv) All other 
loans are 
approved by 
Government 
(generally for 
financing 
requirements of 
infrastructure 
projects, export 
oriented units, 
etc.). 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
Queuing for 
purposes of 
implementing 
ceiling on ECB 
while ensuring 
that a few very 
large borrowers 
do not crowd out 
relatively smaller 
borrowers. No 
restrictions on 
end use of 
funds. 
Loans for 
periods with 
average maturity 
of 10 years and 
above to be kept 
outside the 
ceiling. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
except for 
loans with 
average 
maturity of 
7 years 
and above 
to be 
outside 
ceiling. 
Phase III 
1999-
2000 
Same as 
Phase II 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Upto $20 
million 
Three-Year 
Maturity and 
upto $500 
million - Five 
Year Maturity 
under 
automatic 
route for 
infrastructure 
projects. 
Above these 
limits, RBI 
approval is 
needed. 
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Item 
5. Foreign 
Currency 
Convertible 
Bonds/Floating 
Rate Notes 
6. Loans from 
non residents 
Position 
as of April 
1997 
Permitted 
individually by 
Government 
within overall 
ECB ceiling. 
Allowed by 
RBI on a 
case-by-case 
basis for 
loans from 
NRIs on non-
repatriable 
basis with 
restrictions on 
interest 
payment and 
end-use. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
To be within 
ECB ceiling 
with same 
procedure viz. 
queuing vide 
item 4 
To be allowed 
to borrow up 
to $250,000 
per entity with 
payment of 
interest not 
exceeding 
LIBOR without 
restriction on 
period of loan, 
use of funds 
and 
repatriation of 
loan/interest. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
To be 
allowed to 
borrow up to 
$500,000 per 
entity with 
payment of 
interest not 
exceeding 
LIBOR 
without 
restriction on 
period of 
loan, use of 
funds and 
repatriation 
of 
loan/interest. 
Phase III 
1999-2000 
Same as 
Phase 1 
To be 
allowed to 
borrow up to 
$1 million per 
entity with 
payment of 
interest not 
exceeding 
LIBOR 
without 
restriction on 
period of 
loan, use of 
funds and 
repatriation 
of 
loan/interest. 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Automatic 
approval as 
per GOI 
guidelines. 
As per ECB 
guidelines 
for 
borrowing 
foreign 
currency. 
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Item 
7. Joint 
ventures/wholly 
owned 
subsidiaries 
abroad 
Position 
as of April 1997 
The RBI clears 
proposals for 
investments up 
to US $4 million. 
The extent of 
outflow is 
dependent upon 
the export 
performance of 
the Indian 
promoter and 
capability for 
repatriation by 
way of dividend, 
etc. within a 
period of five 
years. A 
Special 
Committee 
clears cases not 
covered by 
these criteria. 
Recently, an 
announcement 
has been made 
in the Budget 
that balances in 
EEFC accounts 
can be used for 
investments 
uptoUS$15 
million without 
the specific 
approval of RBI. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
Direct investments 
abroad to be allowed 
for ventures up to 
$50 million by Ads 
subject to 
transparent 
guidelines to be laid 
out by the RBI. 
Above $ 50 million 
through Special 
Committee. The 
current stipulation on 
repatriation of 
earnings by way of 
dividend etc. within a 
specified time period 
should be removed. 
JVs/ WOSs can be 
set up by all parties 
and not restricted 
only to 
exporters/exchange 
earners. 
Phase 
II 
1998-
99 
Same 
as 
Phase 
1 
Phase 
III 
1999-
2000 
Same 
as 
Phase 
1 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Companies 
can invest in 
JV / Wholly 
owned 
subsidiaries 
upto$100 
million under 
automatic 
route. Above 
$100 million 
RBI working 
group 
approval is 
required. 
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Item 
8. Project 
Exports 
9. Establishment 
of offices abroad 
Position 
as of April 1997 
Indian project 
exporters are 
required to approach 
the RBI for prior 
approval for variety 
of purposes while 
executing the 
projects abroad. 
Powers given to ADs 
to allow remittances 
for exporters with an 
average annual 
export turnover of 
Rs.150 lakhs and 
above to open 
representative/non-
trading offices. 
Further, EEFC 
account holders 
have been permitted 
to utilize their EEFC 
balances without any 
restriction for 
establishing any type 
of offices. Other 
cases require RBI 
approval. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
Requirement of 
prior approval 
by the RBI may 
be dispensed 
with subject to 
reporting to the 
RBI. 
Any corporate 
entity may open 
offices abroad 
without the 
need for prior 
approval from 
RBI. Capital 
expenditure 
towards 
opening of the 
offices and 
current 
expenditure for 
maintenance 
could be 
subject to 
overall value 
limits to be 
allowed by 
ADs. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Phase III 
1999-
2000 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Same as 
Phase 1 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Prior 
approval 
from 
ADs/EXIM 
Bank for 
upto$100 
million and 
above $100 
million 
working 
group / RBI 
approval 
required. 
Permitted 
under 
general 
permission 
given by 
FEMA Act, 
1999. 
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Item 
10. EEFC 
accounts for 
exporters and 
exchange 
earners 
Position 
as of April 1997 
50% for EOUs 
and 25% for 
others -
restrictions on 
use of funds for 
current account 
and permitted 
capital account 
transactions. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
100% of earnings for 
all 
exporters/exchange 
earners to be 
allowed to be held in 
EEFC accounts in 
India. Use of funds 
allowed for current 
and permitted capital 
account transactions 
with cheque writing 
facility. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Phase III 
1999-2000 
Same as 
Phase 1 
with 
additional 
provision 
that EEFC 
accounts 
can be held 
with banks 
outside 
India at the 
option of 
the 
exporter 
and the 
exchange 
earners. 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Permitted 
according to 
entitlement 
for EOUs, 
status 
holders, 
EPZ and 
STPI Units 
upto 100%. 
Others upto 
50%. 
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Item 
B. Corporates - ^ 
1. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) 
2. Portfolio 
Investment in 
India through 
stock exchange 
in shares/ 
debentures. 
Position 
as of April 1997 
on Residents (inc 
Currently OCBs 
are allowed 
facilities similar 
toNRIs. Other 
corporates are 
allowed to invest 
up to various 
proportions with 
RBI/ Government 
approval under 
the FDI policy of 
the Government. 
Allowed within 
the 24% limit 
(can be 
increased to 30% 
at the option of 
the company), 
which includes 
portfolio 
investment by 
NRIs, Fllsand 
OCBs subject to 
approval by the 
RBI, which is 
valid for a period 
of five years. 
The investment 
restricted to 1 % 
by individual 
NRIs/ OCBs and 
10% by 
individual Flls. 
Corporates, 
other than OCBs 
and Flls, are not 
permitted. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Phase III 
1999-
2000 
uding OCBs) 
Prior approval 
of RBI not 
required for 
FDI. 
Reporting by 
ADs to the RBI 
To be allowed 
to all non-
residents 
without prior 
approval by 
RBI. 
Designated ADs 
should be 
required to 
report to the 
RBI. 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Same as 
Phase 1 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
Allowed 
under 
automatic 
route as per 
GOI policies. 
OCB, initially 
allowed, now 
banned. 
Allowed 
subject to 
individual / 
group 
ceilings and 
sectoral 
caps. 
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Item 
3. Disinvestment 
Position 
as of April 1997 
Disinvestment as 
approved by the 
RBI except where 
sales are made 
through stock 
exchange under 
portfolio 
investment 
scheme. 
Phase 1 
1997-98 
RBI approval 
to be 
dispensed 
with. 
Phase II 
1998-99 
Same as 
Phase 1 
Phase III 
1999-
2000 
Same as 
Phase 1 
November 
2004 
Current 
Position 
As approved 
by RBI in 
April 1997. 
A three-year road map was outlined with Phase I (1997-98), Phase II 
(1998-99) and Phase III (1999-2000). Concomitant measures for the 
development and integration of the foreign exchange, money and 
securities markets were also set out. Some of the important measures, 
which are applicable to corporates, are as follows: 
A. Corporate/Business - Residents (Position as of November 
2004) 
(i) Financial capital transfer abroad including for opening of 
current account and chequeable accounts - upto $25000 
permitted. 
(ii) Accessing capital markets abroad through GDR and ADRs -
permitted as per GOI guidelines under automatic route, 
subject to complying with prescribed conditions. 
(iii) External Commercial Borrowing - Upto $20 million for three-
year maturity and upto $500 million for five-year maturity 
under automatic route for infrastructure projects permitted. 
(iv) Foreign Currency Convertible Bonds/Floating Rate Notes -
Permitted as per automatic approval of GOI. 
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(v) Joint Ventures/wholly owned subsidiaries abroad -
Companies can invest upto $ 100 million under automatic 
route and above $100 million RBI working group approval is 
required. 
(vi) Project Exports - Prior approval from ADs/EXIM Bank upto 
$100 million and above $100 million, working group of RBI 
approval is required. 
(vii) Establishment of Offices abroad - Permitted under general 
permission given by FEMA Act, 1999. 
(viii) EEFC Accounts for Exporters and Exchange Earners -
Permitted according to entitlement for EOUs, status holders, 
EPZ and STPI Units upto 100 per cent. Others upto 50%. 
B. Corporates - Non Residents (including OCBs) (Position as of 
November 2004) 
(i) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - Allowed under automatic 
route as per GOI policies. OCB, initially allowed, now not 
permitted. 
(11) Portfolio Investment in India through stock exchanges in 
shares/debentures - Allowed subject to individual / group 
ceilings and sectoral caps. 
(iii) Disinvestment - As approved by RBI except where sales are 
made through stock exchange under portfolio investment 
scheme. 
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4.12 Summary of major pre-Conditions and the current position as of 
November 2004 
1. Gross fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to come down from a budgeted 
4.5% in 1997-98 to 3.5% in 1999-2000. In November 2004, it was 
still at 5%. 
2. A consolidated sinking fund has to be set up to meet the 
Government's debt repayment needs; to be financed by the 
increase in RBI's profit transfer to the Government and 
disinvestments proceeds. As of now, it is not yet done. Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2003 has been passed to reduce government's 
borrowings. 
3. Transparent and globally comparable procedures for fiscal 
accounting need to be implemented. 
4. Inflation rate should remain between an average 3.5% for the three-
year period 1997-2000. It was around 7.5% in November 2004. 
5. Gross NPAs of the public sector banking system needs to be 
brought down from the present 13.7% to 5% by 2000 and at the 
same time, average effective CRR needs to be brought down from 
the 10% level to 3% level. The Gross NPAs to advances of public 
sector banks as of 2003 are at 9.4% and Gross NPAs to total 
assets of the public sector banks are at 4.2%. The net NPAs to total 
advances of public sector banks as of 2003 are at 4.5% and net 
NPAs to total assets of the public sector banks are at 1.9% (RBI 
Annual Report, 2003). 
6. RBI should have a Monitoring Exchange Rate Band of plus/minus 
5% around a neutral Real Effective Exchange Rate. RBI should be 
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transparent about the changes in REER. Currently, RBI is tracking 
the REER, but it does not have any target rate in mind nor any 
band within which the rates should move. 
7. External sector policies should be designed to increase current 
receipts to GDP ratio and bring down the debt servicing ratio from 
25% to 20%. This has been achieved. Current receipts to GDP ratio 
is 18.7% and debt service ratio is at 14.7%. 
8. Indicators should be used for evaluating adequacy of foreign 
exchange reserves to safeguard against any contingency. Plus, law 
should prescribe a minimum net foreign asset to currency ratio of 
40%. Currently, our foreign exchange reserves are about $ 126 
billion as of November 2004 and they are quite adequate. Foreign 
asset to currency ratio is more than adequate at 130%. 
4.13 Chapter Summary 
The Management of the external sector has been one of the success 
stories of India in the last decade. The country has completed the first 
step towards full-float of the Rupee by allowing Foreign Direct Investment 
and Foreign Institutional Investment and the investors can bring in and 
take out money from the country. The second stage of allowing 
companies and individuals to borrow and invest in Foreign Exchange has 
been initiated but not completed in full. The country has comfortable 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (126 billion Dollars as of November 2004) 
and a healthy Balance of Payments situation. 
India needs to bring down the gross fiscal deficit to GDP Ratio from the 
present 5% to 3.5%. Inflation should be contained from the current 7.5% 
to 3.5%. GDP should grow consistently at a growth ratio of 8% to 10%. If 
the above are achieved, India will be ready for full convertibility of the 
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capital account. Based on the recommendations made by tine Tarapore 
Committee and the analysis made, the following 9 factors, which are very 
important for capital account convertibility and which have influence on the 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar are identified as the 
Balance of Payments position. Inflation, Bank rate, Fiscal deficit. Gross 
Domestic Product, Foreign Exchange Reserves, External Debt, Foreign 
Direct Investment and Foreign Institutional Investment and US Federal 
Interest Rate. In the next chapter. Exchange Rate Volatility and its 
forecasting, Monte Carlo simulation method is used to demonstrate the 
exchange rate volatility. The relationship between the nine identified 
macroeconomic factors and the exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar is studied and a model for forecasting exchange rate is developed, 
using multivariate regression analysis. 
References: 
1. Union budget speech of 1997-98 from GOI Budget Papers. 
2. Tarapore committee report, 1997. 
3. RBI Circulars and Web site rbi.org.in 
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CHAPTER - 5 
Exchange Rate Volatility and its Forecasting 
In this Chapter, the daily exchange rates for the Rupee against the US Dollar 
for the period 1973 to 2004 are studied and it is found that they have followed 
a linear depreciating path from January 1973 to June 2002. From July 2002, 
they have turned volatile. Using simulation, the risk of leaving open the 
foreign currency exposure of companies is demonstrated. This calls for 
forecasting of exchange rates. Based on the identified nine macroeconomic 
factors, which are very important for capital account convertibility and which 
have influence on the exchange rate of the Rupee against Dollar, this chapter 
concentrates on examining the relationship between the selected nine 
macroeconomic factors and the exchange rate. An exchange rate forecasting 
model is built based on the exchange rate (dependent variable) and the nine 
macroeconomic variables (independent variables), based on the data for the 
years 1991 to 2004 
5.1 The Recent volatility in Exchange Rates: 
For more than five decades, the Rupee has been steadily depreciating 
from the level of Rs.2.4 per US Dollar prior to 1947 to Rs.49.07 in June 
2002. From July 2002 onwards the Rupee has appreciated from Rs. 
49.07 per US Dollar to Rs.43.40 per US Dollar as of March 2004. From 
April 2004 the Rupee has again started depreciating against the US 
Dollar and reached the level of Rs.46.16 per US Dollar on 30*" 
September 2004. On 7*'' December 2004 it reached a level of Rs.43.70. 
The Indian Rupee is on a roller coaster ride. At Rs.43.4 to a U.S. Dollar 
as on 31®' March 2004, the Rupee had appreciated by as much as 
11.55 percent against the Dollar over July 2002 levels. Again, it has 
depreciated to the level of 46.16 as of 30* September 2004, a 
depreciation of 6.36 percent. It has again appreciated to 43.70 levels as 
of 7**^  December 2004, an appreciation of 5.32 percent. There has been 
enormous volatility. An intra day swing by 1 percent has become 
routine. A couple of years ago, this possibility would have been difficult 
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to envisage. Interestingly, following the introduction of the Liberalized 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (LERM) by the Reserve Bank of India in 
March 1993, the Rupee experienced remarkable tranquility for an 
unbroken stretch of 27 months till July 1995. Overall, instances of the 
Rupee appreciating against the Dollar have been few and far between. 
Hence, the current strengthening of the Rupee against the Dollar and its 
subsequent depreciation over a short period of three months is 
noteworthy for the volatility in the exchange rate of Rupee - Dollar. 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique is used to study this recent 
phenomenon of currency volatility. 
5.2 Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate the volatility in exchange 
rates 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique is a well-known technique of 
simulation that uses random numbers generated from a uniform 
distribution and maps the relative frequency to the random numbers 
generated. Each time when a random number corresponds to a specific 
relative frequency, the exchange rate that is associated with that 
category is taken as the prediction for the next period. Monte Carlo 
simulation method is equally applicable when random numbers are 
generated from a standard probability distribution such as the normal 
distribution. In this case, the cumulative probability of the standard 
normal distribution is taken as the basis for predicting the exchange 
rate. The following are the steps followed: -
Monte Carlo simulation - Method 1: (Method 1 is where the 
randomized variation i.e. difference between maximum and minimum in 
the observed distribution is used.) 
1. The range from the maximum and the minimum number in the 
given distribution of past exchange rates is computed. In this 
case, daily exchange rates have been used in for the period 
from January 2002 to November 2004. 
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2. A set of random numbers was generated by using the Rand 
function in excel and linked to the variation (range) to obtain a 
randomized tolerance value. 
3. This number is added to the minimum rate to obtain the 
simulated rate of exchange. 
4. The mean and the standard deviation of the simulated 
distribution of exchange rates have been derived. This forms the 
basic probability distribution of exchange rates from which one 
can predict the probability of any given exchange rate. 
5. For determining the probability of a given exchange rate or a 
range of exchange rates, the Z transformation (standardized 
normal variate) is performed on the given exchange rate. 
6. The Z values are used to refer the normal distribution table or 
using the paste function of Microsoft Excel to obtain the 
probability associated with the given exchange rates. 
Observations 
The results under this method are as follows: 
Expected Exchange Rate 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Probabilities 
91.54% 
77.53% 
55.47% 
31.52% 
13.57% 
Monte Carlo simulation-Method 2(relative frequency mapping) 
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The following are the steps followed in the simulation model of Monte 
Carlo method 2: (Method 2 is where the relative frequency of the 
exchange rates as the estimator of probability are used). 
1. The relative frequency of exchange rates from the past data is 
computed. 
2. The probability based on relative frequency is computed. 
3. Cumulative probability is computed. 
4. The random numbers (say 2000 trials) are generated. 
5. Using the random numbers, the distribution of exchange rates 
based on the probability weightage is generated. 
6. The mean and standard deviation of the simulated distribution 
are determined. 
7. The probability of a given exchange rate based on Z 
transformation is estimated with reference to normal distribution 
tables 
The results under this method are shown below; 
Expected Exchange Rate 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Probability 
98.35% 
93.26% 
80.48% 
58.79% 
33.93% 
14.66% 
The above two simulation results show that the exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar is volatile and the rate is most likely to be in 
the range of 44 to 47 for the coming year ending March 2005. This 
calls for forecasting exchange rates, which will be discussed now, in 
this chapter. 
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5.3 The Exchange Rate Determination 
The exchange rate is determined by supply and demand in the foreign 
exchange market. Indian companies wishing to import goods will sell 
the Rupee to buy foreign currencies with which to pay suppliers 
abroad; tourists visiting India sell their own currencies to buy the 
Rupee; if an American company intends to buy a bond issued by the 
Government of India or to buy a factory in Gujarat, it will convert the 
Dollar into the Rupee. An Indian bank wishing to make a Dollar deposit 
in New York will sell the Rupee to buy the Dollar. Thus demand for 
foreign exchange arises as a result of import of goods and services 
and outflow of capital - purchase of plants and equipment overseas or 
acquisition of overseas bonds and securities by domestic asset 
holders. Supply is created by exports of goods and services and inflow 
of capital. In other words, each debit item in BoP represents a demand 
for foreign currency and each credit item a supply. 
Other things remaining unchanged, the demand for the Rupee 
increases when the exchange rate rises (the price of the Rupee falls) 
as the price of Indian goods to consumers abroad falls in their own 
currencies, increasing the demand for India's exports. The supply of 
the Rupee, on the other hand, normally goes down as the price of the 
Rupee falls because foreign goods become more expensive in Rupees 
in our own market, thereby reducing our import demand. Thus demand 
and supply curves for the Rupee have their normal shape when plotted 
against the price of the Rupee (inverse of the exchange rate). The 
determination of the exchange rate (the price of the Rupee) is shown in 
the Chart-5.1. 
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Chart - 5.1: Exchange Rate Determination 
Price of Re ($ per Re = 1/e) 
Quantity (Re) 
A deficit in the balance of trade (BoT) (imports exceeding exports) 
implies that supply of the Rupee will exceed demand and the price of 
the Rupee will tend to fall to reach its equilibrium level. This will be 
allowed to happen in a floating exchange regime, but in a fixed or 
managed system the overvalued rate can be supported only by buying 
up the excess Rupee in exchange for foreign exchange. The reverse 
is true when the trade balance is in surplus. 
Although the price level of the country does not appear explicitly in the 
figure, it can be used to analyse the effect of price changes. Suppose 
P rises relative to P*, this will induce a general substitution in favour of 
foreign goods and away from home goods. The induced rise in import 
demand will shift the supply curve to the right and the equilibrium price 
of the Rupee will fall, as predicted by purchasing power parity. 
Demand and supply curves can shift for a number of reasons. A 
change in taste and preference for foreign goods will cause a rightward 
shift in supply; a leftward shift in demand might be due to a fall in the 
rate of interest in India as investors switch their funds out of the Indian 
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money market. In either case the equilibrium price of the Rupee will 
fall implying depreciation. This would be the outcome under a flexible 
or floating exchange system. If the authorities wish to keep the 
exchange rate at the old level they will have to buy Rupee. In a fixed 
exchange regime (also called a pegged exchange system) the price of 
the Rupee is not allowed to respond to changes in demand or supply. 
The authorities will have to stand ready to intervene in the market by 
buying up excess Rupees (selling foreign currency) or selling Rupees 
when there is excess demand. The limits to intervention will be set, 
among other things, by the available stock of foreign exchange. 
The repercussions of macroeconomic policy on the exchange rate are 
not hard to analyse in terms of the demand supply diagram. If 
expansionary action is taken, fiscal or monetary, the level of income 
will rise and so will import demand. A deficit will emerge in BoP 
leading to a depreciation of the currency. There will be an additional 
effect if the rate of interest changes as a result of the expansionary 
action. 
Fiscal expansion is usually accompanied by a rise in interest rates. 
This will tend to encourage capital inflow, which adds to the demand for 
the Rupee. This will counter the rise in the supply caused by income-
induced rise in imports. The final effect on the exchange rate will 
depend on the strength of the marginal propensity to import in relation 
to the elasticity of capital flows. For a monetary expansion, income 
rises but interest rate falls. Supply of the Rupee goes up on both 
counts and the Rupee's price falls unambiguously. 
The demand and supply curves for the Rupee (and, therefore, the 
M value of the Rupee) in Chart -5.1 respond not only to domestic policies 
^ but to macro policies of our trading partners as well. Suppose, the 
USA raises its rate of interest as part of a contractionary monetary 
policy, US bonds become more attractive to Indian investors and, as a 
result, capital flows out, causing a downward pressure on the Rupee 
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(upward pressure on the Dollar). Raising the interest rate in India can 
relieve this pressure, but the result may be an economic recession with 
declining employment. If, instead, the USA had stimulated domestic 
spending by tax cuts or expansion in money supply, its imports from 
India would have gone up, exerting an upward pressure on the Rupee. 
This inter-linkage of domestic policies and national exchange rates has 
given rise to what has aptly been termed an unstable triumvirate: 
pegged or managed exchange rates, autonomous macro policies and 
extensive capital flows (lla Patnaik, 2003; Bimal Jalan, 2003) 
Under a freely floating or fully flexible exchange rate the price of a 
country's currency may be subject to wide and very frequent 
fluctuations. This is likely to prove very disruptive for business 
activities by exposing companies to serious currency risks. Moreover, 
since future expectations are heavily influenced by the volatility of 
currency prices, the risk of the market becoming disorderly and 
unstable becomes unbearably high. A fixed exchange rate regime, in 
contrast guarantees that trade can proceed at a given parity against 
one or more other major currencies. This guarantee comes from the 
Central Bank that uses open market interventions to keep the rate 
constant (or within a narrow band) by purchasing a home currency if it 
is falling, or selling it if it is rising (Sikdar, 2003). 
Today's capital markets are characterized by huge speculative and 
hedging flows over which national governments have very little control. 
As a consequence currency values are extremely volatile and difficult 
to maintain. The days are all but gone when national authorities could 
stabilize currencies through regulations and limits on interest rates. 
Advances in information technology and data processing have 
transformed global operations to the point where US $1.5 trillion is 
transferred every day around the world. This is many times the annual 
value of world trade in goods. The tremendous acceleration in 
speculation encouraged by wide-ranging financial deregulation and 
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aided by the revolution in communications technology has inevitably 
precipitated several crises within the past few years. The Mexican 
crises in 1995 and the South East Asian crises in 1997 are two striking 
examples. 
In the light of their recent volatility, corporates need to forecast the 
exchange rates using statistical models. For this purpose, the 
exchange rate (the dependent variable) and the identified nine other 
macroeconomic variables (independent variables) for the years 1991-
2004 are used. These variables have been identified based on the 
literature review done by us and also based on the recommendations 
of the Tarapore Committee on Capital Account Convertibility. 
5.4 Data Source 
The study has used secondary data from the handbook of statistics on 
the Indian economy. Reserve Bank of India, annual report of the 
Reserve Bank of India, the website of Reserve Bank of India viz. 
www.rbi.org.in, Center for Monitoring Indian Economy and the federal 
reserve statistical release of the US government are used for the study. 
The secondary data are very reliable and sound. 
5.5 The macroeconomic variables selected for data analysis are: -
(1) Exchange Rate 
(2) Bank Rate 
(3) Balance of Payments 
(4) External Debt 
(5) Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Institutional Investment 
in India 
(6) Foreign Exchange Reserves 
(7) Gross Domestic Product 
(8) Fiscal Deficit 
(9) Inflation 
(10) US Federal Interest Rate 
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5.6 Tools of Analysis 
The objective of the analysis is to study the relationship between 
exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar and the other nine-
macroeconomic variables. This association between the two can be 
studied either by finding the relationship between the Rupee exchange 
rate against the Dollar and a macroeconomic variable each at a time, 
or by analyzing the relationship between the Rupee exchange rate 
against the Dollar and all the macroeconomic variables jointly at the 
same time. For this, the univariate relationship is first tested and then 
the multivariate analysis is earned out. The results of the various 
models, both univariate and multivariate are given below for a 
meaningful appreciation of the problem: 
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CHAPTER - 6 
IMPLICATIONS OF EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT FOR INDIAN COMPANIES 
This chapter reports the findings of an empirical study on the foreign exchange risk 
management practices of 54 companies in India. It is based on a questionnaire 
survey conducted in 2004. (Questionnaire is given in Appendix -1). 
Two case studies, one on Infosys Technologies Limited, highlighting their corporate 
risk management practices and another on Orchid Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 
Limited highlighting their use of swap are presented. 
6.1 Methodology of the empirical study 
125 Chennai-based companies were identified, which had exposure to foreign 
exchange on account of imports, exports or foreign currency loans from the 
database of Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. Structured questionnaires 
were sent to the Chief Financial Officers of these companies and 54 
responses were obtained and the analysis of the above is covered in this 
Chapter. The response rate of 43.2.percent is quite high for a survey of this 
type. One may assume that the high participation rate was due to the strong 
interest the Chief Financial Officers of the Companies took in the problem 
discussed. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) has been used 
for the above analysis. The aim of the study was to find out how these firms 
manage their foreign exchange risk and which instruments they use for 
hedging foreign exchange risks and the problems they encounter in the 
process. 
157 
6.2 Results of the empirical study 
Table - 6.1(a) Paid-up Share Capital 
Table 6.1(a) Paid-up Share Capital 
less than 1 cr. 
1-10 cr 
more than lOcrore 
Total 
Frequency 
14 
11 
29 
54 
Percent 
25.9 
20.4 
53.7 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
25.9 
46.3 
100.0 
Table - 6.1(a) shows the responding companies according to their paid-up 
share capital. Out of the 54 companies, 14 companies had paid-up share 
capital of less than Rs.1.00 Crore, 11 companies had paid-up share capital of 
Rs.1.00 to Rs. 10.00 Crores and 29 companies had paid-up share capital of 
more than Rs. 10.00 Crores. An analysis of the industry pattern of the 
companies included in the study showed that the small scale, medium scale 
and large-scale companies are represented in the survey. Chart - 6.1(b) 
showing paid-up share capital of the 54 responding companies is given 
below: 
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Chart-6.1(b) Paid-up Share Capital 
paid up share capital 
less than 1 cr. 1 -10 cr more than 10 crore 
paid up share capital 
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Table • 6.2(a) Type of Business 
t 
engineering 
sugar 
automobile 
fertiliser 
watches 
garments 
telecom 
cycle manufacturing 
biotech 
communications 
chemicals 
auto ancillary 
power 
Tubes Mfg. 
Tractors Mfg. 
Industrial Construction 
Boilers 
cutting tools 
pharma 
software 
financial services 
drilling 
shipping 
Electronics 
Cement 
Total 
Table - 6.2(a) Type of Business 
Frequency 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
8 
1 
2 
2 
1 
54 
Percent 
9.3 
1.9 
3.7 
1.9 
1.9 
3.7 
1.9 
1.9 
3.7 
1.9 
5.6 
11.1 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
5.6 
9.3 
14.8 
1.9 
3.7 
3.7 
1.9 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
9.3 
11.1 
14.8 
16.7 
18.5 
22.2 
24.1 
25.9 
29.6 
31.5 
37.0 
48.1 
50.0 
51.9 
53.7 
55.6 
57.4 
59.3 
64.8 
74.1 
88.9 
90.7 
94.4 
98.1 
100.0 
Table - 6.2(a) shows the type of businesses of the responding companies. 5 
companies belonged to engineering industries, 1 sugar, 2 automobiles, 1 fertilizer, 1 
watch making, 2 garment making, 1 telecom, 1 cycle manufacturing, 2 bio-tech 
companies, 1 communication, 3 chemicals manufacturing, 6 auto ancillary, 1 power, 
1 tubes manufacturing, 1 tractor manufacturing, 1 industrial construction, 1 boiler, 1 
cutting tool, 3 pharma, 5 software, 8 financial services, 1 drilling, 2 shipping, 2 
electronics and 1 cement. An analysis of the industry pattern included in the study 
showed that most of the major industrial segments in Chennai are represented in the 
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survey. Chart - 6.2(b) showing the type of businesses of the 54 companies is given 
below: 
Chart - 6.2(b) Type of Business 
type of business 
K^>x\v»'\y%\x\ \ % \ . X 
type of business 
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Table - 6.3(a) Mode of exposure to foreign exchange 
Table - 6.3(a) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange 
Imports 
Exports 
foreign currency loans 
imports & foreign currency 
all the above 
imports&exports 
exports & foreign currency loans 
Total 
Frequency 
3 
8 
3 
1 
28 
g 
2 
54 
Percent 
5.6 
14.8 
5.6 
1.9 
51.9 
16.7 
3.7 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
5.6 
20.4 
25.9 
27.8 
79.6 
96.3 
100.0 
Table - 6.3(a) shows the mode of exposure to foreign exchange of the responding 
companies. 28 companies had exposure to foreign exchange on account of imports 
exports and foreign currency loans. 9 companies had imports and exports only, 8 
companies had only exports, 3 companies had only foreign currency loans, 2 
companies had exports and foreign currency loans, 3 companies had imports only 
and 1 company had imports and foreign currency loans. Chart - 6.3(b) showing the 
mode of exposure to foreign exchange of the 54 companies is given below: 
Chart - 6.3(b) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange 
mode of exposure to forex 
l l 0 
imports foreign currency loa all the above exports & foreign cu 
exports imports & foreign cu imports&exports 
mode of exposure to forex 
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Table - 6.4(a) Management of foreign exchange exposure - Hedging strategies 
Table - 6.4(a) Management of Exposure 
aggressive 
passive 
case to case/time to time 
Total 
Frequency 
4 
5 
45 
54 
Percent 
7.4 
9.3 
83.3 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Percent 
7.4 
16.7 
100.0 
Table - 6.4(a) shows the foreign exchange exposure management strategies of the 
companies. 4 companies manage the exposure aggressively, 5 companies manage 
their exposure passively, 45 companies manage their exposure on a case-to-case 
and time-to-time basis. The majority of the companies followed the so-called 
selective hedging strategy. This means that the firms hedge only those positions for 
which they expect a currency loss while leaving open positions for which they 
expect a currency gain. Obviously, such a strategy is based on forecast of future 
exchange rate changes. Chart - 6.4(b) shows the foreign exchange exposure 
management strategies. 
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Chart - 6.4(b) Foreign Exchange Exposure Management Strategies. 
management of exposure 
aggressive passive case to case/time to 
management of exposure 
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6.3 Exposure Management 
As far as exposure management strategies are concerned, a lot depends on 
the corporate philosophy of a company, in particular its attitude to risk. As risk 
and reward go hand in hand, there is no low risk, high reward strategy in real 
life. And if one is to look for high rewards, high risks have to be assumed. 
Apart from a company's willingness to take risks in pursuit of rewards, equally 
relevant are its financial strength and therefore ability to take risks, the nature 
of its business and its vulnerability to adverse movements and so on. In short 
there can be no single strategy, which is appropriate to all businesses. 
Graphically, with attitude to risk on the X-axis and the profit motivation on Y-
axis, the range of strategy options could be as follows: 
R 
E 
W 
A 
R 
D 
S 
High 
Low 
Low risk: 
Reasonable 
rewards 
Low rewards: 
Low risks 
High risk: 
High rewards 
Low reward: 
High risk 
Low High 
RISK 
6.4 Low Risk: Low Reward - Passive Strategy - This option involves automatic 
hedging of exposures in the fonward market irrespective of the attractiveness 
or otherwise of the forward rate. The merits of this approach are that yields 
and costs of the transaction are known and there is little risk of cash flow 
destabilization. Again, this option does not require any investment of 
management time or effort. The negative side is that automatic hedging at 
whatever rates available is hardly likely to result into optimum costs or yields. 
Again, under Indian exchange control, exposures cannot be hedged unless 
they are contractual commitments. Therefore between "conception" and 
"birth", the exposures remain un-hedged and have the potential to destabilize 
the budgeted cash flows, if the exchange rate moves in the interim. In terms of 
an investment strategy, this option is similar to putting all the money in the 
165 
bank deposits or AAA rated bonds (known, safe returns) and nothing in 
equities (uncertain, but overall higher returns). 
Some company management seems to prefer this strategy on the grounds 
that an active management of exposure is not really their business. But this 
argument does not hold true in today's floating rate era, as currencies outside 
their home currency have assumed the characteristics of commodities. 
Businesses, whose costs or yields depend significantly on commodity prices, 
can hardly afford not to take views on the price of the commodity. Indeed, for 
such businesses, a significant part of the profitability would depend on 
purchasing the commodity at the optimum price level. The same is the case of 
businesses having significant exposures to other types of commodifies, viz. 
currencies. The philosophy that currency management is not really part of 
one's business was perhaps appropriate in fixed exchange rate era when rate 
changes used to be few and far between. Given that the world has changed, 
this does not seem to be an opfimum strategy now. 
6.5 High Risk: Low Reward - Aggressive Strategy (1) - Perhaps the worst 
strategy is leaving all exposures un-hedged. The risks of destabilization of 
cash flows are very high. This option is similar to an investment strategy, 
which puts the entire portfolio in equities, with little thought having gone in 
selecting them. 
6.6 High Risl<: High Reward - Aggressive Strategy (2) - This strategy involves 
active trading in the currency market through continuous cancellafions and re-
bookings of fonward contracts. With exchange controls in India relaxed 
considerably in recent fimes, a few of the larger companies are adopfing this 
strategy. This requires the trading function to become a profit centre. This is a 
high risk: high reward strategy and if it is to be adopted, this should be done in 
full consciousness of the risks. In terms of an investment strategy, this option 
is comparable to active trading of the portfolio on expected price movements. 
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6.7 Low Risk: Reasonable Reward - Neutral Strategy 
This strategy requires selective hedging of exposures whenever forward rates 
are attractive, but l^ eeping exposures open when they are not. Successful 
pursuit of the strategy requires quantification of expectation about the future 
and the rewards would depend on the accuracy of the prediction. This option 
is similar to an investment strategy of a combination of bonds and equities 
with the proportion of the two components depending on the attractiveness of 
prices. A mix between bonds and equities provides an automatic hedge 
against the prediction of price movements going wrong. 
As management of exposure and risk is an extremely important task and the 
effectiveness with which it is performed can have serious implications for a 
company's survival, Other than using particular instruments like forwards, 
futures or options to hedge individual exposure, these issues also need to be 
borne in mind: 
• Company's strategic business posture 
• Attitude towards risk and risk tolerance 
• Organisational design to implement a coherent policy 
• Monitoring and control mechanism 
• Implications for performance evaluation 
• Possible conflict of interest between a parent company and its global 
subsidiary 
Therefore top management must get intimately involved in the process of 
designing the policy and ensure the participation of all those who have 
contribution to make and also those who might be affected by it. Again the 
exposure management policy and its implementation cannot be divorced from 
the particular set of circumstances, which condition a firm's decision-making 
and operations. Hence it would be impossible to attempt to provide a 
framework with universal applicability. Therefore, the framework should be 
flexible and situation specific. 
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Table - 6.5(a) Risk Management Products 
Table - 6.5(a) Risk Management Products 
forwards 
all the above 
forwards & options 
forwards & swaps 
Total 
Frequency 
39 
7 
7 
1 
54 
Percent 
72.2 
13.0 
13.0 
1.9 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
72.2 
85.2 
98.1 
100.0 
Table - 6.5(a) above shows the risk management products used by the 54 
responding companies. 39 companies have used only forwards for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure. 7 companies have used fon/vards and options and 7 
companies have used forwards, options and swaps 1 company has used forwards 
and swaps. Chart - 6.5(b) shows the risk management products used by the 
companies. 
Chart - 6.5(b) Risk IVIanagement Products used by companies 
risk management products 
forwards forwards & options 
all the above forwards & swaps 
risk management products 
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The companies cited the following reasons for using forwards for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
1) Simple and easy to understand 
2) Liquid and available all the time 
3) Transparent 
4) Cost effective 
5) Useful in targeting a budgeted cost 
The companies cited the following reasons for using options for hedging their foreign 
exchange exposure: -
(1) Strike price and premium are attractive 
(2) Flexible with room to manoeuvre 
(3) Gives right without obligation 
(4) It is liquid and available 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using options for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Option premium is high 
(2) Minimum contract size is high 
(3) Companies are not yet comfortable with the product 
(4) Fear of manipulation 
(5) Option quotes favour the banks only 
(6) Absence of dynamic quotations 
The companies cited the following reasons for using swaps for hedging their foreign 
exchange exposure: -
(1) For interest rate reduction 
(2) It is cost effective 
(3) It is transparent 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using swaps for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) The international swap dealers association agreement is too confusing 
(2) The agreement has irrelevant clauses 
(3) It is too lengthy 
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Table - 6.6(a) Uncovered foreign exchange exposure of companies 
nil 
upto 25% 
upto 50% 
upto 75% 
upto100% 
Total 
Table - 6.6(a) Uncovered Exposure 
Frequency 
15 
12 
20 
4 
3 
54 
Percent 
27.8 
22.2 
37.0 
7.4 
5.6 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
27.8 
50.0 
87.0 
94.4 
100.0 
Table - 6.6(a) shows the percentage of uncovered foreign exchange exposure of the 
53 companies. 15 companies had no uncovered exposure, 12 companies had upto 
25% uncovered exposure, 20 companies had upto 50% uncovered exposure, 4 
companies had upto 75% uncovered exposure and 3 companies had 100% 
uncovered exposure. Chart - 6.6(b) shows the percentage of uncovered exposure of 
the 54 companies. 
Chart - 6.6(b) Percentage of Uncovered Exposure 
uncovered exposure 
30 T 
nil upto 25% upto 50% upto 75% upto 100% 
uncovered exposure 
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Table - 6.7(a) Forecasting Exchange Rates 
Table • 
yes 
no 
Total 
6.7(a) Are you forecasting exchange rate? 
Frequency 
4 
50 
54 
Percent 
7.4 
92.6 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
7.4 
100.0 
Table - 6.7(a) shows only 4 companies are forecasting exchange rates on their own. 
50 companies do not forecast exchange rates on their own. Chart - 6.7(b) shows the 
same. 
Chart - 6.7(b) Forecasting Exchange Rates 
are you forecasting exchange rate? 
are you forecasting exchange rate? 
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Table - 6.8(a) Bankers' and Expert opinion 
Table - 6.8(a) If not forecasting 
banker's opinion 
Both 
Total 
Frequency 
12 
42 
54 
Percent 
22.2 
77.8 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
22.2 
100.0 
Table - 6.8(a) shows12 companies rely on bankers' opinion for managing their 
foreign exchange exposure. 42 companies rely on banl<ers' opinion as well as 
foreign exchange experts for managing their exposure. Chart - 6.8(b) below shows 
the number of companies relying on bankers' opinion alone and bankers and 
expert's opinion. 
Chart - 6.8(b) Bankers' and Expert opinion 
if not forecasting 
banker's opinion both 
if not forecasting 
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Table - 6.9(a) Forecasting exchange rates for March 2005 
Table - 6.9(a) Opinion about 
45-46.5 
45-47 
Total 
Frequency 
46 
8 
54 
exchange rate by the end of march 2005 
Percent 
85.2 
14.8 
100.0 
Cumulative Percent 
85.2 
100.0 
Table 6.9(a) shows the expectation on the exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar. 46 companies feel the rates will move in the range of Rs.45 to Rs.46.50 per 
Dollar. 8 companies feel, it will be in the range of Rs.45 to Rs.47 per Dollar. The 
same is shown in Chart 6.9(b). 
Chart - 6.9(b) Forecasting exchange rates for March 2005 
opinion about exchange rate by the end of m 
li: 01 
45-46.5 45-47 
opinion about exciiange rate by tlie end of march 2005 
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Table • 6.10(a) Mode of exposure to foreign exchan 
Table - 6.10(a) Mode of Exposure to Foreign 
mode of exposure to 
forex 
imports 
exports 
foreign currency loans 
imports & foreign currency 
all the above 
imports&exports 
exports & foreign currency 
loans 
Total 
ge and Management of Exposure 
Exchange and Management of Exposure 
management of exposure 
aggressive 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
passive 
1 
2 
2 
5 
case to case/time to 
time 
2 
5 
2 
1 
25 
8 
2 
45 
Total 
3 
8 
3 
1 
28 
9 
2 
54 
Table - 6.10(a) shows how the 54 companies managed their foreign exchange exposures 
using risk management strategies. 4 companies followed aggressive strategy, 5 companies 
followed passive strategy and 45 companies relied on case-to-case and time-to-time 
strategy. 
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Chart - 6.10(b) Mode of exposure to foreign exchange and management of exposure 
3D 
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Table - 6.11(a) Mode of exposure to foreign exchange and risk management products 
Table - 6.11(a) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange and Risk Management Products 
mode of exposure to 
forex 
imports 
exports 
foreign currency loans 
imports & foreign currency 
all the above 
imports&exports 
exports & foreign currency 
loans 
Total 
risk management products 
fonwards 
3 
6 
21 
8 
1 
39 
all the 
above 
2 
5 
7 
fonwards & 
options 
2 
7 
forwards & 
swaps 
1 
1 
Total 
3 
8 
3 
1 
28 
9 
2 
54 
Table - 6.11(a) shows the mode of exposure to foreign exchange and the risk management 
products used by the corporates to manage the exposure. 39 companies used forwards 
only, 7 companies used fonwards, options and swaps, 7 companies used fonwards and 
options and 1 company used forwards and swaps. 
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Chart - 6.11 (b) Mode of exposure to foreign exchange and risk management products 
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Table - 6.12(a) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange and Uncovered Exposure 
Table - 6.12(a) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange and Uncovered Exposure 
mode of exposure to 
forex 
imports 
exports 
foreign currency loans 
imports & foreign currency 
all the above 
imports&exports 
exports & foreign currency 
loans 
1 Total 
uncovered exposure 
nil 
2 
13 
15 
upto 
25% 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
12 
upto 
50% 
1 
3 
1 
8 
6 
1 
20 
upto 
75% 
1 
3 
4 
upto 
100% 
1 
1 
1 
3 
Total 
3 
8 
3 
1 
28 
9 
2 
54 
Table - 6.12(a) shows the mode of exposure to foreign exchange for the 54 
companies and the uncovered exposure of these companies. 15 companies had nil 
uncovered position, 12 companies had upto 25% uncovered position, 20 companies 
had upto 50% uncovered position, 4 companies had upto 75% uncovered position 
and 3 companies had upto 100% uncovered exposure. 
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Chart - 6.12(b) Mode of Exposure to Foreign Exchange and Uncovered Exposure 
uncovered exposure 
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Table - 6.13(a) Management of exposure and Risk Management Products 
Table - 6.13(a) Management of Exposure and 1 
risk management 
products 
forwards 
all the above 
forwards & 
options 
forwards & swaps 
Total 
Risk Management Products 
management of exposure 
aggressive 
2 
2 
4 
passive 
5 
5 
case to case/time to 
time 
32 
5 
7 
1 
45 
Total 
39 
7 
7 
1 
54 
Table - 6.13(a) shows management of exposure of the 54 companies and the risk 
management products they used for the above. 4 companies had aggressive risk 
management strategy and out of them 2 used only forwards and the other two used 
forwards, options and swaps. 5 companies were passive in their risk management 
strategy and they used forwards only. 45 companies managed their risk on a case-
to-case and time-to-time basis and of these, 32 used only forwards, 5 used fonwards, 
options and swaps, 7 used forwards and options and 1 forwards and swaps. 
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Chart - 6.13(b) Management of exposure and Risk Management Products 
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Table - 6.14(a) Type of business and management of exposure 
Table - 6.14(a) Type of business and Management of Exposure 
type of business 
t 
j 
I 
j 
! 
i Total 
engineering 
sugar 
automobile 
fertiliser 
watches 
garments 
telecom 
cycle manufacturing 
biotech 
communications 
chemicals 
auto ancillary 
power 
Tubes Mfg. 
Tractors Mfg. 
Industrial Construction 
Boilers 
cutting tools 
pharma 
software 
financial services 
drilling 
shipping 
electronics 
cement 
management of exposure 
aggressive 
1 
2 
1 
4 
passive 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
case to case/time to time 
4 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
3 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
45 
Total 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
8 
1 
2 
2 
1 
54 
Table - 6.14(a) shows the type of business and how the 54 companies manage their 
exposure using risk management strategies. 1 communication company, 2 financial 
services companies and 1 electronics company used aggressive risk management 
strategy. 1 engineering company, 1 garment manufacturer, 1 auto ancillary, 1 
software company and 1 shipping company used passive risk management strategy. 
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The rest of the 45 companies belonging to various industries followed a case-to-case 
and time-to-time strategy for managing their exposure. 
Chart - 6.14(b) Type of business and management of exposure 
management of exposu 
ipaff L« 
|ca{« to caft/tln« to 
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type of business 
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Table- 6.15(a) Type of business and uncovered exposure 
Table - 6.15(a) Type of Business and Uncovered Exposure 
type of business 
engineering 
sugar 
automobile 
fertiliser 
watches 
garments 
telecom 
cycle manufacturing 
biotech 
communications 
chemicals 
auto ancillary 
power 
Tubes Mfg. 
Tractors Mfg. 
industrial Construction 
Boilers 
cutting tools 
pharma 
software 
financial services 
drilling 
shipping 
electronics 
cement 
Total 
uncovered exposure 
nil 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
15 
upto 25% 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
12 
upto 50% 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1 
20 
upto 75% 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
upto 100% 
1 
1 
1 
3 
Total 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
8 
1 
2 
2 
1 
54 
Table - 6.15(a) shows the type of business and the uncovered foreign exchange 
exposure. 15 companies had nil uncovered exposure, 12 companies had upto 25% 
uncovered exposure, 20 companies had upto 50% uncovered exposure, 4 
companies had upto 75% uncovered exposure and 3 companies had upto 100% 
uncovered exposure. 
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Chart- 6.15(b) Type of business and uncovered exposure 
uncovered exposure 
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Table- 6.16(a) Management of Exposure and Uncovered Exposure 
Table - 6.16(a) Management of Exposure and Uncovered Exposure 
uncovered exposure 
nil 
upto 25% 
upto 50% 
upto 75% 
upto 100% 
Total 
management of exposure 
aggressive 
2 
1 
1 
4 
passive 
2 
2 
1 
5 
case to case/time to time 
13 
8 
19 
3 
2 
45 
Total 
15 
12 
20 
4 
3 
54 
Table - 6.16(a) shows the management of exposure of the companies and the 
uncovered exposure. Out of the 4 aggressive risk management companies, 2 had 
uncovered exposure upto 25%, 1 had upto 50% and one had upto 75%. Out of the 5 
passive risk management companies, 2 had nil uncovered exposure, 2 had upto 
25% and 1 had upto 100%. Out of the 45 companies managing their risk on a case-
to-case and time-to-time basis, 13 had nil uncovered exposure, 8 had upto 25%, 19 
had upto 50%, 3 had upto 75% and 2 had upto 100%. 
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Chart- 6.16(b) Management of Exposure and uncovered exposure 
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Table- 6.17(a) Paid up share capital and risk management products 
Table - 6.17(a) Paid-up Share Capital and Risk Management Products 
paid up share 
1 capital 
less than 1 cr. 
1-10 cr 
more than 10 
crore 
Total 
risk management products 
forwards 
10 
10 
19 
39 
all the 
above 
1 
6 
7 
forwards & 
options 
4 
3 
7 
forwards & 
swaps 
1 
Total 
14 
11 
29 
1 , 54 
Table - 6 17(a) shows the paid-up share capital and the risk management products 
used by the companies. Out of the 14 companies having paid-up share capital of 
less than 1.00 crore, 10 used only forwards and 4 used forwards and options. Out of 
the 11 companies having paid up share capital of Rs.1 to Rs.10 Crores, 10 used only 
forwards and 1 company used forwards, options and swaps. Out of the 29 
companies having paid-up share capital of more than Rs.10.00 Crores, 19 used only 
forwards, 6 used forwards, options and swaps, 3 used forwards and options and 1 
used forwards and swaps. 
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Chart- 6.17(b) Paid up share capital and risk management products 
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Table - 6.18(a) Paid-up Share Capital and Uncovered Exposure 
Table - 6.18(a) Paid up Share Capital and Uncovered Exposure 
paid up share capital 
less than 1 cr. 
1-10 cr 
more than lOcrore 
Total 
uncovered exposure 
nil 
5 
4 
6 
15 
upto 25% 
1 
11 
12 
upto 50% 
6 
7 
7 
20 
upto75%hP*°''°°°/'' 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
Total 
14 
11 
29 
54 
Table - 6 18(a) shows the paid-up share capital and the uncovered exposure of companies. 
Out of the 14 companies having less than Rs.1.00 Crore paid-up share capital, 5 companies 
had nil uncovered position, 1 company had upto 25% uncovered exposure, 6 companies had 
upto 50% uncovered exposure, 2 companies had upto 75% uncovered exposure. Out of the 
11 companies having paid-up capital of Rs.1.00 to Rs.10.00 Crores, 4 companies had nil 
uncovered exposure, 7 had upto 50% uncovered exposure. Out of the 29 companies having 
paid-up share capital of more than Rs.10.00 Crores, 6 had nil uncovered exposure, 11 upto 
25% uncovered exposure, 7 upto 50% uncovered exposure, 2 upto 75% uncovered 
exposure and 3 upto 100% uncovered exposure. 
190 
Chart- 6.18(b) Paid-up Share Capital and Uncovered Exposure 
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6.8 Views expressed by CFOs of Companies, Banl(ers and Regulators 
Based on our interactions with corporate Chief Financial Officers, Bankers and 
Regulators, we give below their views: -
The foreign exchange derivative products that are available in the Indian 
financial markets are fonwards, options and currency swaps. A detailed look at 
these products is given below: -
Rupee forwards 
An important segment of the foreign exchange derivatives market in India is 
the Rupee forward contract. This market is growing rapidly with an increased 
participation from the corporates and banks. Till February 1992, fonward 
contracts were permitted only against trade related exposures and these 
contracts could not be cancelled except where the underlying transactions 
failed to matehalize. In March 1992, in order to provide operational freedom to 
corporates unrestricted booking and cancellation of fonward contracts for all 
genuine exposures, whether trade related or not were permitted. Due to the 
Asian currency crisis, this freedom to rebook cancelled contracts was 
suspended in 1998, which has been relaxed for the exporters in 2002 and for 
the importers in 2004. 
The liquidity in the Indian fon/vard market has been steadily improving and the 
bid-offer spread has been decreasing considerably with the increase in turn 
over in the fonward market. The forward market in our country was active only 
upto 6 months, where two-way quotes were available. With the initiative of 
RBI, the maturity profile has elongated and quotes are now available upto one 
year. But the liquidity of this segment needs to improve. Understandably in 
most markets, where there are restrictions on capital movements, liquidity 
across the spectrum as seen in the developed markets, proves to be difficult in 
early stages of development of the market. 
The liquidity in the Indian fonwards market is mainly for the end of the month 
maturity contracts, where the bid-offer spread is low. Standard maturity 
contracts like for three months and six months are not quoted in the inter bank 
markets. Hence, the cost of entering into a standard maturity contract is much 
higher as compared to a month end contract. 
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The Indian forward market is relatively illiquid for the standard nnaturity 
contracts as most of the contracts are for the month ends only. One of the 
reasons for the market makers' reluctance to offer these standard contracts 
could be the absence of a well-developed term money market. The market 
makers feel that given the future like nature of Indian fonward market, currency 
futures could be allowed. Some of the benefits that may be provided by the 
futures are as follows: -
(a) Currency futures, since they are traded on organized exchanges, also 
confer benefits from concentrating order flow and providing a 
transparent venue for price discovery, while over-the-counter forward 
contracts rely on bilateral negotiations. 
(b) Two characteristics of futures contract - their minimal margin 
requirements and low transaction cost relative to the over-the-counter 
markets strengthen the case for their introduction. 
(c) Credit risks are further mitigated by daily marking to market of all future 
positions with gains and losses paid by each participant to the 
clearinghouse by the end of the trading session. 
(d) Future contracts are standardized using the same delivery dates and 
the same nominal amount of currency units to be traded. 
Currency options 
The Reserve Bank of India has permitted authorized dealers to offer cross 
currency options and Rupee currency options to the corporate clients. Cross 
currency options provide a way of availing of the upside from any currency 
exposure while being protected from the downside on payment of an upfront 
premium. The corporates feel the option premium is currently very high and 
the spread is very wide. Minimum size of the contract is also high at quarter 
million Dollars. At present, activity in this product is limited as these are early 
days of introduction of this product. Increased activity in options can result as 
the corporates start understanding this product better. 
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Currency Swaps 
Another spin-off of the financial reforms and liberalization is the introduction 
of foreign currency to Rupee swaps. Initially, the market was very small and 
the two-way quotes were very wide. The market started developing as more 
players as well as corporates started understanding this product and using 
them to manage their exposures. Corporates started using swaps for hedging 
their currency exposure and to reduce their borrowing cost. RBI tried to 
regulate the market by fixing USD 10 million as the limit for open position on 
the swap book for the authorized dealers. This was raised to USD 25 million 
and then to USD 50 million. The authorized dealers were also allowed the 
use of currency swaps to hedge their asset-liability portfolio. These 
developments are expected to result in increased market activity. The 
corporates feel the international swap dealers' association agreement that 
they have to sign with the Authorized Dealers is too confusing, lengthy and 
has lot of irrelevant clauses. This agreement needs to be made user-friendly 
for the corporates. 
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6.9 Case Study - 1 : Infosys Technologies Limited - Corporate Risk 
IVIanagement 
Introduction 
"One cannot manage change, One can only be ahead of it" 
Peter Drucker 
"Progress always involves risk; you can't steal second base and keep your 
foot on first base" 
Fredrick B Wilcox 
Infosys Technologies: An Exemplar Intangible-Intensive Company 
Infosys was set up in July 1981 by Mr. Narayana Murthy and his associates 
who shared a dream of building a world class IT services organisation. Infosys 
has emerged as a leading global IT services company, headquartered in 
Bangalore, India, with a turnover in excess of $1 billion in 2003-04. It provides 
end-to-end business solutions that leverage technology to enable their clients 
to enhance business performance. Its solutions span the entire software life 
cycle encompassing consulting, design, development, re-engineering, 
maintenance, systems integration, package evaluation, and maintenance. 
Infosys has become an icon of modern India, its achievements are nonpareil. 
No company in India has won so many laurels and awards for its multi-faceted 
accomplishments in so short a time. 
A List of select Awards Received by Infosys Technologies during the year 
2002-03 
> Ranked the best employer in India by Business Today - Hewlett in 
their annual survey. 
> Ranked as the Best Managed Company in India by Asia Money. 
> Received the best Annual Report award of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India for the seventh successive year. 
> Ranked No.1 among Asia's leading companies in India by Far Eastern 
Economic Review 
> Rated the most globally competitive company, 
> Rated the most globally competitive company, most dynamic company, 
most ethical company and best IT company by Business World. 
Stellar Performance 
Set up in July 1981 with a nominal capital of Rs. 10,000, Infosys has achieved 
phenomenal growth in revenues, profit, and market capitalization over time. 
Selective financial data is given below for four years, viz., 1981-1982 (the first 
year of the company's existence), 1993-94 (the year after the company made 
its IPO), 2002-03 and 2003-04 (the last two financial years). 
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Rs. in crore 
Revenues 
Profit after tax from ordinary 
activities 
Net Worth 
Market capitalization 
0.12 
0.04 
0.16 
28.90 
8.09 
28.70 
191.02 
3622.69 
957.93 
2860.67 
26847.33 
4760.89 
1243.47 
3253.43 
32908.69 
From the above data we find that: 
> The CAGR in revenues and profit over 22 years (1981-82 to 2003-04) 
was 62 percent and 60 percent respectively. 
> The CAGR In market capitalization over 10 years (1993-94 to 2003-04) 
was 67 percent. 
> The market value added at the end of 2002-03 was Rs.23986.66 
crores and Rs.29655.26 at the end of 2003-04. 
Thanks to such sterling performance and to the attractive pricing of the IPO 
made in March 1993, investors who participated in the IPO of the company 
earned spectacular returns. An investment of Rs.95 in one share in March 
1993 appreciated to Rs.92,800 by August 2004, thanks to three 1:1 bonus 
issues in 1993, 1997, and 1999 and one 2:1 stock split in 2000 and a three for 
one share held bonus issue in 2004. One share in 1993 became 64 shares in 
2004. An appreciation of Rs.95 to Rs.92,800 over an eleven year period 
means a compounded annual rate of growth of 86.98 percent. There is 
perhaps no parallel to this in Indian capital market history. 
Drivers of Performance 
The outstanding performance of Infosys may be attributed to a number of 
factors. The more important ones are described briefly below: 
Mature Global Delivery IVIodel 
Infosys has pioneered and perfected the off shore development model which 
is very attractive to its clients who are primarily located in the United States, 
Europe, and Japan. 
The advantages of the off shore development model are: (a) A 24-hour work 
schedule that takes advantage of time zone differences between development 
centers in India and client sites, (b) Access to a large pool of highly skilled 
English-speaking IT professionals in India, available at a relatively low cost, 
(c) The ability to accelerate the delivery time of large projects by parallel 
processing of different phases of a project's development, (d) Physical and 
operational separation from all other client projects, providing enhanced 
security for a client's intellectual property. 
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Deep Client Relationships 
Infosys is sharply focused on the needs and preferences of its customers. 
Their tracl< records of delivering high quality solutions across the entire 
software cycle and its strong industry expertise have strengthened its 
relationships with large multi-national corporations. 
Sound Systems and Processes 
Infosys has laid a lot of emphasis on developing sound systems and 
processes in various areas such as marketing, project management, delivery, 
quality, human resources, finance, and technical support. 
Infosys has been successfully assessed at Level 5 of the Integrated Capability 
Maturity Model (SEl - CMMl) developed by the Software Engineering Institute 
(SB!) at Carnegie Mellon University, USA. This is a reflection of the maturity 
and effectiveness of its software processes. The company has also been 
assessed at Level 5 of the People Capability Maturity Model (PCMM), a 
testimony to the strong process orientation in its human resources 
management. 
Conducive Work Environment 
Since the success of Infosys depends on its ability to attract and retain highly 
talented IT professionals, Infosys pays considerable attention to creating a 
quality work environment, imparting training, providing challenging 
assignments, fostering a congenial atmosphere and informal culture, and 
encouraging free flow of ideas. 
Infosys has displayed remarkable foresight in introducing one of the most 
comprehensive stock option plans in India. The plan has been a very effective 
instrument to motivate employees, provide long-term incentives for value 
creation, and induce a sense of ownership among employees. 
Integrated Performance Management 
Infosys has an integrated performance management system that sets 
challenging targets, facilitates objective-driven appraisal, and links the 
variable component of the compensation package to individual unit and 
company performance. All this fosters a culture of high performance work 
ethic. 
Comprehensive Risk Management 
Infosys has a very comprehensive approach to risk management. The thrust 
of its risk management practice is to prevent undue concentration of revenues 
in any one service, client, industry, or geography, hedge against exchange 
rate risk, eschew debt, maintain strong liquidity, comply with all legal and 
statutory requirements, develop strong processes and systems, install proper 
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financial responsibility, and ensure disaster recovery and business continuity 
plans for all the operations. 
Evolved Corporate Governance 
Infosys firmly believes in aligning the interest of managers with shareholders, 
complying with the laws in all countries in which it operates. The Annual 
Report of Infosys provides a wealth of information, much beyond what is 
required statutorily. 
Favourable Tax Environment 
Infosys has benefited from a variety of tax incentives given to software firms in 
India. These include relief from import duties on hardware, a tax exemption for 
income derived from software, and tax holidays provided for companies 
operating in specially designed "Software Technology Parks". 
Management: The Key Force 
Infosys has set an inspiring vision, pursued a well-created strategy of levering 
on the off shore development model, raised capital economically, invested 
judiciously in infrastructure, technology, systems, processes, human 
resources, and brand development, established an effective approach to 
performance management, managed growth effectively, developed a sound 
risk management system, and communicated superbly with investors. 
The outstanding leadership and management of the firm who take a balanced 
approach to the multiple facets of business have driven all this. The cohesive 
leadership provided by the founders who strongly share certain values and 
aspirations, the caliber and talent of its management team, the pattern of 
ownership and control and the organizational architecture that instills a value 
orientation seem to be the foundation for the outstanding performance of this 
jewel of modern India. 
Summary 
> The terms knowledge assets, intellectual capital, and intangible assets 
are used interchangeably. Economists call them knowledge assets; 
management experts refer to them as intellectual capital and 
accountants call them intangible assets or simply intangibles. 
> Firms in sectors such as information technology, biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, and fast moving consumer goods seem to be more 
intangible asset intensive whereas firms in sectors such as oil, 
automobiles, and consumer durables are more tangible asset 
intensive. 
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> The important characteristics or features of intangible assets or 
intangible-intensive firms are as follows: (a) Intangible assets are, in 
general, non-hval in nature, (b) Intangible assets have hazy property 
rights, (c) The investment in intangibles is inherently very risky, (d) 
Intangibles do not generally have organized and competitive markets, 
(e) A very large portion of the value of an intangible-intensive firm is 
accounted for by the future growth value. 
> The implications of an intangible-intensive business for financial 
management are as follows: (a) An intangible-intensive business is a 
high risk-high return proposition, (b) To ensure that an intangible-
intensive firm delivers on its growth expectation, its organizational 
architecture must promote decentralization, encourage cooperative 
endeavour, and sharpen accountability (c) An intangible-intensive firm 
has to rely primarily on equity financing, (d) Meaningful investor 
communication is very important for an intangible-intensive firm. 
> The most important types of intangible assets are: brands, publishing 
rights, intellectual property, and licenses. 
> There are three board approaches to valuing an intangible asset: cost 
approach, market approach and economic approach. Out of these, the 
economic approach is the most widely used. It involves estimating the 
cash flows/earnings associated with the intangible assets and 
capitalizing the same. 
> The outstanding performance of Infosys Technologies Limited may be 
attributed to a number of factors such as a mature global delivery 
model, deep client relationships, sound systems and processes, 
conducive work performance, integrated performance management, 
comprehensive risk management, evolved corporate governance, and 
favourable tax environment. The prime force behind these factors has 
been the outstanding leadership and management of the firm. 
The Information Technology (IT) business has several inherent risks, 
including a dynamic and rapidly changing environment. The evident impact of 
the challenging environment on businesses, over the past few years, bears 
testimony to this. It is indeed during such fimes that a company's ability to 
manage risk is put to test. Infosys has performed better than estimates and 
industry growth rates, even during these tough times. 
Infosys' business model is based on four vital elements - Predictability, 
Sustainability, Profitability and De-risking, which we refer to as our PSPD 
model. The model helps the management analyze the risk-return trade-off 
and effectively evaluate strategic options. In this context, Infosys' 
performance can be attributed, in a significant measure, to its resilient 
business model and its prudent risk management practices. 
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Risk management structure 
The audit committee of tlie board provides the overall direction on the risk 
management policies of the company. The board of directors is responsible 
for monitoring risk levels on various parameters and the management council 
ensures implementation of mitigation measures. The disclosure committee 
monitors the risks periodically. The risk management structure is designed to 
cascade to the line managers so that risks at the transactional level are 
identified and steps are taken to mitigate risk in a decentralized manner. 
Risk management framework 
A comprehensive and integrated risk management framework forms the basis 
of all the de-risking efforts of the company. Prudential norms aimed at limiting 
exposure are an integral part of this framework. Formal reporting and control 
mechanisms ensure timely availability of information and facilitate proactive 
risk management. The framework seeks to address the following risks that 
management believes can be actively addressed through corporate action. 
Environment and market 
1 .Macroeconomic factors 
2.Competition 
S.Concentration of revenues 
3.1 Service offerings 
3.2 Clients 
3.3 Industry 
3.4 Geography 
4. Political environment 
Organization management 
5. Finance 
5.1 Exchange rates 
5.2 Liquidity 
5.3 Leverage 
6. Regulatory and 
legal compliance 
6.1 Contractual 
commitments 
6.2 Statutory 
compliance 
6.3 Conformity with 
local laws 
6.4 Intellectual 
property 
6.5 Immigration 
7. Systems and 
Processes 
7.1 Leadership 
development 
7.2 Human resource 
management 
7.3 Process and project 
management 
7.4 Internal control 
systems 
7.5 Security and 
business continuity 
7.6 Currency of 
technology 
Infosys has insured itself against various types of risks. This includes key 
insurance cover for Directors and Officers (D&O) and cover for professional 
Errors and Omissions (E&O). Further, the company has full insurance cover 
for its entire physical infrastructure. In addition, they have protected their fixed 
costs and have covered against loss of profits. They have also insured 
against other contingencies including coverage for lives of all employees in 
India and abroad, and accident cover for employees. 
Infosys has always sought a comprehensive view to risk management to 
address risks inherent to strategy, operations, finance and compliance, and 
their resulting organizational impact. Over the last fiscal, Infosys made 
improvements in its risk management processes at the corporate level, within 
the business units and made progress in extending the same to its subsidiary 
organizations. This holistic approach provides the assurance that, to the best 
of its capabilities, the organization and all its performing units are identifying. 
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assessing and mitigating risks that could materially impact its performance 
towards the stated objectives. 
Exchange rate fluctuations 
Functional currency of Infosys is the Indian Rupee (except for Infosys, 
Australia and Infosys, China), although a major portion of business is 
transacted in foreign currencies. Last fiscal, Infosys derived its revenues from 
39 countries of which 84.9% were US $ denominated and majority of the 
company's expenses were in the Indian Rupee. The exchange rate between 
the rupee and the dollar has been changing substantially, and the company 
faces the risks associated with exchange rate fluctuations and translation 
effect, wherein the appreciation of the rupee against foreign currency 
adversely impacts its profitability and operating results. 
Infosys' risk management policy ensures that expenses in local currency are 
met through receipts in the same currency. The company seeks to reduce the 
effect of exchange rate fluctuations on operating results by purchasing foreign 
exchange forward contracts to cover a portion of outstanding accounts 
receivable. Contracts in non-US and non-EU regions are in internationally 
tradable currencies so that the company is not exposed to local currencies 
that may have non-tradability risks. The company does not take active trading 
positions in foreign currency markets and operates only to hedge against 
appreciation of rupee during the year. 
Financial reporting risks 
The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, ushered in after the various financial 
reporting debacles in previous 24 months, has served to herald a new era in 
corporate governance enforcement. The CEO and CFO responsibilities, as 
outlined in the Act, seek to make the officers of the company "serve and 
protect' shareholder interests in the companies that they run. Recognizing the 
concerns the Act seeks to address, the Company's directors sought early 
adoption of several of the Act's requirements, well before the prescribed 
mandatory applicability dates in fiscal - 2006. 
The company prepares financial statements in conformity with the US GAAP. 
This requires estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of 
assets and liabilities, disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities on the date 
of the financial statements, and the reported amounts of revenues and 
expenses during the financial reporting period. These estimates and 
assumptions are made based on judgments about carrying values of assets 
and liabilities, which carry inherent reporting risks. Here, the accounting 
policies related to revenue recognition and income tax deserve special 
attention. 
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Change in Hedging Strategy 
The company's revenue recognition norms have been evaluated by experts 
and have been deployed through the company's processes and systems. 
Based on the evaluation of income-tax position and the information presently 
available, the company has adequately covered for probable exposures as of 
March 31, 2004. 
The Rupee's depreciation in the June quarter of 2004 has prompted Infosys to 
change its hedging strategy and the Company is marking to market its 
outstanding positions according to Chief Financial Officer and Director 
(Finance), Mr T V Mohandas Pal. He admitted that the Rupee's depreciation 
had taken Infosys by surprise. "Fortunately, we did not have large positions 
outstanding at the year-end March 2004. In the Indian GAAP (Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles) for June 2004, we have marked to market 
the entire position of $228 million", he said. 
He added, "When you mark to market, because you have sold it fonward at 
the lower rate, you have taken the loss. That loss has been input into the 
accounts. All the losses on the forward cover have been marked to market, at 
45.99 to the dollar. 
Infosys is "cautious" on the Rupee at the moment. "We are cautious right now, 
but we shall look at the markets and make sure our hedging policy actually 
works. We need to reconfigure our policy and take appropriate steps", he 
said. 
Source: (1) Annual Report - 2003 - 04 - Infosys. 
(2) www.moneycontrol.com 
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6.10 Case Study - 2: Orchid Pharmaceuticals &Chemicals Limited 
About orchid: 
Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. is a leading pharmaceutical 
company headquartered in Chennai, India involved in the manufacture of 
cephalosporin and non-cephalosporin bulk actives, formulations and 
nutraceuticals. With exports spanning more than 75 countries, Orchid is the 
largest manufacturer-exporter of cephalosporin bulk actives in India and is 
ranked amongst the Top 5-cephalosporin producers in the world. 
A first generation enterprise founded in 1992 by K Raghavendra Rao, Orchid 
has been recognized as the only company in the Indian Pharmaceutical 
industry to record remarkable growth in less than a decade of inception. 
fVlanufacturing facilities: 
Orchid's world-class manufacturing facilities for bulk actives, including the 
latest USFDA compliant facilities, are located in Alathur, a little away from 
Chennai and in Aurangabad, near Mumbai. Orchid also has dedicated 
manufacturing facilities for nutraceutical bulk active ingredients and 
formulations in Alathur. Orchid's R&D facility located at Sholinganallur in 
Chennai is considered among the most advanced and state-of-the-art center 
for applied research and analytical development. It also houses the newly 
commissioned New Drug Discovery infrastructure and a world-class pre-
clinical toxicology and pharmacology center. 
Orchid has undertaken several initiatives to position itself strategically in the 
evolving global pharmaceutical paradigm. From a core competence in 
manufacture of cephalosporin bulk drugs, Orchid has evolved into a 
composite pharmaceutical company that has distinctly moved up 
the pharmaceutical value chain. 
IVIanagement: 
Orchid acknowledges the fact that apart from its world-class infrastructure and 
technology enhancements, the most valuable resource is its human asset. It 
is the dedication of its people that has helped Orchid transform its dreams and 
ambitions into realities and achievements. 
The Orchid family is now 3000 strong (together with and including all 
divisions) comprising of professionals handpicked from different faculties 
handling an array of diverse operations ranging ft-om R&D, process 
development, production and quality to effluent treatment, utilities, 
maintenance, safety, environment and health. 
203 
Similarly, experienced professionals steer crucial operational aspects like 
marketing, accounts, finance and human resources together with engineering 
and other operational areas. 
The core management team (CMT) responsible for formulating the company's 
growth strategies comprises of innovative, entrepreneurial, and collaborative 
senior management members led by the Founder and Managing Director and 
are responsible for building Orchid from a blueprint project to its current global 
leadership position. 
Collectively, Orchid's team has built the company into a highly respectable 
and admired player in the global Pharmaceutical industry. 
Recognition: 
> CEU Award for Excellence in Exports - Drugs & Pharmaceutical. 
> Trophy for meritorious performance - Exports. 
> First Award for Exports. 
> Industrial Economist Business Excellence Award. 
> Entrepreneur of the year Award - Manufacturing 1999. 
> Dynamic Entrepreneur of the Year Award. 
> Indian Express Young India Business Achiever Award. 
Regulated markets: 
Entry into the regulated markets of Europe and US is a key component of the 
Company's business strategy. The new manufacturing facilities for oral and 
sterile cephalosporin bulk drugs, designed for US FDA compliance, were 
commissioned during the last quarter of the year under review. The state-of -
the-art formulations plant for oral and sterile cephalosporins is also fast 
nearing completion at Irungattukottai, near Chennai. With this, Orchid will 
have unique end-to-end connectivity for servicing the regulated market 
requirements. 
During the year under review, the Company received US FDA certification for 
its flagship product. Cephalexin. Exports of this product to the US market 
have commenced this fiscal. The Company has a structured plan for 
regulatory submissions, inspections and approvals, which will enable a major, 
thrust into advanced markets in the future years. 
Simultaneously, the Company has stepped up efforts to expand into Europe. 
Orchid has three Certificates of Suitability (CoS) from the European 
Directorate of Quality Medicines (EDQM), including the latest CoS received 
for its premium molecule Cefuroxime Axetil. Even as more CoS filings are in 
204 
the pipeline; an inspection by the EDQM of the facilities was done in 
September 2003.. 
Business mission: 
The Active Pharma Ingredients (API) business has taken up for itself three-
business missions: 
> Achieve a major increase in production and sales through new facilities 
and de- bottlenecking. 
> Achieve cost compression through sustained focus on process 
efficiency, yield improvement & solvent recovery. 
> Achieve US FDA certification for all key products, based on new as 
well as existing facilities. 
Similarly, the formulation business is anchored around three critical business 
missions. 
> Achieve a viable, self- sustaining business in domestic and export 
formulations markets. 
> Become a co - marketer of choice for select strategic partners. 
> Lead the US generics effort through the state of art formulations plant 
and series of ANDAs. 
The drug discovery & drug delivery missions are to 
> Develop lead molecules in each of the chosen therapeutic classes 
through phase I and phase II proof of concept human clinical studies. 
> Develop novel drug delivery systems for the chosen cephalosporin 
molecules. 
> Position the drug discovery and delivery infrastructure in the global 
research scenario for strategic partnerships. 
Future outloolc 
As a result of the various initiatives undertaken over the last two years. Orchid 
is poised to enter a new era of growth and profitability. Future growth drivers 
of Orchid will be in terms of entry into the US antibiotics generics business, 
diversified formulations growth covering both domestic and non-regulated 
markets and potential discovery of new drugs by Orchid and its US joint 
venture. 
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These coupled with the manufacturing joint venture in China and focused 
thrust on Russia and Brazil would significantly reinforce Orchid's position in 
the global pharmaceutical industry. Orchid expects robust performance 
growth in the years to come as a result of the multi-pronged business 
strategy. 
Corporate risk management policy: 
The risk management posture differs from company to company. Some 
companies follow active strategy, some may be passive or conservative and 
some may be risk neutral. 
In active strategy the risk management center is a profit center. Such profits 
arise out of active currency trading and have little to do with the core 
business. 
If a company wishes to be neither hurt nor benefit from the financial market 
fluctuations, then the company has a passive approach to risk management. 
They hedge exposure 100% as and when they arise. 
There are some firms that are risk neutral and they follow a selective hedging 
approach. That is, they hedge when the rates are attractive, and leave the 
exposure if the rates are not attractive. 
Orchid belongs to the third category. They are risk neutral. They entered in to 
a swap deal on 11.09.2002 with ABN-AMRO Bank for a one-year maturity 
converting 800 million rupees into US dollars @ Rs.48,52 per dollar at an 
interest rate of 9.78% when the rupee loan was taken at 12.5% from IDBI. On 
23.05.2003, this deal was closed at a rupee-dollar rate of Rs.47.42. The 
Rupee interest plus principal repayment was 900,000,000.00. But the actual 
cash outflow was 871,282,231.38 on account of the swap deal. This deal 
resulted in a profit of nearly Rs.2.87 crores for Orchid. In September 2003, the 
rupee reached the level of Rs.46. If Orchid had continued this transaction till 
September 2003, the expected gain for the company could have been nearly 
Rs.5.63 crores. This is an opportunity loss for the company. The details of the 
swap deal are given in Table - 6.19 & 6.20 belowj^ 
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Table - 6.19 Orchid's deal with ABN-AMRO Bank from 11.09.2002 to 
23.05.2003 
INR PRINCIPAL 
INR/USD 
USD PRINCIPAL 
INR ROI 
USD ROI 
INR INTEREST 
FRA FOR MATURITY 
TOTAL USD ROI 
USD INT. 
TOTAL P + 1 
TOTAL USD = INR 
TOTAL OUTFLOW 
TOTAL INFLOW 
NETT FLOW 
800,000,000.00 
48.52 
16,488,046.17 
12.50% 
9.78% 
100,000,000.00 
1.50000% 
11.28% 
1,885,682.88 
18,373,729.05 
47.42 
871,282,231.38 
900,000,000.00 
28,717,768.62 
Table - 6.20: Orchid's deal with ABN-AMRO Bank from 11.09.2002 to 
actual date of maturity 11.09.2003 
Proposed for Maturity 
INR PRINCIPAL 
INR/USD 
USD PRINCIPAL 
INR ROI 
USD ROI 
INR INTEREST 
FRA FOR MATURITY 
TOTAL USD ROI 
USD INT. 
TOTAL P + 1 
TOTAL USD = INR 
TOTAL OUTFLOW 
TOTAL INFLOW 
NETT FLOW 
800,000,000.00 
48.52 
16,488,046.17 
12.50% 
9.78% 
100,000,000.00 
1.30% 
11.08% 
1,852,248.79 
18,340,294.95 
46.00 
843,653,567.83 
900,000,000.00 
56,346,432.17 
Source: 1. Annual Report - 2003-04: Orchid. 
3. Personal Interviews with Company Managers. 
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6.11 Summary of the cases 
Case Study 1: Infosys Technologies Limited lias a very good risk 
management structure. Inspite of their very good risk management 
framework, the Rupee's sudden depreciation in the June quarter caught them 
by surprise and they had to change their hedging strategy. Infosys had 
covered their June quarter receivables through fonward contracts around the 
March 2004 rate of Rs.43.40 per US Dollar. They had to book losses on the 
forward cover by marking to market the forward cover contracts at the rate of 
Rs.45.99 to the Dollar for the entire position of $228 millions as the Rupee 
started depreciating from the March, 2004 level of 43.40 to 45.99 by June, 
2004. 
Case Study 2: Orchid Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited belongs to the 
risk neutral category and it follows a selective hedging approach to its foreign 
exchange risk management. They entered in to a swap deal on 11* 
September 2002 with ABN-AMRO Bank for a one-year maturity converting 
800 million rupees into US dollars @ Rs.48.52 per dollar at an interest rate of 
9.78% when the rupee loan was taken at 12.5% from IDBI. On 23"^  May 2003, 
this deal was closed at a rupee-dollar rate of Rs.47.42. The Rupee interest 
plus principal repayment was Rs.900,000,000.00. But the actual cash outflow 
was Rs.871,282,231.38 on account of the swap deal. This deal resulted in a 
profit of nearly Rs.2.87 crores for Orchid. In September 2003, the rupee 
reached the level of Rs.46. If Orchid had continued this transaction till 
September 2003, the expected gain for the company could have been nearly 
Rs.5.63 crores. This is an opportunity loss for the company. 
In both cases, the opportunity loss was due to the inability of the companies to 
forecast the exchange rates. 
6.12 Summary of the questionnaire based survey findings 
The survey reports the results of the empirical study into the foreign exchange 
risk management practices of 54 responding companies. Of the 125 
companies that were addressed, a total of 54 responded to the questionnaire. 
The managers of these companies were asked about the mode of exposure to 
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foreign exchange, about their risk management strategies, the risl< 
management products that they were using and their reasons for using the 
same and if they were not using a particular product, their reasons for not 
using the same. The managers were asked to quantify their uncovered 
exposure. They were also asked how they forecast the exchange rate. The 
results can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Most of the firms (51.9%) had exposure to foreign currency on account 
of all of imports, exports and foreign currency loans. 
(ii) A sizeable majority of the firms (83.3%) adopted a selective hedging 
strategy based on case-to-case and time-to-time decisions. 
(iii) Overwhelming majority of the companies (92.6%) did not forecast 
exchange rates on their own. About 77.8% of the responding 
companies relied on bankers' opinion and experts' opinion for taking a 
view on the exchange rates. 
(iv) Only a small minority of firms (5.6%) does not hedge its foreign 
exchange risks and only a few companies (27.8%) hedge their 
exposure completely. 
(v) A majority of the corporate managers (85.2%) feels that the exchange 
rates will move in the range of Rs.45 to Rs.46.5 per Dollar upto March 
2005. 
The companies cited the following reasons for using fonwards for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure:-
(1) Simple and easy to understand 
(2) Liquid and available all the time 
(3) Transparent 
(4) Cost effective 
(5) Useful in targeting a budgeted cost 
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The companies cited ttie following reasons for using options for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure:-
(1) Strike price and premium are attractive 
(2) Flexible with room to manoeuvre 
(3) Gives right without obligation 
(4) Liquid and available 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using options for hedging 
their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Option premium is high 
(2) Minimum contract size is high 
(3) Companies are not yet comfortable with the product 
(4) Fear of manipulation 
(5) Option quotes favour the banks only 
(6) Absence of dynamic quotations 
The companies cited the following reasons for using swaps for hedging their 
foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Interest rate reduction 
(2) Cost effective 
(3) Transparent 
The companies cited the following reasons for not using swaps for hedging 
their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) The international swap dealers association agreement is too confusing 
(2) The agreement has irrelevant clauses 
(3) It is too lengthy 
6.13 Summary of the views expressed by Corporate Chief Finance Officers, 
Banl<ers and Regulators 
The Indian foreign exchange derivatives market is still in a nascent stage of 
development but offers tremendous growth potential. The development of a 
vibrant foreign exchange derivatives market in India would critically depend on 
the growth in the underlying spot/fonward markets, growth in the Rupee 
derivative markets along with the evolution of a supporting regulatory 
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structure. Factors such as market liquidity, corporate investor behaviour, 
regulatory structure and tax laws will have a heavy bearing on the behaviour 
of market variables in this market. Increased convertibility on the capital 
account would accelerate the process of integration of Indian financial 
markets with international markets. Some of the necessary preconditions to 
this as suggested by the Tarapore Committee are already met. Introduction of 
derivative products tailored to specific corporate requirements would enable 
corporates to completely focus on their core businesses, de-risking the 
currency and interest rate risks while allowing them to gain from the financial 
markets. Increased convertibility on the Rupee and regulatory impetus for new 
products should see a host of innovative products and structures tailored to 
business needs. The possibilities are many and include currency futures. 
Rupee forward rate agreements. Rupee and cross currency swaptions as well 
as structures composed of the above to address the needs of corporates. A 
further development in the derivatives market could also see derivative 
products linked to commodities, weather, etc., which would add great value in 
an economy where substantial section is still agrarian and dependent on the 
vagaries of the monsoon. 
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CHAPTER - 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter highlights the conclusion of the study and the 
recommendations that are put-fonward. For this purpose, the following 
scheme of presentation of this chapter has been adopted. 
(i) Conclusions related with the recommendations of Tarapore 
Committee on Capital Account Convertibility, its sequencing and 
present status of implementation in India. 
(ii) Identification of macroeconomic factors affecting the exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
(iii) Exchange rate volatility and its forecasting 
(iv) Implications of exchange rate management for Indian 
companies 
7.1 Summary of major pre-Conditions of Tarapore Committee and the 
current position as of November 2004 
1. Gross fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to come down from a budgeted 
4.5% in 1997-98 to 3.5% in 1999-2000. In November 2004, it was 
still at 5%. 
2. A consolidated sinking fund has to be set up to meet the 
Government's debt repayment needs; to be financed by the 
increases in RBI's profit transfer to the Government and 
disinvestments proceeds. As of now, it is not yet done. Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2003 has been passed to reduce government's 
borrowings. 
3. Transparent and globally comparable procedures for fiscal 
accounting need to be implemented. 
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4. Inflation rate should remain between an average 3.5% for the three-
year period 1997-2000. It was around 7.5% in November 2004. 
5. Gross NPAs of the public sector banking system needs to be 
brought down from the present 13.7% to 5% by 2000 and at the 
same time, average effective CRR needs to be brought down from 
the 10% level to 3% level. The Gross NPAs to advances of public 
sector banks as of 2003 are at 9.4% and Gross NPAs to total 
assets of the public sector banks are at 4.2%. The net NPAs to total 
advances of public sector banks as of 2003 are at 4.5% and net 
NPAs to total assets of the public sector banks are at 1.9% (RBI 
Annual Report, 2003). 
6. RBI should have a Monitoring Exchange Rate Band of plus/minus 
5% around a neutral Real Effective Exchange Rate. RBI should be 
transparent about the changes in REER. Currently, RBI is tracking 
the REER, but it does not have any target rate in mind or any band 
within which the rates should move. 
7. External sector policies should be designed to increase current 
receipts to GDP ratio and bring down the debt-servicing ratio from 
25% to 20%. This has been achieved. Current receipts to GDP ratio 
is 18.7% and debt service ratio is at 14.7%. 
8. Indicators should be used for evaluating adequacy of foreign 
exchange reserves to safeguard against any contingency. Plus law 
should prescribe a minimum net foreign asset to currency ratio of 
40%. Currently, our foreign exchange reserves are about $126 
billion as of November 2004 and they are quite adequate. Foreign 
asset to currency ratio is more than adequate at 130%. 
213 
7.2 Identification of IVIacroeconomic Factors affecting Exciiange Rates 
The Management of the external sector has been one of the success 
stories of India in the last decade. The country has completed the first 
step towards full-float of the Rupee by allowing Foreign Direct 
Investment and Foreign Institutional Investment and the investors can 
bring in and take out money from the country. The second stage of 
allowing companies and individuals to borrow and invest in Foreign 
Exchange has been initiated but not completed in full. The country has 
comfortable Foreign Exchange Reserves (126 billion Dollars as of 
November 2004) and a healthy Balance of Payments situation. 
India needs to bring down the gross fiscal deficit to GDP Ratio ft"om the 
present 5% to 3.5%. Infiation should be contained fi-om the current 
7.5% to 3.5%. GDP should grow consistently at a growth ratio of 8% to 
10%. If the above are achieved, India will be ready for full convertibility 
of the capital account. Based on the recommendations made by the 
Tarapore Committee and the analysis made, the following 9 factors, 
which are very important for capital account convertibility and which 
have influence on the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar 
are identified as the Balance of Payments position, Inflation, Bank rate. 
Fiscal deficit. Gross Domestic Product, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 
External Debt, Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Institutional 
Investment and US Federal Interest Rate. 
7.3 Exchange rate volatility 
The daily exchange rates of the Rupee against the US Dollar from 
January 1973 to November 2004 were studied and it was found that 
the Rupee exchange rates have followed a linear depreciating trend 
fi-om 1973 to June 2002. From July 2002, they have turned volatile. 
Monte Carlo simulation results show that the exchange rate of the 
Rupee against the Dollar is volatile and the rate is most likely to be in 
the range of Rs.44 per Dollar to Rs.47 per Dollar for the year ending 
March 2005. 
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7.4 Forecasting of Exchange Rate 
1. The relationship between the exchange rate of the Rupee 
against the Dollar and the nine-macroeconomic variables 
identified on Capital Account Convertibility has been studied. 
The univariate analysis rejected the null hypothesis for eight out 
of nine variables. Hence, it was found that there is a relationship 
between bank rate, balance of payment, external debt, FDI and 
FN, Foreign Exchange Reserves, GDP, Gross Fiscal Deficit, 
Inflation and the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar. 
Only in the case of US Federal Interest Rate and the Exchange 
Rate of the Rupee against the Dollar, the null hypothesis of no 
linear relationship between the two variables is accepted at 5% 
level of significance. However, it is significant at 8.55% level 
based on the "P" value given in the summary output. In other 
words, if we increase the level of significance to 8.55% then the 
null hypothesis is rejected and there is a relationship between 
the exchange rate of the Rupee against the Dollar and the US 
Federal Interest Rate. 
2. Multivariate analysis has been used for ail the nine 
macroeconomic variables and it was found that there is a very 
strong linear relationship between the dependent variable 
(exchange rate of Rupee against Dollar) and the nine 
independent variables (bank rate, balance of payment, external 
debt, FDI and FN, Foreign Exchange Reserves, GDP, Gross 
Fiscal Deficit, Inflation and US Federal Interest Rate). The 
statistical validity test ANOVA also ovenwhelmingly rejects the 
null hypothesis of no linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the set of independent variables already mentioned 
above. Then six of the significant independent variables have 
been selected, using the "P" (Probability significance) value. 
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They are external debt, foreign exchange reserves, GDP, US 
Federal Interest Rate, Bank Rate and Gross Fiscal Deficit. 
Multivariate analysis using the six significant variables found that 
the results are equally good and the differences are only 
marginal in the correlation value, r^  value and the adjusted r^  
value. 
The forecast of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar based on all the nine variables using the above 
multivariate regression model comes to Rs.44.55 per Dollar for 
March 2005. 
The forecast of the exchange rate of the Rupee against the 
Dollar based on the six significant variables using the 
multivariate regression model come to Rs.45.91 per Dollar for 
March 2005. 
The forecast of the exchange rates based on time series 
regression analysis was made. It was found that this method of 
forecasting showed a linear depreciating trend even when the 
Rupee was appreciating and hence we found it to be not 
reliable. 
The forecast of the exchange rates based on exponential 
smoothing method taking the monthly data and the yearly data 
was also made and it was found the forecast exchange rate per 
Dollar to be in the range of Rs.44.10 Per Dollar to Rs.44.17 per 
Dollar from December 2004 to March 2005. 
The forecast of the exchange rate based on the monthly moving 
average method and the yearly moving average method was 
made and it is in the range of Rs.44.63 per Dollar to Rs.43.70 
per Dollar. 
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Based on the various techniques of forecasting, the exchange 
rate of the Rupee against the Dollar is expected to be in the 
range of Rs.43.70 per Dollar to Rs.45.91 per Dollar during 
December 2004 to March 2005. The forecast rates vary due to 
the application of different methods of calculation. 
7.5 Summary of the questionnaire based survey findings 
The survey reports the results of the empirical study into the foreign 
exchange risk management practices of 54 responding companies. Of 
the 125 companies that were addressed, a total of 54 responded to the 
questionnaire. The managers of these companies were asked about the 
mode of exposure to foreign exchange, about their risk management 
strategies, the risk management techniques that they were using and 
their reasons for using the same and if they were not using a particular 
technique, their reasons for not using the same. The managers were 
asked to quantify their uncovered exposure. They were also asked how 
they forecast the exchange rate. 
7.5.1 The results can be summarized as follows: 
1. Most of the firms (51.9%) had exposure to foreign currency on 
account of all of imports, exports and foreign currency loans. 
2. A sizeable majority of the firms (83.3%) adopted a selective 
hedging strategy based on case-to-case and time-to-time 
decisions. 
3. Overwhelming majority of the companies (92.6%) did not 
forecast exchange rates on their own. About 77.8% of the 
responding companies relied on bankers' opinion and experts' 
opinion for taking a view on the exchange rates. 
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4. Only a small minority of firms (5.6%) does not hedge its foreign 
exchange risks and only a few companies (27.8%) hedge their 
exposure completely. 
5. A majority of the corporate managers (85.2%) feels that the 
exchange rates will move in the range of Rs.45 to Rs.46.5 per 
Dollar upto March 2005. 
7.5.2 The companies cited the following reasons for using forwards for 
hedging their foreign exchange exposure:-
(1) Simple and easy to understand 
(2) Liquid and available all the time 
(3) Transparent 
(4) Cost effective 
(5) Useful in targeting a budgeted cost 
7.5.3 The companies cited the following reasons for using options for 
hedging their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Strike price and premium are attractive 
(2) Flexible with room to manoeuvre 
(3) Gives right without obligation 
(4) Liquid and available 
7.5.4 The companies cited the following reasons for not using options 
for hedging their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Option premium is high 
(2) Minimum contract size is high 
(3) Companies are not yet comfortable with the product 
(4) Fear of manipulation 
(5) Option quotes favour the banks only 
(6) Absence of dynamic quotations 
7.5.5 The companies cited the following reasons for using swaps for 
hedging their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) Interest rate reduction 
(2) Cost effective 
(3) Transparent 
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7.5.6 The companies cited the following reasons for not using swaps 
for hedging their foreign exchange exposure: -
(1) The international swap dealers association agreement is too 
confusing 
(2) The agreement has irrelevant clauses 
(3) It is too lengthy 
7.6 Summary of the views expressed by Corporate Chief Finance 
Officers, Bankers and Regulators: 
The foreign exchange derivative products that are available in the 
Indian financial markets are forwards, options and currency swaps. 
Rupee forwards 
An important segment of the foreign exchange derivatives market in 
India is the Rupee forward contract. This market is growing rapidly with 
an increased participation from the corporates and banks. Till February 
1992, forward contracts were permitted only against trade related 
exposures and these contracts could not be cancelled except where 
the underlying transactions failed to materialize. In March 1992, in 
order to provide operational freedom to corporates, unrestricted 
booking and cancellation of forward contracts for all genuine 
exposures, whether trade related or not, were permitted. Due to the 
Asian currency crisis, this freedom to rebook the cancelled contracts 
was suspended in 1998, which has been relaxed for the exporters in 
2002 and for importers in 2004. 
The liquidity in the Indian fonward market has been steadily improving 
and the bid-offer spread has been decreasing considerably with the 
increase in turn over in the forward market. The forward market in our 
country is active only upto 6 months, where two-way quotes are 
available. With the initiative of RBI, the maturity profile has elongated 
and quotes are now available upto one year. But the liquidity of this 
segment needs to improve. Understandably in most markets, where 
there are restrictions on capital movements, liquidity across the 
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spectrum as seen in the developed markets, proves to be difficult in 
early stages of development of the market. 
The liquidity in the Indian forwards market is mainly for the end of the 
month maturity contracts, where the bid-offer spread is low. Standard 
maturity contracts like, for three months and six months, are not 
quoted in the inter bank markets. Hence, the cost of entering into a 
standard maturity contract is much higher as compared to a month end 
contract. 
The Indian fon/vard market is relatively illiquid for the standard maturity 
contracts as most of the contracts are for the month ends only. One of 
the reasons for the market makers' reluctance to offer these standard 
contracts could be the absence of a well-developed term money 
market. The market makers feel that given the future like nature of 
Indian forward market, currency futures could be allowed. Some of the 
benefits that may be provided by the futures are as follows: -
a) Currency futures, since they are traded on organized 
exchanges, also confer benefits from concentrating order flow 
and providing a transparent venue for price discovery, while 
over-the-counter fonward contracts rely on bilateral negotiations. 
b) Two characteristics of futures contract - their minimal margin 
requirements and low transaction cost relative to the over-the-
counter markets strengthen the case for their introduction. 
c) Credit risks are further mitigated by daily marking to market of all 
future positions with gains and losses paid by each participant to 
the clearinghouse by the end of the trading session. 
d) Future contracts are standardized using the same delivery dates 
and the same nominal amount of currency units to be traded. 
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Currency options 
The Reserve Bank of India has permitted authorized dealers to offer 
cross currency options and Rupee currency options to the corporate 
clients. Cross currency options provide a way of availing of the upside 
from any currency exposure while being protected from the downside 
on payment of an upfront premium. The corporates feel the option 
premium is currently very high and the spread is very wide. Minimum 
size of the contract is also high at quarter million Dollars. At present, 
activity in this product is limited as it is in its early stage of introduction. 
Increased activity in options can result as the corporates start 
understanding this product better. 
Currency swaps 
Another spin-off of the financial reforms and liberalization is the 
introduction of foreign currency to Rupee swaps. Initially, the market 
was very small and the two-way quotes were very wide. The market 
started developing as more players as well as corporates started 
understanding this product and using them to manage their exposures. 
Corporates started using swaps for hedging their currency exposure 
and to reduce their borrowing cost. RBI tried to regulate the market by 
fixing USD 10 million as the limit for open position on the swap book for 
the authorized dealers. This was raised to USD 25 million and then to 
USD 50 million. The authorized dealers were also allowed the use of 
currency swaps to hedge their asset-liability portfolio. These 
developments are expected to result in increased market activity. The 
corporates feel the international swap dealers' association agreement, 
which they have to sign with the Authorized Dealers, at the time of 
entering into a swap deal, is too confusing, lengthy and has lot of 
irrelevant clauses. This agreement needs to be made user-friendly for 
the corporates. 
221 
7.7 Summary of the cases 
Case Study 1: Infosys Technologies Limited has a very good risk 
management structure. Inspite of their very good risk management 
framework, the Rupee's sudden depreciation in the quarter ending 
June 2004 caught them by surprise and they had to change their 
hedging strategy. Infosys had covered their June quarter end 
receivables through fonward contracts around the March 2004 rate of 
Rs.43.40 per US Dollar. They had to book losses on the fonward cover 
by marking to market the forward cover contracts at the rate of 
Rs.45.99 to the Dollar for the entire position of $228 millions as the 
Rupee started depreciating from the March, 2004 level of Rs.43.40 to 
Rs.45.99 by June, 2004. 
Case Study 2: Orchid Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited belongs 
to the risk neutral category and follows a selective hedging approach to 
their foreign exchange risk management. They entered in to a swap 
deal on 11"^ September 2002 with ABN-AMRO Bank for a one-year 
maturity converting 800 million rupees into US dollars @ Rs.48.52 per 
dollar at an interest rate of 9.78% when the rupee loan was taken at 
12.5% from IDBI. On 23"^  May 2003, this deal was closed at a rupee-
dollar rate of Rs.47.42. The Rupee interest plus principal repayment 
was Rs.900,000,000.00. But the actual cash outflow was 
Rs.871,282,231.38 on account of the swap deal. This deal resulted in a 
profit of nearly Rs.2.87 crores for Orchid. In September 2003, the 
rupee reached the level of Rs.46. If Orchid had continued this 
transaction till September 2003, the expected gain for the company 
could have been nearly Rs.5.63 crores. This is an opportunity loss for 
the company. 
In both cases, the opportunity loss was due to the inability of the 
companies to forecast the exchange rates. 
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7.8 Recommendations for the Companies 
The study has amply demonstrated the volatility in the exchange rate of 
the Rupee against the Dollar. From January 1973 to June 2002, the 
Rupee depreciated steadily from the level of Rs.8.02 to a Dollar to 
Rs.49.07 to a Dollar. From June 2002, it appreciated steadily till March 
2004 to a level of Rs.43.40. From April 2004 again it has started 
depreciating and reached a level of Rs.46.16 end of September 2004. 
By end of November 2004, it has again reached a level of Rs.44.75. 
From 2002 to 2004, there is lot of volatility in the exchange rate 
movement and the trend is no more unidirectional. This calls for 
forecasting of exchange rates with emphasis on various factors 
affecting the exchange rates and continuous monitoring of the 
exposure. Prior to the volatile phase in the exchange rates, corporates 
used to hedge their exposure on imports, interest payments and loan 
repayments and leave their export receivables un-hedged because of 
the unidirectional movement of the Rupee-Dollar exchange rates. The 
current scenario calls for active risk management on the part of the 
fund managers. They have to make effective use of currency forwards, 
currency options and swaps. These products are now freely available, 
thanks to the policy changes announced by the Reserve Bank of India. 
For effective use of these products, corporates need to forecast the 
exchange rates based on the macroeconomic factors that affect the 
rates. Based on the forecasting models and views from the corporate 
finance heads, bankers and regulators, we have arrived at a range of 
Rs.43.70 to Rs.45.91 for the Rupee - Dollar exchange rates for the 
year ending March 2005. Corporates should cover their export 
receivables at the higher end of the range (Rs.45.91) and cover their 
payables on account of imports, interest payments and repayment of 
loans at the lower end of the range (Rs.43.70). They should constantly 
watch the exchange rate movement and take the above steps when 
the opportunity presents itself. 
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7.9 Recommendations for the Regulators and the Government 
The Indian foreign exciiange derivatives market is still in a nascent 
stage of development but offers tremendous growth potential. The 
development of a vibrant foreign exchange derivatives market in India 
would critically depend on the growth in the underlying spot/forward 
markets, growth in the Rupee derivative markets along with the 
evolution of a supporting regulatory structure. Factors such as market 
liquidity, corporate investor behaviour, regulatory structure and tax laws 
will have a significant bearing on the behaviour of market variables in 
this market. Increased convertibility on the capital account would 
accelerate the process of integration of Indian financial markets with 
international markets. Some of the necessary preconditions to this, as 
suggested by the Tarapore Committee, are already met. Introduction of 
derivative products, tailored to specific corporate requirements, would 
enable corporates to completely focus on their core businesses, de-
risking the currency and interest rate risks while allowing them to gain 
from the financial markets. Increased convertibility on the Rupee and 
regulatory impetus for new products should see a host of innovative 
products and structures tailored to business needs. The possibilities are 
many and include currency futures, Rupee fonward rate agreements. 
Rupee and cross currency swaptions as well as structures composed of 
the above to address the needs of corporates. A further development in 
the derivatives market could also see derivative products linked to 
commodities, weather etc., which would add great value in an economy 
where substantial section is still agrarian and dependent on the 
vagaries of the monsoon. 
7.10 Direction for future Research 
This study has revealed interesting insights into the fascinating worid of 
foreign exchange markets and exchange rate management. This study 
has taken only two currencies namely; the Rupee and the Dollar. 
Similar studies can be taken up against other currencies like Euro, 
Pound and Yen. 
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(i) With 31 countries adopting Euro as their national currency, it will 
be interesting to study the Euro - Dollar exchange rate 
behaviour in the immediate future. 
(ii) This study is based on 54 companies, which are predominantly 
Chennai based. The scope of the study can be enlarged by 
taking sample Companies on an all India basis. 
(iii) Conducting a focus group discussion involving CFOs that would 
shed light on certain important underlying dimensions can 
further delineate the study. These dimensions and their 
ramifications cannot be brought about by one to one discussion 
with experts because there is no interaction amongst experts. 
In the focus group discussion, the collective synergy of these 
experts will give rise to a number of useful hypotheses. These 
hypotheses could be tested at a macro level by conclusive 
studies. Needless to mention here that the audience for the 
focus group discussion must form a homogenous group and 
screened before they are invited for the discussion. 
(iv) Advanced econometric models of forecasting could be 
undertaken by making available a large database. These 
models would include Box and Jenkin (Johnston, 1972; Greene, 
2000; Ramu Ramanathan, 2002), ARIMA (Auto Regressive 
Moving Average) and Adaptive Filtering. 
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Appendix 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name of the Company: 
Name of the Person: 
Designation: 
1. Your exposure to foreign currency is on account of 
a) Imports 
b) Exports 
c) Foreign Currency Loans 
d) All the above 
2. How do you manage this exposure? 
a) Aggressive (active management through treasury department) 
b) Passive (immediate forward cover) 
c) On a case to case and time to time basis 
3. What risk management products you are using currently to manage 
your currency risk? 
a) Fonwards 
b) Options 
c) Swaps 
d) All the above 
e) Fonwards and Options 
f) Fon/vards and Swaps 
4. If you are using fonwards, please state the reasons for using fonwards. 
a) It is simple and easy to understand 
b) It is liquid and available 
c) It is transparent 
d) It is cost effective 
e) Useful in targeting budgeted cost 
f) All the above 
g) Others 
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5. If you are using options, please give the reasons for using options. 
a) Strike and premium is attractive 
b) It is liquid and available 
c) Flexible with room to manoeuvre 
d) It is cost effective 
e) Gives right without obligation 
f) Any other reason 
g) All the above 
h) Not using 
6. If you are using swaps, please give the reasons for using swaps. 
a) It is simple and easy to understand 
b) It is liquid and available 
c) it is transparent 
d) It is cost effective 
e) Interest rate reduction 
f) All the above 
g) Not using 
7. If you are not using forwards, please give reasons. 
8. If you are not using options, please give reasons. 
a) Premium is high 
b) Minimum contract size is high 
c) Fear of manipulation 
d) Not yet comfortable with the product 
e) Option quotes favour banks only 
f) Absence of dynamic option quotes 
g) All the above 
h) Not applicable 
9. If you are not using swaps, please give reasons. 
a) ISDA agreement is too confusing 
b) It has irrelevant clauses and difficult to read and understand 
c) Not applicable 
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10. What percentage of your exposure mostly remains uncovered at any 
point of time? 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
Nil 
Upto 25% 
Upto 50% 
Upto 75% 
Upto 100% 
11. Are you forecasting exchange rates? If yes, how? 
12. If you are not forecasting exchange rates, then do you rely on 
a) Bankers' opinion 
b) Experts' opinion 
c) Combination of both 
13. What is your opinion on Rupee-Dollar movement by the end of March 
2005? 
14. Information about your company: 
a) Type of business 
b) Paid-up Capital 
Thank you. 
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